Germany and the Second World War: Volume 5: Organization and Mobilization of the German Sphere of Power. Part I: Wartime Administration, Economy, and ... of Power Vol 5 (Germany & Second World War)

Cover......Page 1
CONTENTS......Page 0
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS......Page 14
LIST OF TABLES......Page 20
NOTES ON THE AUTHORS......Page 24
NOTE ON THE TRANSLATION......Page 26
ABBREVIATIONS......Page 27
W......Page 47
INTRODUCTION......Page 48
PART I: Towards Continental Dominion......Page 56
I. PLANS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES BEFORE THE OUTBREAK OF WAR......Page 58
1. Germany’s Expansion by ‘Peaceful’ and Warlike Means......Page 69
2. Structures of the German Sphere of Power......Page 168
3. Lack of Uniformity in Administration......Page 176
4. Hitler’s Europe......Page 198
III. THE PREFERRED ‘NEW ORDER’: TERRITORIES ANNEXED DE JURE AND DE FACTO......Page 215
1. Direct Exercise of Rule and Supervisory Administration......Page 250
2. Legislation and Jurisdiction......Page 260
3. Securing the Occupied Territories by Police and Military Means......Page 270
1. The Economic ‘New Order’......Page 300
2. Pillage and Methodical Exploitation......Page 307
3. Attainment of Financial Advantage......Page 345
4. Recruitment of Labour......Page 354
1. The ‘Master Race’ and ‘Ethnic Aliens’: German Racial Policy......Page 361
2. German Propaganda in the Occupied Territories......Page 396
3. Aspirations towards Cultural Hegemony......Page 409
4. Material Hardships and Hunger......Page 423
VII. COLLABORATION AND RESISTANCE......Page 431
PART II: The Mobilization of the German Economy for Hitler’s War Aims......Page 452
I. PREPARATIONS FOR TOTAL WAR......Page 454
1. The Abortive Mobilization of September 1939......Page 471
2. The Claim to Military Primacy......Page 477
3. Curbed Reorientation and the Decentralization of Industrial Production......Page 483
4. Polycentrism as a Product of Indecision in the National Socialist Regime......Page 495
5. Initial Effects and Consequences of the Blockade......Page 500
1. The ‘Ammunition Crisis’: Renewed Mobilization Efforts and Administrative Compromises......Page 521
2. The Allocation of Raw Materials as a Means of Controlling Armaments......Page 542
3. The First Closure Campaign......Page 560
4. Todt in the Ascendant......Page 573
5. The Formation of the Reich Ministry for Arms and Ammunition......Page 587
1. Mobilization Discontinued Once More......Page 611
2. Adjustment to a Postwar Economy......Page 616
3. Continental Europe in the Service of the German War Economy......Page 623
4. The Reorientation of Arms Manufacture: Shortages and Priorities......Page 628
1. The Struggle for Control of the Armaments Industry......Page 651
2. The Second Closure Campaign: Intensified Mobilization in Favour of Armaments Begins in Spring 1941......Page 668
3. Hitler Turns East......Page 676
1. Todt’s Initiative in the Summer of 1941......Page 688
2. Readjustment to a ‘War of Endurance’?......Page 694
3. The New Redirection of Armaments in July 1941......Page 699
4. Upheavals in the Domestic Economy......Page 713
5. Limits of Economic Expansion......Page 726
6. Waiting for a Solution......Page 731
7. Göring’s Last Appearance as Economic Dictator......Page 748
8. Starting-point for Armaments in 1942......Page 755
1. The Search for New Outlooks......Page 769
2. The End of the Military Command Economy......Page 805
3. From Todt to Speer......Page 820
PART III: The Manpower Resources of the Third Reich in the Area of Conflict between Wehrmacht, Bureaucracy, and War Economy, 1939–1942......Page 834
Introduction: Blitzkrieg Strategy and Blitzkrieg Economy: The Genesis of a Concept......Page 836
1. Population Distribution in Wartime: The Lessons of the First World War......Page 841
2. The Creation of ‘Combat-readiness’ in the Summer of 1939......Page 850
3. The Mobilization of the Wehrmacht......Page 853
1. Replacement of Other Ranks......Page 877
2. The Situation regarding Replacement of Non-commissioned Officers......Page 881
3. The Officer Corps......Page 883
1. Organizational Structure and Method of Operation of the Military Replacement System......Page 893
2. Controlling the Manpower Requirements of the War Economy......Page 897
3. The Process of Industrial Mobilization......Page 914
4. Changes in the Employment Situation between September 1939 and June 1941......Page 915
5. Socio-political Measures and Labour Discipline......Page 936
6. Results of the Stocktaking of Industrial Manpower of 31 May 1940......Page 939
7. The ‘Armaments Swerve’, June–September 1940......Page 944
8. The Development of the Employment Situation between the Führer Order of 28 September 1940 and the Attack on the Soviet Union......Page 951
9. The Balance of Forces of the National Economy on 31 May 1941: Human Balance Sheet’ and War Statistics......Page 970
1. The ‘Ammunition Crisis’ and the French Campaign (September 1939–June 1940): Changes in the Personnel Framework and Structure of the Wehrmacht up to the Summer of 1940......Page 988
2. From ‘Sea Lion’ to ‘Barbarossa’:The Restructuring of the Wehrmacht between the French Campaign and the Attack on the Soviet Union......Page 1003
3. The Manpower Equipment of the Wehrmacht for the War in Eastern Europe, September 1940–June 1941......Page 1013
4. Plans for Army Reorganization after Barbarossa......Page 1033
1. Inside View of a Crisis......Page 1048
2. The Distribution of Scarcity......Page 1114
3. The Balance Sheet of the Crisis......Page 1147
VI. BLITZKRIEG OR TOTAL WAR? IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL-MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE REACTION TO THE TRAUMA OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR......Page 1188
CONCLUSION......Page 1202
BIBLIOGRAPHY......Page 1218
B......Page 1248
F......Page 1249
H......Page 1250
K......Page 1251
M......Page 1252
R......Page 1253
S......Page 1254
V......Page 1255
Z......Page 1256