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دانلود کتاب Ignoring the Obvious: Combined Arms and Fire and Maneuver Tactics Prior to World War I
دانلود کتاب نادیده گرفتن چیزهای بدیهی: ترکیب اسلحه و آتش و تاکتیک های مانور قبل از جنگ جهانی اول
مشخصات کتاب
Ignoring the Obvious: Combined Arms and Fire and Maneuver Tactics Prior to World War I
ویرایش:
نویسندگان: Major Thomas A. Bruno USMC
سری:
ناشر: Pickle Partners Publishing
سال نشر: 2015
تعداد صفحات: 0
زبان: English
فرمت فایل : EPUB (درصورت درخواست کاربر به PDF، EPUB یا AZW3 تبدیل می شود)
حجم فایل: 526 کیلوبایت
قیمت کتاب (تومان) : 31,000
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توجه داشته باشید کتاب نادیده گرفتن چیزهای بدیهی: ترکیب اسلحه و آتش و تاکتیک های مانور قبل از جنگ جهانی اول نسخه زبان اصلی می باشد و کتاب ترجمه شده به فارسی نمی باشد. وبسایت اینترنشنال لایبرری ارائه دهنده کتاب های زبان اصلی می باشد و هیچ گونه کتاب ترجمه شده یا نوشته شده به فارسی را ارائه نمی دهد.
توضیحاتی در مورد کتاب نادیده گرفتن چیزهای بدیهی: ترکیب اسلحه و آتش و تاکتیک های مانور قبل از جنگ جهانی اول
عادلانه یا ناعادلانه، بن بست در جبهه غربی جنگ جهانی اول اغلب به رکود فکری افسران نظامی آن دوره نسبت داده می شود. این مقاله توسعه (یا عدم توسعه) سلاح های ترکیبی و آتش را ردیابی می کند
توضیحاتی درمورد کتاب به خارجی
Fairly or unfairly, the stalemate on the First World War’s
Western Front is often attributed to the intellectual
stagnation of the era’s military officers. This paper traces
the development (or absence of development) of combined arms
and fire & maneuver tactics and doctrine in the period prior to
WW I, focusing on the Russo-Japanese War.
The Western armies that entered the Great War seemingly ignored
many of the hard-learned lessons and observations of pre-war
conflicts. Though World War I armies were later credited with
developing revolutionary wartime tactical-level advances, many
scholars claim that this phase of tactical evolution followed
an earlier period of intellectual stagnation that resulted in
the stalemate on the war’s Western Front. This stalemate, they
claim, could have been avoided by heeding the admonitions of
pre-war conflicts and incorporating the burgeoning effects of
technology into military tactics and doctrine. Some go even
further and fault the military leadership with incompetence and
foolishness for not adapting to the requirements of modern
war.
The Russo-Japanese War showed the necessity for combined arms
techniques and fire and maneuver tactics on the modern
battlefield. Specifically, the war showed the need for: (1) the
adoption of dispersed, irregular (non-linear) formations; (2)
the employment of fire and maneuver techniques and small
unit-tactics, including base of fire techniques; (3) the
transition to indirect-fire artillery support to ensure the
survivability of the batteries, and; (4) the necessity for
combined arms tactics to increase the survivability of
assaulting infantry and compensate for the dispersion of
infantry firepower.
However, deeply ingrained concerns over the loss of control on
the battlefield and faith in the ability of morale to overcome
firepower prevented the full realization of advanced combined
arms techniques and fire and maneuver tactics. Instead, the
lessons of the Russo-Japanese War were disregarded or
minimized.
Military leaders did not ignore the lessons of the
Russo-Japanese War. In fact, the ramifications of increased
firepower and rudimentary techniques of fire and maneuver
tactics were addressed in most nations’ pre-World War I
doctrine. Unfortunately, these concepts were not fully
developed or practiced due to a failure to recognize a change
to the fundamental nature of warfare itself. Massive firepower
necessitated a new system of warfare. To effect this type of
transformation, the entire military culture—equipment,
doctrine, organization, and leadership— would have to evolve.
Lamentably, the hard-earned lessons of the Boer and
Russo-Japanese Wars had not prompted such a reformation. It
would take the cataclysm of the First World War to act as a
catalyst for this transformation.
