Institutional Approach to Global Corporate Governance (International Finance Review)

International finance review......Page 1
sdarticle_001.pdf......Page 2
sdarticle_002.pdf......Page 3
List of contributors......Page 4
Introduction......Page 7
US Boards Post-Enron......Page 11
International Evidence on the Board of Directors......Page 13
Pay-for-Performance for US Firms......Page 14
International Evidence on Executive Compensation......Page 16
Ownership Structure......Page 17
Market for Corporate Control......Page 21
Shareholder Protection and Legal Tradition......Page 22
Business systems and beyond......Page 25
Conclusions......Page 27
Acknowledgements......Page 28
References......Page 29
Introduction......Page 36
Incentives or Governance?......Page 38
Corporate Governance and Openness to FDI......Page 40
Empirical analysis......Page 42
Model Specification......Page 44
Data Definitions and Sources......Page 45
Results......Page 47
Conclusions......Page 53
Notes......Page 54
References......Page 55
How do Japanese banks discipline small- and medium-sized borrowersquest An investigation of the deployment of lending technologies......Page 58
Introduction......Page 59
Lending technology......Page 61
Construction of Lending Technology Indices......Page 63
The Relative Importance of Individual Lending Technologies......Page 67
Univariate Analysis......Page 69
Methodology......Page 70
Results......Page 71
Conclusion......Page 75
Notes......Page 77
References......Page 79
Lending Factors in the RIETI Survey......Page 80
Control Variables......Page 81
Introduction......Page 82
Multifunctionalism......Page 84
Stakeholderism......Page 86
Multiculturalism......Page 88
Reciprocity in business-society interface......Page 90
Conclusion......Page 93
References......Page 95
Expanding the limits of corporate responsibility: An institutional approach......Page 98
The State Duty to Protect, and Corporate Accountability for International Crimes......Page 101
Soft Law and Voluntary Standards......Page 104
What Are the Problems with Seeking to Impose International Law on TNCs......Page 105
Strengthened UN and Regional Human Rights Bodies......Page 108
The Global Firm and a Stronger International Labor Organization (ILO)......Page 109
The Global Firm and the ICJ......Page 110
Conclusion......Page 112
International Instruments......Page 113
Other References......Page 114
Introduction......Page 117
Separation of executive and governance powers......Page 121
Contractual communications systems independent of management......Page 125
Defining good governance in terms of outcomes not practices......Page 131
Notes......Page 135
References......Page 136
Corporate governance mechanisms and performance related CEO turnover......Page 140
Introduction......Page 141
Board Size and Duality......Page 142
CEO Stock Ownership and Founding Family......Page 143
Identifying Forced Turnover......Page 144
Other Control Variables......Page 145
Empirical methodology......Page 147
Benchmark Results......Page 149
CEO Stock Ownership and Performance-Turnover Sensitivity......Page 151
Robustness......Page 153
Notes......Page 156
References......Page 157
Size and advisory role of corporate boards......Page 159
Introduction......Page 160
Prior literature and hypothesis development......Page 162
The Sample......Page 164
Board Structure and Firm Performance......Page 165
Descriptive and Univariate Statistics......Page 166
Board Size and Firm Value......Page 168
Current and Past Board Size and Firm Productivity......Page 172
Directors’ Compensation and Board Structure......Page 175
Non-Linearities of Board Size and Inclusion of Other Control Variables......Page 177
Simultaneity Issue of Board Structure and Firm Value......Page 178
Notes......Page 179
References......Page 180
Financial contracts for CEOs: Expropriation or effective corporate governance?......Page 182
Introduction......Page 183
Why OBRA?......Page 185
Relevant Dates......Page 186
Data and compensation variables......Page 188
Methodology and empirical results......Page 190
Conclusions......Page 198
Notes......Page 199
References......Page 200
Corporate governance and interlisted stocks: The persistence of country-specific traits......Page 202
The Canadian governance context......Page 203
Powerful Owners, Managerial Agency Problems, and Owner Entrenchment......Page 204
Different Roles for Ownership in Canada and the US......Page 205
Significant Outside Ownership and Corporate Governance......Page 207
Executive Compensation and Agency Costs: Are Differences Related to National Context?......Page 209
The Market for Corporate Control in Canada......Page 212
Boards of Directors......Page 213
The Role of Debt in Constraining Agency Costs......Page 214
Does cross-listing promote governance convergence?......Page 215
Ownership and Firm Performance......Page 216
Sample......Page 217
Executive Compensation......Page 218
Methodology......Page 219
Ownership, Executive Compensation, and Short-term Performance......Page 220
Ownership, Executive Compensation, and Long-term Performance......Page 221
Salary Determinants in Canada and the US......Page 223
The Determinants of Incentive Pay in Canada and the US......Page 225
Conclusions and directions for future research......Page 226
Acknowledgments......Page 229
References......Page 230
Introduction......Page 234
MCS Regulation......Page 237
Hypotheses......Page 239
Data and methodology......Page 240
Stock Returns8......Page 242
Stock Liquidity......Page 244
Voting Premium and Short Sale......Page 246
Cross-Sectional Analysis......Page 249
Additional Results......Page 253
Notes......Page 255
References......Page 257
Headline Media Inc.......Page 259
Introduction......Page 260
Hypothesized Effect of the Dual Role of Main Bank......Page 263
Previous Empirical Findings......Page 267
Description of Sample......Page 268
Identification of the Main Bank......Page 269
Descriptive Statistics......Page 270
Dual Role of the Main Bank......Page 274
Existence of Loans and Bonds......Page 282
Individual Bank Effect......Page 286
Change in Firm Performance during the Transition Period......Page 287
Conclusions......Page 289
Notes......Page 290
References......Page 292
Legal rights matter: evidence from panel data on creditor protection and debt......Page 294
Introduction......Page 295
Data......Page 296
Data Quality, Industry Selection, and Truncation......Page 297
Data Description......Page 300
Country-level analysis......Page 305
Country-Level Models......Page 306
Country-Level Econometric Specifications and Findings......Page 307
Firm-Level Leverage Model......Page 309
Income Statement Variables and Potential Endogeneity of Effective Tax Rates......Page 310
Magnitude of EmCred Score, Policy Relevance, and Fixed Effects......Page 313
EmCred Magnitude and GLS Fixed-Effects Findings......Page 314
Firm-Level Maturity Model......Page 315
Extension: legal origin......Page 316
Conclusion......Page 320
Notes......Page 321
References......Page 324
Appendix. Variable Definitions......Page 326
Introduction......Page 328
Deficiencies in the common law and the approach to reform......Page 330
Introduction......Page 332
Extending the Types of Breaches under which a Derivative Claim may be Brought......Page 333
Derivative Claims against Third Parties......Page 336
Can the Applicant Bring a Derivative Claim in Respect of Wrongs Committed Prior to his Becoming a Member (or After he Leaves the Company)?......Page 337
Derivative Claims against a Former Director and a Shadow Director......Page 338
General Principles......Page 339
An Assessment of the Procedural Requirements......Page 340
Background......Page 341
The New Framework......Page 342
Section 263(2)(a)124......Page 344
Section 263(2)(b) and (c)140......Page 346
Matters That the Court must take into Account When Considering an Application for Permission to Proceed with a Derivative Claim......Page 348
What is Not There?......Page 350
An assessment of the likely impact of the new regime......Page 351
Conclusion......Page 356
Notes......Page 357
Acknowledgements......Page 373
References......Page 374
Law reform commission reports......Page 375
Introduction......Page 376
Institutions, ownership structure, and control......Page 380
The Role of Legal Institutions......Page 381
The Role of Extra-Legal Institutions......Page 382
The Separation of Ownership and Control......Page 384
Legal Institution Variables......Page 386
Extra-Legal Institution Variables......Page 388
Empirical analysis......Page 389
Legal Determinants of Excess Control......Page 392
Extra-Legal Determinants of Excess Control......Page 396
Robustness Checks......Page 398
Conclusion......Page 400
Notes......Page 401
References......Page 402
Introduction......Page 405
Literature review......Page 407
Scorecard......Page 408
Weighted Scoring Results......Page 414
Investors’ Perceptions of Corporate Governance Practices......Page 416
Conclusion......Page 419
References......Page 422
Study One: List of Criteria......Page 424
Survey One: Summary of Questions and Answers, by Country......Page 431
Questionnaire on Corporate Governance Practices in Nine East Asian countries. Instruction: Please Score 1-5, Where 1 is the Worst and 5 is the Best Practice......Page 447
The nature of political connections and firm value......Page 449
Introduction......Page 450
Politics and corporate governance in China......Page 453
Descriptions of data......Page 455
Ownership and Governance......Page 456
Developed Connections......Page 459
Inherited Connections......Page 461
Control Variables......Page 462
The Impact of Self-Developed and Inherited Connections on Firm Performance......Page 463
Developed Connections......Page 465
Inherited Connections......Page 467
Re-examine Political Connections in General......Page 468
Endogeneity......Page 472
CEO Turnovers......Page 476
Conclusion......Page 478
Notes......Page 479
References......Page 480
Introduction......Page 483
The end of history for the modern corporationquest......Page 486
’Hardwiring’ culture......Page 488
Corporate governance and differences......Page 490
Searching for good governance......Page 493
Transplanting change......Page 494
Ownership, shareholders and relationships......Page 496
Conclusion......Page 498
Notes......Page 500
References......Page 501