John McDowell (Philosophy Now)

Contents......Page 5
Acknowledgements......Page 6
Introduction......Page 7
The Cartesian conception of mind......Page 11
The post-Kantian conception of the world......Page 16
The rejection of\rreductionist naturalism......Page 20
A therapeutic conception of philosophical method......Page 23
The role of the philosophical canon......Page 26
III.\rThe structure of the book......Page 27
1 / Wittgenstein on philosophy,\rnormativity and understanding......Page 31
I.\rThe background: Wittgenstein on normativity......Page 33
II.\rOpposing interpretations of Wittgenstein......Page 35
Kripke\'s Wittgenstein......Page 36
Wright\'s Wittgenstein......Page 39
Objections to Kripke and Wright......Page 42
III.\rMcDowell\'s interpretation......Page 45
Diagnosis......Page 46
Sketch of an alternative view: practice......Page 49
IV.\rHearing meaning directly in speech......Page 51
V.\rGerman Idealism, scheme-content dualism, realism and nature......Page 58
The private language argument and post-Kantian\rphilosophy......Page 60
Rule-following considerations and post-Kantian\rphilosophy......Page 63
2 /\rValue judgements......Page 69
Neo-Humeanism......Page 71
Secondary qualities......Page 74
McDowell\'s criticism of Mackie......Page 76
Bernard Williams\'s absolute conception......Page 80
McDowell\'s criticism of the absolute conception......Page 83
Wright\'s argument against the analogy of colour\rand value......Page 85
II. The grounds of moral judgement and a moral\routlook: Aristotle and Kant......Page 88
The place of moral judgements in a post-Kantian view\rof nature......Page 90
Naturalism in moral philosophy......Page 94
III.\rThe uncodifiability of moral judgement......Page 98
3 /\rFormal theories of meaning and theories of sense......Page 107
I.\rDavidson and the philosophy of language of the field linguist......Page 108
II.\rDavidson and Tarski......Page 115
III.\rWhat is the relation between truth and meaning?......Page 122
IV.\rModest or full-blooded meaning theories?......Page 127
V.\rIs a theory of meaning really a theory of sense?......Page 134
Truth theories as theories of sense, 1......Page 136
Truth theories as theories of sense, 2......Page 138
Truth theories as theories of sense,\r3......Page 140
The apparent insubstantiality of knowledge of senses......Page 141
The articulation of linguistic abilities......Page 143
4 /\rSingular thought and the Cartesian picture of mind......Page 147
Russellian singular propositions......Page 150
Neo-Fregean singular thoughts......Page 153
Recent neo-Fregean and neo-Russellian theories:\rone versus two components......Page 157
Objections to a two-component view......Page 162
II.\rSingular thought and the philosophy of mind......Page 164
Singular thoughts and the master thesis......Page 165
Cartesian approaches to mind......Page 169
III.\rThe disjunctive account of experience and openness to the world......Page 177
5 /\rExperience, knowledge and openness to the world......Page 183
The standard view of criteria......Page 184
McDowell\'s criticism of the standard view of criteria......Page 187
II.\rMcDowell\'s account of criteria......Page 188
Two intuitive objections to McDowell\'s account......Page 190
A picture of knowledge based on the argument from\rillusion......Page 195
McDowell\'s positive account......Page 199
IV.\rScepticism......Page 206
6 /\rMind and World and idealism......Page 215
The Kantian slogan......Page 216
Experience and the world......Page 219
Demonstrative concepts......Page 224
McDowell, Brandom and Sellars and the transcendental\rrole of experience......Page 226
II.\rThe nature of nature......Page 230
III.\rThe threat of idealism......Page 239
Glossary......Page 251
Guide to further reading......Page 257
Works by John McDowell......Page 261
Works by other authors......Page 262
Index......Page 267