Game Theory and Applications

Content: 
ECONOMIC THEORY, ECONOMETRICS, AND MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, Pages ii,iia
Front Matter, Page iii
Copyright, Page iv
Contributors, Pages viii-x
Preface, Page xi, TATSURO ICHIISHI, ABRAHAM NEYMAN, YAIR TAUMAN
Refinement of Nash Equilibrium: The Main Ideas, Pages 3-45, ELON KOHLBERG
Supergames, Pages 46-63, SYLVAIN SORIN
Repeated Games with Incomplete Information, Pages 64-76, FRANÇOISE FORGES
Repeated Games, Pages 77-130, JEAN-FRANÇOIS MERTENS
Bounded Rationality and Strategic Complexity in Repeated Games, Pages 131-157, EHUD KALAI
The Shapley Value, Pages 158-165, ROBERT AUMANN
Advances in Value Theory, Pages 166-175, SERGIU HART
Axiomatizations of the Core, the Nucleolus, and the Prekernel, Pages 176-182, BEZALEL PELEG
Consistency, Pages 183-186, MICHAEL MASCHLER
The Consistency Principle, Pages 187-215, WILLIAM THOMSON
Discrete Concepts in n-Person Game Theory: Nondegeneracy and Homogeneity, Pages 216-231, JOACHIM ROSENMÜLLER
Two-Sided Matching Markets: An Overview of Some Theory and Empirical Evidence, Pages 232-251, ALVIN E. ROTH
Strategic Market Game Models of Exchange Economies, Pages 252-272, MARTIN SHUBIK
Information Transmission, Pages 273-281, SHMUEL ZAMIR, MORTON I. KAMIEN, YAIR TAUMAN
Monotonic Surplus Sharing and the Utilization of Common Property Resources, Pages 282-299, HERVÉ MOULIN
Developments in Stable Set Theory, Pages 300-316, WILLIAM F. LUCAS
Game Theoretic Models of Voting in Multidimensional Issue Spaces, Pages 317-335, RICHARD D. MCKELVEY
Israel and the PLO: A Game with Differential Information, Pages 336-357, SHAUL MISHAL, DAVID SCHMEIDLER, ITAI SENED
A Survey of Some Results Closely Related to the Knaster–Kuratowski–Mazurkiewicz Theorem, Pages 358-370, KY FAN
On the Core of the Assignment Game, Pages 373-374, MICHEL L. BALINSKI, DAVID GALE
The Second Welfare Theorem in Nonconvex Economies, Pages 375-376, BERNARD CORNET
An Evolutionary Game Theory Model for Risk-Taking, Pages 377-379, STEPHEN ELLNER, AVI SHMIDA
Values of Nonatomic Vector Measure Games: Are They Linear Combinations of the Measures?, Page 380, SERGIU HART, ABRAHAM NEYMAN
Subgame-Perfect Equilibria in Discrete and Continuous Games: Does Discretization Matter?, Pages 381-382, MARTIN HELLWIG, WOLFGANG LEININGER
To Vote or Not to Vote: What Is the Quota?, Page 383, RON HOLZMAN
Some Bounds for the Banzhaf Index and Other Semivalues, Page 384, RON HOLZMAN, EHUD LEHRER, NATHAN LINIAL
Comparative Cooperative Game Theory, Pages 385-387, TATSURO ICHIISHI
Escalation and Cooperation in International Conflicts: The Dollar-Auction Revisited, Pages 388-389, WOLFGANG LEININGER
An Axiomatization of the Nonsymmetric, Nontransferable Utility Value, Pages 390-391, ANAT LEVY, RICHARD P. MCLEAN
A Milnor Condition for Nonatomic Lipschitz Games and Its Applications, Page 392, DOV MONDERER
Zero-Sum Nonstationary Stochastic Games with General State Space, Pages 393-397, ANDRZEJ S. NOWAK
Perfect Equilibrium Points and Lexicographic Domination, Pages 398-400, AKIRA OKADA
A Two-Person Repeated Bargaining Game with Long Term Contracts, Pages 401-403, AKIRA OKADA
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Revealed Group Preferences, Pages 404-406, HANS PETERS, PETER WAKKER
The Sealed-Bid Mechanism: An Experimental Study, Page 407, ROY RADNER, ANDREW SCHOTTER
Rate of Convergence to Full Efficiency in the Buyers' Bid Double Auction as the Market Becomes Large, Page 408, MARK A. SATTERTHWAITE, STEVEN R. WILLIAMS
Stationary Strategies in Deterministic Games, Page 409, RASTISLAV TELGÁRSKY
Big Boss Games, Clan Games, and Information Market Games, Pages 410-412, STEF H. TIJS
Large Games and Economies with Near-Exhaustion of Gains to Coalition Formation, Pages 413-415, MYRNA HOLTZ WOODERS
Values of Large Finite Games, Pages 416-417, MYRNA HOLTZ WOODERS, WILLIAM R. ZAME
Index, Pages 419-435