Imperfect Union: Representation and Taxation in Multilevel Governments (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)

Half-title......Page 3
Dedication......Page 4
Series-title......Page 5
Title......Page 7
Copyright......Page 8
Contents......Page 9
Preface......Page 11
Acknowledgments......Page 13
1 Introduction: American Politics in 3D......Page 17
1.1 Cook county's 10.25 percent solution......Page 18
1.2 Competition in 2-d: voting with your feet......Page 20
1.3 Politics in 3-d: territorial overlap and concurrent taxation......Page 22
1.4 The fiscal common pool......Page 25
1.5 Putting politics back into local political economy......Page 35
1.6 Contributions......Page 38
1.7 Plan of the book......Page 39
2.1 What is a special district?......Page 42
2.2 What do special districts do?......Page 45
2.3 How are special districts governed?......Page 52
2.4 How are special districts financed?......Page 53
2.5 How are special districts created?......Page 55
2.6 How big are special districts?......Page 57
2.7 How do special districts contribute to jurisdictional overlap?......Page 58
2.8.1 Major Themes......Page 62
2.8.2 Empirical Evidence......Page 64
3 A Political Theory of Special-Purpose Government......Page 67
3.1 A theory of specialized government......Page 68
3.1.1 General-Purpose Government......Page 71
3.1.2 Single-Function Government: Full versus Selective Participation......Page 73
3.1.3 Comparison of Policy Outcomes......Page 77
3.1.4 Full Participation versus Selective Participation: Evidence......Page 79
3.2 Extensions......Page 85
3.2.1 Special Districts Are Not So Special......Page 86
3.2.2 Repeated Interactions......Page 90
3.2.3 The Shadow of Tiebout......Page 92
3.3 Nontechnical summary......Page 100
3.4 Why so many governments?......Page 102
3.5 Conclusion......Page 104
4.1 Measuring jurisdictional overlap......Page 105
4.2 Estimation strategy......Page 109
4.3 Variables, data sources, and case selection......Page 112
4.4 Results......Page 114
4.4.1 Functional Performance......Page 117
4.4.2 Sources of Revenue......Page 123
4.4.3 Current versus Capital Expenditures......Page 127
4.4.4 Tax and Expenditure Limitations......Page 129
4.4.5 Area Flexibility......Page 132
4.4.6 Instrumental Variables Estimation......Page 133
4.4.7 Functional Form......Page 140
4.5 Summary......Page 142
5 Specialization and Quality......Page 145
5.1 Background......Page 147
5.2 Analysis: Do library districts perform better?......Page 149
5.2.1 Library Finances......Page 151
5.2.2 Library Collections and Staffing......Page 154
5.2.3 Library Utilization and Efficiency......Page 159
5.3 Related studies......Page 161
5.4 Discussion......Page 162
6.1 Commons knowledge......Page 164
6.2 Political parties, multilevel government, and collective action problems......Page 166
6.2.1 Local Parties: Means and Motives......Page 168
6.3 Data and methods......Page 171
6.4 Rresults......Page 173
6.4.2 An Alternative Measure of Party Organizational Strength......Page 178
6.4.3 Party Competition......Page 185
6.4.4 Fiscal Constraints......Page 192
6.5 Summary and conclusions......Page 193
7 Conclusion......Page 195
7.1 Social welfare analysis......Page 200
7.2.1 Tiebout......Page 203
7.2.2 Fiscal Federalism and Multilevel Government......Page 205
7.2.3 Political Parties......Page 207
7.3 Policy implications......Page 208
7.4 American democracy in 3-d: too much of a good thing?......Page 210
A.1.1 COG Data on Special Districts......Page 213
A.1.2 Case Selection......Page 214
A.1.3 Defining Common Functions......Page 218
A.2.1 Results from Chapter 2......Page 220
A.2.2 Results from Chapter 4......Page 222
A.2.3 Results from Chapter 6......Page 240
A.3 Summary Statistics......Page 241
References......Page 249
Index......Page 263