John Searle

Half-title......Page 3
Series-title......Page 5
Title......Page 7
Copyright......Page 8
Contents......Page 9
Contributors......Page 11
1 John Searle: From Speech Acts to Social Reality......Page 15
SPEECH ACT THEORY: FROM ARISTOTLE TO REINACH......Page 17
SPEECH ACT THEORY: FROM AUSTIN TO SEARLE......Page 19
RULES, MEANINGS, FACTS......Page 20
PROMISE AND OBLIGATION......Page 23
SPEECH ACTS AND SOCIAL REALITY......Page 25
A HUGE INVISIBLE ONTOLOGY......Page 27
THE ONTOLOGY OF SOCIAL REALITY......Page 28
THE X COUNTS AS Y THEORY OF INSTITUTIONAL REALITY......Page 29
OBJECTS AND REPRESENTATIONS......Page 32
THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL......Page 35
SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF FREE-STANDING Y TERMS......Page 36
HIGHER STILL, AND HIGHER......Page 38
THE PRIMACY OF REALITY......Page 39
CONCLUSION: FREEDOM AND THE SELF......Page 41
Notes......Page 43
Literature......Page 45
I. SPEECH ACT THEORY......Page 48
II. NOT GOING FROM SPEECH ACTS TO SPEECH ACTIVITY......Page 49
III. FICTION......Page 50
IV. HISTORICAL FICTION (DOCU-DRAMAS), BIOGRAPHIES, AND AUTOBIOGRAPHIES......Page 52
V. MIXED TYPES......Page 55
VII. PURPOSE......Page 58
VIII. SOME CONCLUSIONS......Page 62
Notes......Page 64
3 Intentions, Promises, and Obligations......Page 66
I. THE BELIEF/DESIRE ANALYSIS OF INTENTIONAL STATES......Page 67
II. INTENTIONS AND ACTION......Page 70
III. CAUSALITY AND ITS DISCONTENTS......Page 72
IV. COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY......Page 74
V. PROMISES AND OTHER SPEECH ACTS......Page 77
VI. PROMISES, OBLIGATIONS, AND THE IS/OUGHT GAP......Page 81
VII. THE UBIQUITY OF PROMISES AND MORALITY......Page 85
VIII. RATIONALITY AND THE BINDING FORCE OF OBLIGATIONS......Page 88
CONCLUSION......Page 93
Notes......Page 94
1. LAW IN SEARLE......Page 99
The X Term......Page 100
The Relationship “Counts As”......Page 101
The Y Term......Page 103
The Context C......Page 105
The Law and the Facts......Page 107
Law as Fact......Page 109
Discretion......Page 110
Intelligibility......Page 111
Acceptance and Authority......Page 112
Collective Intentions......Page 113
5 Action......Page 116
1. INTENTION-IN-ACTION......Page 117
2. CAUSAL REFLEXIVITY IN THE CONDITIONS OF SATISFACTION OF AN ACTION......Page 120
3. CAUSAL REFLEXIVITY AND PHENOMENOLOGY......Page 125
4. SOLVING THE PUZZLES......Page 126
A. Experience of Acting and Unconscious Acting......Page 129
B. The Representational Format of Intentions-in-Action......Page 130
C. Intention-in-Action and Control of Action......Page 133
6. EXPANDING SEARLE’S THEORY......Page 135
Notes......Page 139
1. THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING CONSCIOUS......Page 142
2. CONSCIOUSNESS, INTENTIONALITY, PERCEPTION AND ACTION......Page 143
3. WHY ARE CONSCIOUSNESS AND MIND SO PUZZLING?......Page 145
4. FUNCTIONALISM TO THE RESCUE?......Page 148
5. DIVIDE AND CONQUER: FIRST CONTENT, THEN ‘MENTAL STATE CONSCIOUSNESS’......Page 151
6. SEARLE’S ‘CONSCIOUSNESS-DEPENDENT’ CONCEPTION OF MIND......Page 154
7. OVERCOMING OUR PROBLEM WITH CONSCIOUSNESS: SEARLE’S ‘HIGHER-LEVEL PROPERTY’ ACCOUNT OF CONSCIOUSNESS......Page 157
8. THE CENTRALITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS: PROS AND CONS......Page 162
Notes......Page 165
7 The Intentionality of Perception......Page 168
Notes......Page 181
1. INTRODUCTION......Page 183
2. CLARIFICATION......Page 186
(a) Sense Data and the Visibility of Objects in Three-Dimensional Space......Page 188
(b) Transparency......Page 190
(c) Answering the Objection......Page 192
(d) Modes of Showing......Page 193
4. THE NATURE OF ATTENTIVE CONTACT WITH AN OBJECT......Page 196
5. REPRESENTATIONALISM AND RESEMBLANCE......Page 198
Notes......Page 202
I. THE DETERMINATION VIEW......Page 203
II. BACKGROUND ASSUMPTIONS......Page 204
III. CONTEXTUALISM......Page 206
IV. THE PRINCIPLE OF EXPRESSIBILITY......Page 207
V. EXPRESSIBILITY AND EFFABILITY......Page 208
VI. EXPRESSIBILITY AND INDEXICALITY......Page 211
VII. LOCAL EXPRESSIBILITY, GLOBAL INEXPRESSIBILITY......Page 213
VIII. THE GENERALIZATION OF BACKGROUND DEPENDENCE TO ALL INTENTIONAL STATES......Page 214
IX. LITERAL MEANING VS. INTENTIONAL CONTENT......Page 216
X. LITERAL MEANING, SENSORY CONTENT, AND THE BRAIN......Page 219
XI. A CONTEXTUALIST PERSPECTIVE......Page 221
XII. ACCOUNTING FOR BACKGROUND DEPENDENCE......Page 223
XIII. CONCLUSION......Page 224
Notes......Page 226
10 The Chinese Room Argument......Page 228
1. THE CHINESE ROOM ARGUMENT AS STATED IN SEARLE’S TEXTS......Page 229
1.1. The Chinese Room Thought Experiment......Page 230
1.2. The Argument......Page 233
1.3. Peripheral Issues......Page 235
2. CRITICISM AND REPLIES......Page 237
2.1. The Thought Experiment Debate: First Layer......Page 238
2.2. The Thought Experiment Debate: Second and Third Layers......Page 240
2.3. The Argument Debate......Page 244
2.4. Peripheral Issues Debate......Page 247
3.1. The New Argument as Presented in Searle’s Texts......Page 252
3.2. From the Debate Related to the New Argument......Page 254
4. CONCLUSIONS......Page 256
4.1. The Transition from the Thought Experiment to the Core Arguments......Page 257
4.2. The First Core Argument: Causal Powers......Page 259
4.3. The Second Core Point: Semantics......Page 262
4.4. Some Remaining Issues......Page 264
Notes......Page 266
1. SEARLE VERSUS THE REST OF THE WORLD......Page 275
2. WHAT WAS PHENOMENOLOGY?......Page 276
3. PHENOMENOLOGY AND OXFORD PHILOSOPHY–A LOST CAUSE?......Page 278
4. PHENOMENOLOGY AND SEARLE......Page 280
5. SEARLE VERSUS DERRIDA: THE END OF PHENOMENOLOGY AND ITS BEGINNING......Page 283
6. CANT, COGNITIVE VALUES, AND REALISM......Page 286
7. CANT PHILOSOPHICAL AND CANT THEORETICAL......Page 288
8. COGNITIVE VALUE AND REALISM......Page 291
9. S R L IN 1911......Page 292
10. SEARLE’S SPLENDID ISOLATION......Page 294
Notes......Page 296
Selected Articles by Searle......Page 301
Selected Commentary on Searle......Page 302
Index......Page 303