Hegel and the Metaphysics of Absolute Negativity

Hegel and the Metaphysics of Absolute Negativity
Series
Title
Copyright
Contents
Acknowledgments
A note on citations and translations
Abbreviations
Introduction: “A completely altered view of logic"
	0.1. Hegel’s metaphysical project
	0.2. The argument of this book
		0.2.1. Absolute negativity as the essence of the Hegelian Concept
		0.2.2. The critique of finite cognition
		0.2.3 Kant and Spinoza: the metaphysics of intentionality meets the metaphysics of substance
		0.2.4. Absolute negativity and the history of logic
1 The Hegelian Concept, absolute negativity, and the transformation of philosophical critique
	1.1. Introduction
	1.2. Kant’s and Jacobi’s challenge to rationalism and Hegel’s response
	1.3. The Hegelian Concept and the transformation of the categorial structure of intelligibility
		1.3.1 The science of logic as a critique of categorial thought
		1.3.2 Horstmann’s analysis of the Hegelian Concept as a relation of relations
		1.3.3 The role of the Hegelian Concept in constructing a positively determinate absolute
	1.4. The logic of absolute negativity and the transformation of the demonstrative ideal
		1.4.1 Jacobi’s critique of “Spinozism” and its legacy in Fichte and Hegel
		1.4.2 Henrich’s analysis of autonomous negation and its identity with the Concept
		1.4.3 Hegelian terminology as representing modes of negativity
		1.4.4 The refutation of Spinozism and the critical self-consciousness of finite cognition
		1.4.5 The origin of finite cognition and Hegel’s transformation of the concept of critique
2 Hegel’s complex relationship to “pre-Kantian” metaphysics
	2.1. Introduction
	2.2. The legacy of Christian Wolff
	2.3. Hegel’s conception of the metaphysics of the understanding and its Kantian background
		2.3.1 Kant on reason and the understanding: a brief review
		2.3.2 The metaphysics of the understanding and the categorial view of reality
	2.4. The metaphysical origin and structure of the understanding
	2.5. Hegel’s critique of the metaphysics of the understanding
	2.6. The aporiae of pre-Kantian metaphysics and their re-emergence in Kant and Jacobi
	2.7. Kant and Jacobi between the finite metaphysics of the understanding and the speculative metaphysics of reason
3 Hegelian skepticism and the idealism of the finite
	3.1. Introduction
	3.2. The post-Kantian preconceptions of Hegel’s Kant reception
	3.3. Hegel’s rejection of Kantian subjectivism
	3.4. Hegel’s rejection of transcendental idealism: the realist dimension
	3.5. Hegel on the non-being of the finite: objective idealism and the limits of McDowell’s realist interpretation
	3.6. Kant’s monism of mere appearances: transcendental idealism versus Spinozism
	3.7. “Truth” versus “correctness”: is there adequate ground for true determinate judgments about finite objects?
	3.8. Hegel’s unmitigated skepticism regarding the finite thought-determinations and the shortcomings of Kant’s critique of meta
	3.9. “The critical philosophy is an imperfect form of skepticism”
4 Skeptical implications for the foundations of natural science
	4.1. Introduction
	4.2. Relation-to-other, relation-to-self, self-externality: the terms of Hegel’s critique of empirical science
	4.3. The limitations of empirical science and the real nomological underdetermination of nature
	4.4. Hegel’s critical analysis of the notion of “laws of nature”
	4.5. Natural science as a stage within the life of the Concept
5 The methodology of finite cognition and the ideal of mathematical rigor
	5.1. Introduction
	5.2. Jacobi’s critique of rationalism and the methodological ideal of the mos geometricus
	5.3. Hegel’s appropriation of Jacobi’s critique: a problem and its solution
	5.4. Hegel on the rigor of Euclidean geometry
	5.5. The deductive order of Euclidean geometry and the place of real definitions
	5.6. Geometry as a form of the rational existence of the idea
	5.7. Preliminary result of this discussion: geometrical cognition, speculative cognition, and the structure of the Hegelian concept
	5.8. Hegel’s critique of the geometric method
6 Die Sache selbst: Absolute negativity and Hegel’s speculative logic content
	6.1. Introduction
	6.2. The traditional concepts of formal and objective reality and their usefulness for analyzing Hegel’s talk of substance and subject
	6.3. Kant, the structure of apperception, and the problematic relation of the sensible manifold to objective reality
	6.4. The sensible manifold and the concept of truth as correspondence
	6.5. Hegel’s hypothesis: the extra-mental reality of Conceptual structure
	6.6. Hegel versus Spinoza and Kant: towards a more satisfying model of determinate substance and determinate consciousness
	6.7. Self-determination and the absolutely negative spontaneity of the Concept
	6.8. Hegel, Schellingian Naturphilosophie, and the solution to the problem of the sensible manifold
	6.9. Hegel’s speculative logic of content: from appearance to reality, and back again
7 Absolute negation and the history of logic
	7.1. “The true is the whole”
	7.2. Hegel’s place in the history of thought on negation
	7.3. Autonomous negation and classical logic
	7.4. Conclusion: absolute negativity and Hegel’s “completely altered view of logic”
Works cited
	Primary sources: classical German philosophy
	Secondary literature and other primary sources
Index