Game Theory: A Nontechnical Introduction To The Analysis Of Strategy (Team-IRA)

Contents
Preface to the Fourth Edition
About the Author
PART I Interactive Decisions
	Chapter 1 Conflict, Strategy, and Games
		1. THE SPANISH REBELLION: PUTTIN’ THE HURT ON HIRTULEIUS
		2. WHAT DOES THIS HAVE TO DO WITH GAMES?
		3. GAME THEORY EMERGES
		4. GAME THEORY, NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS AND MATHEMATICS
		5. THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA
		6. ISSUES WITH RESPECT TO THE PRISONERS’ DILEMMA
		7. GAMES IN NORMAL AND EXTENSIVE FORM
		8. A BUSINESS CASE
		9. A SCIENTIFIC METAPHOR
		10. SUMMARY
		Q1. PROBLEMS AND DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
			Q1.1. The Spanish Rebellion
			Q1.2. Nim
			Q1.3. Matching Pennies
			Q1.4. Happy Hour
	Chapter 2 Some Foundations
		1. REPRESENTATION IN NORMAL FORM: A BUSINESS CASE
		2. THE NORMAL FORM IN GENERAL
		3. THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA IN EXTENSIVE FORM
		4. AN EXAMPLE FROM MILITARY HISTORY
		5. ZERO AND NON-CONSTANT SUM GAMES
		6. THE MAXIMIN APPROACH
		7. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ZERO-SUM GAMES
		8. SUMMARY
		Q2. PROBLEMS AND DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
			Q2.1. Sibling Rivalry
			Q2.2. The Great Escape
			Q2.3. Checkers
			Q2.4. Water Game
			Q2.5. Nim strikes again
			Q2.6. Beggars are Choosers
			Q2.7. Beggars Pay Admission
PART II Equilibrium in Normal Form Games
	Chapter 3 Dominant Strategies and Social Dilemmas
		1. THE DUMPING GAME
		2. DOMINANT STRATEGIES
		3. SOCIAL DILEMMAS AND COOPERATIVE SOLUTIONS
		4. A PRICING DILEMMA
		5. COLLABORATIVE PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT
		6. GAMES WITH MORE THAN TWO STRATEGIES
		7. A POLITICAL GAME
		8. A TEXTBOOK-WRITING GAME
		9. SUMMARY
		Q3. EXERCISES AND DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
			Q3.1. Solving the Game
			Q3.2. Effort Dilemmas
			Q3.3. Public Goods
			Q3.4. Poison Gas
			Q3.5. Water Game
			Q3.6. Happy Hour
			Q3.7. The Training Game
	Chapter 4 Nash Equilibrium
		1. A TEXTBOOK-WRITING GAME, CONTINUED
		2. NASH EQUILIBRIUM
		3. A RADIO GAME
		4. AN HEURISTIC METHOD OF FINDING NASH EQUILIBRIA
		5. DOMINANT STRATEGIES AND NASH EQUILIBRIUM
		6. ANOTHER OLIGOPOLY PRICING GAME
		7. A RETAIL LOCATION GAME
		8. SUMMARY
		Q4. EXERCISES AND DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
			Q4.1. Solving the Game
			Q4.2. Location, Location, Location
			Q4.3. Sibling Rivalry
			Q4.4. Hairstyle
			Q4.5. A Dog’s Dinner
	Chapter 5 Games with Two or More Nash Equilibria
		1. DRIVE RIGHT!
		2. HEAVE-HO
		3. ONE MORE DRIVING GAME
		4. PANIC BUYING
		5. CLASSICAL CASES: STAG HUNT
		6. CLASSICAL CASES: THE BATTLE OF THE SEXES
		7. CLASSICAL CASES: CHICKEN
		8. CLASSICAL CASES: HAWK VS. DOVE
		9. AN ESCAPE-EVASION GAME
		10. SUMMARY
		Q5. EXERCISES AND DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
			Q5.1. Sibling Rivalry
			Q5.2. Location for Complementary Services
			Q5.3. Rock, Paper, Scissors
			Q5.4. The Great Escape
	Chapter 6 Three-Person Games
		1. AN INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE
		2. A “SPOILER” IN A POLITICAL GAME
		3. STOCK ADVISING
		4. A CROWDING GAME
		5. GLOBAL WARMING
		6. SUMMARY
		Q6. EXERCISES AND DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
			Q6.1. Another Water-Selling Game
			Q6.2. Three-Person Effort Dilemma
			Q6.3. Frog Mating Game
			Q6.4. Oysterers
			Q6.5. Medical Practice
			Q6.6. NIMBY
	Chapter 7 Probability and Game Theory
		1. PROBABILITY
		2. EXPECTED VALUE
		3. NATURE AS A PLAYER
		4. RISK AVERSION
		5. WILL THERE BE A PANDEMIC?
		6. BAYESIAN NASH EQUILIBRIUM
		7. SUMMARY
		APPENDIX A. MEASURING UTILITY
		APPENDIX B. BAYES’ RULE
		Q7. EXERCISES AND DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
			Q7.1. Country Risk
			Q7.2. Urn Problem
			Q7.3. Lottery
			Q7.4. Investment in Research
			Q7.5. Risk Aversion
			Q7.6. Farmer Ramdass
			Q7.7. Bernie’s Umbrella Business
			Q7.8. Shame
	Chapter 8 Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria
		1. KEEPING THEM HONEST IN BASEBALL
		2. PURE AND MIXED STRATEGIES
		3. A BLUE-LIGHT SPECIAL
		4. EQUILIBRIA WITH MIXED AND PURE STRATEGIES
		5. GRAPHICS FOR MIXED STRATEGIES
		6. SUMMARY
		Q8. EXERCISES AND DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
			Q8.1. Matching Pennies
			Q8.2. Rock, Paper, Scissors
			Q8.3. More Mixed Strategies
			Q8.4. Escape-Evasion
			Q8.5. The Great Escape
			Q8.6. Punic War
			Q8.7. Football
			Q8.8. Give War a Chance — or, anyway, a probability
PART III Sequential and Repeated Play
	Chapter 9 Sequential Games
		1. STRATEGIC INVESTMENT TO DETER ENTRY
		2. CONCEPTS FOR SEQUENTIAL GAMES
		3. NASH AND SUBGAME PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM
		4. MAKE OR BUY
		5. THE CENTIPEDE GAME
		6. THE FUNCTION OF NON-PROFIT ENTERPRISE
		7. SUMMARY
		Q9. EXERCISES AND DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
			Q9.1. Road Rage
			Q9.2. Omnicorp
			Q9.3. Divorce
			Q9.4. Gambling the Night Away
			Q9.5. War of Attrition
			Q9.6. Strike!
			Q9.7. A Drug on the Market
			Q9.8. Free Samples
	Chapter 10 Repeated Play
		1. THE CAMPERS’ DILEMMA
		2. AN EFFORT DILEMMA
		3. PRESSING THE SHIRTS
		4. THE CHAIN STORE PARADOX
		5. SUMMARY
		Q10. EXERCISES AND DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
			Q10.1. Repeated Battle of the Sexes
			Q10.2. Getcha Hot Dog for Five More Weeks
			Q10.3. Congressional Gridlock
			Q10.4. Whiskey and Gin
			Q10.5. Joe Deadbeat
	Chapter 11 Indefinitely Repeated Play
		1. A REPEATED EFFORT DILEMMA
		2. THE DISCOUNT FACTOR
		3. COLLUSIVE PRICING
		4. OTHER TRIGGER STRATEGY RULES
		5. POISON GAS
		6. ERRORS
		7. SUMMARY
		Q11. EXERCISES AND DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
			Q11.1. Pressing the Shirts
			Q11.2. Tourist Trap
			Q11.3. Getcha Hot Dog From Now On
			Q11.4. The CEO Game
			Q11.5. A Dog’s Dinner
			Q11.6. Soda Pop
			Q11.7. Don’t Chicken Out
PART IV Cooperation
	Chapter 12 Cooperative Games in Coalition Function Form
		1. A DIVISION OF LABOR GAME
		2. THE CORE
		3. DOMINANCE
		4. SHAPLEY VALUE
		5. FURTHER EXAMPLES
		6. SUMMARY
		Q12. EXERCISES AND DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
			Q12.1. A Business Partnership
			Q12.2. Choosing Information Systems
			Q12.3. Hospital Merger
			Q12.4. Mallard, Widgeon and Pintail
			Q12.5. A Patent Consortium
	Chapter 13 Cooperative Games Without Coalition Functions
		1. A PUBLIC GOOD
		2. NON-TRANSFERABLE UTILITY
		3. α AND β EFFECTIVITY
		4. GLOBAL WARMING YET AGAIN
		5. SOME POLITICAL COALITIONS
		6. CONCLUDING SUMMARY
		Q13. EXERCISES AND DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
			Q13.1. A Prehistoric Game
			Q13.2. An Exploitation Game
			Q13.3. Another Exploitation Game
			Q13.4. A Reversed Rendezvous Game
PART V Advanced Topics
	Chapter 14 N-Person Games
		1. THE QUEUING GAME
		2. SIMPLIFYING ASSUMPTIONS FOR N-PERSON GAMES
		3. GAMES WITH MANY PARTICIPANTS: PROPORTIONAL GAMES
		4. HAWK VS. DOVE, REVISITED
		5. PANIC BUYING
		6. SUPPLY AND DEMAND
		7. SUMMARY
		Q14. EXERCISES AND DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
			Q14.1. Patenting Game
			Q14.2. Public Goods with N Agents
			Q14.3. Gone Fishin’
			Q14.4. Medical Practice
			Q14.5. El Farol
			Q14.6. More Proportional Games
			Q14.7. Guacamole Valley
			Q14.8. Rockin’ at Midsize
	Chapter 15 Duopoly Strategies and Prices
		1. COURNOT MODELS
		2. BERTRAND MODELS AND NORMAL FORM GAMES
		3. EDGEWORTH
		4. REACTION FUNCTIONS
		5. PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION
		6. REACTION FUNCTIONS IN GENERAL
		7. SUMMARY
		APPENDIX: A MATHEMATICAL TREATMENT OF THE COURNOT MODEL
		Q15. EXERCISES AND DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
			Q15.1. Elevator Music
			Q15.2. A Water Duopoly
			Q15.3. Another Water Duopoly
			Q15.4. Scholarship
	Chapter 16 Rationalizable Strategies
		1. THE RADIO FORMATS GAME AGAIN
		2. A METHOD FOR FINDING RATIONALIZABLE STRATEGIES
		3. DOMINATED STRATEGIES
		4. THE NUTTER GAME REVISITED
		5. THE RETAIL LOCATION GAME REVISITED
		6. RATIONALIZABLE STRATEGIES WITHOUT NASH EQUILIBRIA
		7. RATIONALIZABLE STRATEGIES AND NASH EQUILIBRIUM AGAIN
		8. CONCLUDING SUMMARY
		Q16. EXERCISES AND DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
			Q16.1. Location, Location, Location
			Q16.2. A Restaurant Game
			Q16.3. Athletic Conference
			Q16.4. Advertising Media
	Chapter 17 Trembling Hands and Correlated Strategies
		1. WEAK DOMINANCE
		2. REFINEMENT: A TREMBLING HAND
		3. OTHER REFINEMENTS
		4. TWO RESTAURANTS, AGAIN
		5. A CONFESSION GAME
		6. SOME APPLICATIONS
		7. A MORE ADVANCED CORRELATED STRATEGY EQUILIBRIUM
		8. MORE ON INFORMATION AND EQUILIBRIUM
		9. SUMMARY
		Q17. EXERCISES AND DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
			Q17.1. El Farol
			Q17.2. Medical Practice
			Q17.3. Government Reorganization Plan
			Q17.4. Subcontractors
	Chapter 18 Voting Games
		1. PARTY! PARTY! PARTY!
		2. THE THEME FOR THE PARTY
		3. STRATEGIC VOTING
		4. VOTING PROBLEMS AND CRITERIA
		5. ALTERNATIVE VOTING SCHEMES
		6. CASE: THE FINNISH PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
		7. CASE: THE AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1992
		8. SUMMARY
		Q18. EXERCISES AND DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
			Q18.1. Impasse in the Faculty Senate
			Q18.2. Language
			Q18.3. Weekend Trip
			Q18.4. Beneficiary
	Chapter 19 Social Mechanism Design
		1. MATCHING
		2. GRADING TEAM PROJECTS
		3. A GAME OF TYPES
		4. CAP AND TRADE
		5. SUMMARY
		Q19. EXERCISES AND DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
			Q19.1. Building a Levee
			Q19.2. Laissez Faire
	Chapter 20 Games, Experiments, and Behavioral Game Theory
		1. A PRISONER’S DILEMMA EXPERIMENT
		2. BEHAVIORAL GAME THEORY
		3. A MIXED EXPERIMENT
		4. ULTIMATUM GAMES
		5. CENTIPEDE GAMES AND RECIPROCITY
		6. BUSINESS APPLICATION: RECIPROCITYIN THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
		6. BUSINESS APPLICATION: RECIPROCITY IN THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
		7. LEVEL K
		8. WORK TO BE DONE (FRAMING)
		9. WHERE WE HAVE ARRIVED
		10. SUMMARY
		Q20. EXERCISES AND DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
			Q20.1. Road Rage
			Q20.2. Payback Game
			Q20.3. An Environmental Game
			Q20.4. Effort Dilemma
			Q20.5. Level k
		Endnote
	Chapter 21 Evolution and Adaptive Learning
		1. HAWK VS. DOVE
		2. A SEWAGE GAME
		3. BOUNDED RATIONALITY
		4. EVOLUTION AND A REPEATED SOCIAL DILEMMA
		5. INFORMATIONALLY (ALMOST) EFFICIENT MARKETS
		6. TIT-FOR-TAT, RECIPROCITY, AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE HUMAN SPECIES
		7. SUMMARY
		Q21. EXERCISES AND DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
			Q21.1. Frog Mating Game
			Q21.2. El Farol
			Q21.3. Maximizing profits
			Q21.4. Banking
			Q21.5. Retaliation Game
			Q21.6. A Fishy Dilemma
Index