Judicial Review and the Constitution

Half Title Page......Page 1
Half Title verso......Page 2
Title Page......Page 3
Title verso......Page 4
Preface......Page 5
Contents......Page 7
Acknowledgements......Page 13
Contributors......Page 15
List of Participants......Page 17
Table of Cases......Page 19
Table of Legislation......Page 30
The Debate Begins......Page 39
1.  Is the Ultra Vires Rule the Basis of Judicial Review?......Page 41
SOURCES OF POWER......Page 43
INSTITUTIONS......Page 46
FUNCTIONS......Page 49
CONCLUSIONS......Page 63
INTRODUCTION......Page 67
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE EXERCISE OF NON-LEGAL POWERS BY NON-STATUTORY BODIES......Page 69
“WEAK” AND “STRONG” CRITICISMS OF THE ULTRA VIRES DOCTRINE......Page 71
THE RESPONSE TO “WEAK” CRITICISM......Page 73
RECONCILING THE “WEAK” CRITICISMS WITH ORTHODOXY......Page 78
THE UTILITY OF FIG-LEAVES AND FAIRY TALES......Page 80
THE RESPONSE TO “STRONG” CRITICISM......Page 81
CONCLUSIONS......Page 83
3.  Ultra Vires and the Foundations of Judicial Review......Page 85
THE CRITICISMS OF THE ULTRA VIRES DOCTRINE......Page 86
THE DEFENCE OF THE ULTRA VIRES PRINCIPLE: THE DANGERS OF ITS ABANDONMENT......Page 92
THE DEFENCE OF THE ULTRA VIRES PRINCIPLE:MEETING THE OBJECTIONS......Page 97
THE FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW......Page 99
CONCLUSION......Page 108
4.  An Extract from: Illegality: The Problem of Jurisdiction......Page 111
R. V HULL UNIVERSITY VISITOR......Page 117
INTRODUCTION......Page 121
THE IMPORTANCE OF JUSTIFYING JUDICIAL REVIEW......Page 123
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LEGISLATIVE INTENTION AND JUDICIAL REVIEW......Page 126
A CONSTITUTIONAL SETTING FOR THE ULTRA VIRES DOCTRINE:OVERCOMING THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE TRADITIONAL MODEL......Page 138
CONCLUSION......Page 145
The Jurisprudential Debate......Page 149
6.  Ultra Vires and Institutional Interdependence......Page 151
CRITERIA FOR ASSESSING THE MERITS OF A LEGAL THEORY......Page 152
ULTRA VIRES AS THE CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW......Page 154
INSTITUTIONAL INTERDEPENDENCE AND HART’S RULE OF RECOGNITION......Page 168
AN ANALOGY: PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE......Page 173
CONCLUSION: MAKING EXPLICIT THE BASIS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW......Page 176
INTRODUCTION......Page 179
PROCEDURE AND SUBSTANCE IN POLITICAL THEORY......Page 180
POSITIVISM, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE RULE OF LAW......Page 183
SUBSTANCE AND JUDICIAL SUPREMACISM......Page 198
THE PLEASING PERSISTENCE OF PROCESS BASED THEORIES......Page 205
THE COMMON LAW......Page 211
PHILOSOPHY......Page 214
POSITIVISM......Page 216
THE NATURE OF PRINCIPLE......Page 218
THE RULE OF LAW......Page 221
PARLIAMENT AND THE JUDGES......Page 223
Constitutional Reform and the Foundations of Judicial Review......Page 229
GENERAL INTRODUCTION......Page 231
THE REALITIES......Page 237
DEVOLUTION: THE MECHANICS......Page 238
CONCLUSIONS......Page 247
WALES, EXECUTIVE DEVOLUTION AND THE ASSIGNMENT OF LIMITED COMPETENCE......Page 251
SCOTLAND, LEGISLATIVE DEVOLUTION AND THE DEMARCATION OF LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE......Page 258
JUDICIAL CHALLENGE TO THE COMPETENCE OF THE SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT......Page 262
JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE:THREE CENTRAL ISSUES......Page 266
THE INTERPRETATIVE PERSPECTIVE: STATUTORY OR CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION?......Page 267
THE DIVISION OF POWER: MANNER AND DEGREE......Page 271
THE UNAVOIDABLE TASK: THE CLASSIFICATION OF IMPUGNED LEGISLATION BY SUBJECT MATTER......Page 275
CONCLUSION......Page 281
THE MEANINGS OF “ULTRA VIRES” AND THE PURPOSE OF THIS ESSAY......Page 283
THE EFFECT OF ULTRA VIRES THEORIES ON THE PROTECTION OF CONVENTION RIGHTS......Page 289
THE EFFECT OF CONVENTION RIGHTS ON THE THEORY OF ULTRA VIRES......Page 299
CONCLUSION......Page 304
INTRODUCTION......Page 307
HUMAN RIGHTS AS SUBSTANTIVE RULES OF GOOD ADMINISTRATION......Page 309
HUMAN RIGHTS AS INTERPRETATIVE CONSTRUCTS......Page 315
CONCLUSION......Page 325
Judicial Review of Statutory and Non-Statutory Discretion......Page 327
13.  Public Power and Private Power......Page 329
14.  Review of (Non-Statutory) Discretions......Page 345
FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIPS......Page 346
THE COMMON LAW......Page 353
TOWARDS GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF DECISION-MAKING......Page 359
THE LIMITS OF DUTIES OF CONSIDERATE DECISION-MAKING IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAW......Page 360
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PUBLIC PRIVATE DIVIDE......Page 361
15.  Of Vires and Vacuums: The Constitutional Context of Judicial Review......Page 365
TESTING THE JUSTIFICATIONS THROUGH THE GROUNDS OF REVIEW......Page 367
VIRES IN CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT......Page 374
THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE......Page 376
CONCLUSION......Page 377
INTRODUCTION......Page 379
THE MODIFIED ULTRA VIRES PRINCIPLE......Page 381
AN UNWELCOME DISTINCTION IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW......Page 388
THE UNDESIRABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE UNWELCOME DISTINCTION......Page 397
CONCLUSION......Page 406
Conclusion......Page 409
THE STORY THUS FAR: THE CONTENDING MODELS......Page 411
LEGISLATIVE INTENT AS THE CENTRAL PRINCIPLE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW? THE SUBSTANCE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW......Page 413
LEGISLATIVE INTENT AS THE CENTRAL PRINCIPLE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW?THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SUBSTANCE OF OTHER AREAS OF THE LAW......Page 416
LEGISLATIVE INTENT AS THE CENTRAL PRINCIPLE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW? THE FORMAL BASIS FOR JUDICIAL INTERVENTION......Page 418
CONCLUSION......Page 429
THE VANISHING OF THE “STRONG” CRITICS......Page 431
THE EMERGENCE OF CONSENSUS ON JUDICIAL REVIEW OF NON-STATUTORY DISCRETION......Page 433
BIG-ENDIANS AND LITTLE-ENDIANS......Page 434
THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE ULTRA VIRES DOCTRINE......Page 435
THE CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTIFICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW......Page 437
IS ABANDONING ULTRA VIRES A CHALLENGE TO PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY?......Page 438
THE THEORETICAL CRITICISM......Page 442
THE CONSEQUENCES OF ABANDONMENT FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LAW......Page 443
CONCLUSION......Page 446
Comments from some Participants......Page 449
The Rule of Law as the Foundation of Judicial Review......Page 451
Judicial Review in a Modern Context......Page 459
No Need for a Single Foundation......Page 461
Whither the Constitution?......Page 463
Ultra Vires as Distraction......Page 465
Constitutional Realities and Judicial Prudence......Page 469
Index......Page 471