Justice, Political Liberalism, and Utilitarianism: Themes from Harsanyi and Rawls

Cover
Half-title
Title
Copyright
Contents
Preface
List of Contributors
1 Introduction
	1.1 Themes from Rawls
		1.1.1 Harsanyi on Rawls
		1.1.2 Liberal Egalitarian Approaches to Personal Responsibility
		1.1.3 Arneson on Personal Responsibility
		1.1.4 Griffin on Moral Intuition
	1.2 Harsanyi's Impartial Observer and Social Aggregation Theorems
		1.2.1 Ordinal and Cardinal Utility
		1.2.2 Harsanyi's Impartial Observer and Social Aggregation Theorems
		1.2.3 The Sen--Weymark Critique
		1.2.4 Roemer on the Sen--Weymark Critique
		1.2.5 Social Welfare Functionals and Welfarism
		1.2.6 Blackorby, Donaldson, and Weymark on Social Aggregation under Uncertainty
		1.2.7 D'Aspremont and Mongin on Welfarism and Social Aggregation
		1.2.8 Hild, Jeffrey, and Risse on Ex Ante versus Ex Post Social Aggregation
	1.3 Goodness and Well-Being
		1.3.1 Broome on the Coherence of Preference-Based Utilitarianism
		1.3.2 Sugden on a Common Currency of Advantage
		1.3.3 Fleurbaey and Maniquet on Fair Social Orderings
		1.3.4 Barry on Want Satisfaction
	1.4 Sharing the Gains from Social Cooperation
		1.4.1 Naturalistic versus Normative Theories
		1.4.2 Game Theory
		1.4.3 Binmore on Natural Justice
		1.4.4 Skyrms on the Evolutionary Viability of Fairness Norms
		1.4.5 McClennen on the Use of Cooperative Dispositions as a Coordinating Device
	1.5 Rights and Liberties
		1.5.1 Pettit on Republicanism
		1.5.2 Riley on Rule Utilitarianism and Liberal Priorities
	1.6 Concluding Remarks
	References
PART ONE THEMES FROM RAWLS
	2 Rawls's Theory of Justice
		2.1 What Choices People Would Make in Ignorance of Their Own Personal Interests
		2.2 The Maximin Principle
		2.3 Other Absolute-Priority Principles in Rawls's Theory
		2.4 Rawls's Attempt to Deny Moral Credit to Many People Performing Valuable Services to Society
		2.5 Some Comments on Rawls's Argument
		2.6 Rawls's Conception of Justice and Social Policy
		2.7 Free Will and Moral Responsibility
		2.8 Another Interpretation of Free Will: The Bearer's Responsibility View
		References
	3 Rawls and Responsibility
		3.1 Rawls on Deservingness and Responsibility
		3.2 The Canonical Moment Version of Rawlsian Justice
		3.3 Responsibility for Voluntary Choices is Problematic
		3.4 Responsibility for Ends Reconsidered
		3.5 Joint Responsibility on the Part of Individual and Society for Individual Ends
		3.6 Effectively Equivalent Options
		3.7 AreWe Responsible At Most for What Lies Within Our Control?
		3.8 The Hybrid Proposal
		3.9 Bert’s Case
		3.10 Two Rawlsian Rejoinders
	4 Improving Our Ethical Beliefs
		4.1 Piecemeal Appeal to Intuition
		4.2 Purist Views
		4.3 Have We Been too Hard on Intuitions?
		4.4 The Coherence Theory
		4.5 A Coherence Theory for Ethics
		4.6 What We Need
PART TWO Harsanyi's Impartial Observer and Social Aggregation Theorems
	5 Harsanyi's Impartial Observer Is Not a Utilitarian
		5.1 Introduction
		5.2 Harsanyi's Argument
		5.3 Why the IO Is Not a Utilitarian
		5.4 The Analogy With Individual Choice
		5.5 Conclusion
		References
	6 Social Aggregation and the Expected Utility Hypothesis
		6.1 Introduction
		6.2 State-Contingent Alternatives and Social Evaluation Functionals
		6.3 Interpersonal Utility Comparisons and Information Partitions
		6.4 Expected Utility Theory for State-Contingent Alternatives
		6.5 Welfarism
		6.6 Single-Profile Aggregation
		6.7 Multiprofile Aggregation
		6.8 Single-Information-Set Aggregation
		6.9 Single-Preference-Profile Aggregation
		6.10 Concluding Remarks
		References
	7 A Welfarist Version of Harsanyi’s Aggregation Theorem
		7.1 Introduction
		7.2 A SWFL Version of the Aggregation Theorem for a Single Profile of VNM Preferences
		7.3 A Welfarist Version of the Aggregation Theorem
		7.4 Concluding Remarks: More on SWFLs and Cardinality
		References
	8 Preference Aggregation after Harsanyi
		8.1 Introduction
		8.2 Harsanyi's Utilitarianism
		8.3 Aggregation Ex Ante
		8.4 Aggregation Ex Post
		References
PART THREE GOODNESS AND WELL-BEING
	9 Can There Be a Preference-Based Utilitarianism?
		9.1 Introduction
		9.2 Uncertainty
		9.3 Additivity
		9.4 Preferencism as an Account of Individual Good
		9.5 Ideal Preferencism
		9.6 A Quantitative Concept of Good
		9.7 The Expectational Concept
		9.8 Interpersonal Comparability
		9.9 Evolutionary Equilibrium
		9.10 Conclusion
		References
	10 A Common Currency of Advantage
		10.1 The Common Currency of Pleasure
		10.2 Harsanyi, Imaginative Empathy, and Rational Preference
		10.3 Rawls and Primary Goods
		10.4 Money Metrics
		10.5 An Impersonal Money-Metric of Opportunity
		10.6 Conclusion
		References
	11 Utilitarianism versus Fairness in Welfare Economics
		11.1 Introduction
		11.2 Justifying Social Orderings
			11.2.1 Ordinalism versus Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility
			11.2.2 Social Rankings versus Allocation Rules
		11.3 Constructing Social Orderings
			11.3.1 Direct Inquiry
			11.3.2 Rationalizing Allocation Rules
		11.4 Concluding Comments
		References
	12 Rationality and Want-Satisfaction
		12.1 Introduction
		12.2 Rawls's Objection
		12.3 Elster's Objection
		12.4 Conclusion
PART FOUR: SHARING THE GAINS FROM SOCIAL COOPERATION
	13 Naturalizing Harsanyi and Rawls
		13.1 Introduction
		13.2 Teleological Utilitarianism
		13.3 Nonteleological Moral Theories
			13.3.1 Harsanyi’s Nonteleological Utilitarianism
			13.3.2 Rawls’ Model
			13.3.3 Kantian Foundations for Interpersonal Comparison
		13.4 The Original Position as a Natural Norm
			13.4.1 Interpersonal Comparison in the Medium Run
			13.4.2 Morality as a Short-Run Phenomenon
		13.5 Reform
		References
	14 The Social Contract Naturalized
		14.1 Introduction
		14.2 Distributive Justice, Symmetry
		14.3 Evolution of Justice I
		14.4 Distributive Justice, Asymmetry
		14.5 Evolution of Justice II
		14.6 Conclusion
			Postscript July 2006
		References
	15 An Alternative Model of Rational Cooperation
		15.1 Introduction
		15.2 Mutual Gains and Losses
		15.3 Modeling Cooperative Interaction
		15.4 What Drives the Equilibrium Analysis?
		15.5 Rethinking Rational Cooperation
		15.6 Mixed Games
		15.7 Repeated Interaction over Time
		15.8 Bargaining Theory
		15.9 A More Realistic Setting
		15.10 An Alternative Model of Cooperation
		15.11 The Case for the Revised Model of Cooperation
		15.12 Rule-Governed Choice
		15.13 The Efficiency-Egalitarian Principle
		15.14 The Problem of Ideology
		15.15 The Question of Adaptive Efficiency
		15.16 A Final Observation
		References
PART FIVE: RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES
	16 Republican Political Theory
		16.1 The Republican Ideal of Freedom
			16.1.1 The Constant Connection
			16.1.2 Interference and Arbitrary Interference
			16.1.3 The Harder-to-Lose-Freedom Effect
			16.1.4 The Easier-to-Lose-Freedom Effect
			16.1.5 Three Further Remarks
			References
		16.2 The Significance of the Republican Ideal
			16.2.1 The Paley Connection
			16.2.2 Redistribution and Freedom as Noninterference
			16.2.3 Redistribution and Freedom as Nondomination
			References
	17 Rule Utilitarianism and Liberal Priorities
		17.1 Introduction
		17.2 Harsanyi's Liberal Rule Utilitarianism
		17.3 Absolute Priorities within a Liberal Utilitarian Code
		17.4 Conclusion
		References
Index