Fundamental Uncertainty: Rationality and Plausible Reasoning

Cover......Page 1
Contents......Page 6
List of Figures......Page 13
List of Tables......Page 15
Preface......Page 16
Notes on Contributors......Page 17
1.1 Uncertainty, plausible reasoning and the continuum of inductive methods......Page 22
1.2 A refinement of the distinction between risk and uncertainty: fundamental uncertainty......Page 26
1.3 Plausible reasoning under fundamental uncertainty......Page 28
1.4 The scope of the volume and its contributions......Page 31
1.5 Epilogue......Page 40
2.1.1 Logic and empiricism......Page 44
2.1.2 Probability a logical relation......Page 45
2.1.3 Probability values......Page 46
2.2 Ramsey\'s criticism......Page 47
2.2.2 Dutch Book......Page 48
2.2.3 Black and white balls......Page 50
2.3 Assessing the philosophical issues......Page 53
3.2 Peirce on balancing reasons......Page 60
3.3 Keynes as a conceptualist......Page 64
3.4 Keynes on frequentism......Page 66
3.5 Is more information always a good thing?......Page 69
3.6 Keynes and Ramsey (and Savage and Good)......Page 70
3.7 Inductive warrant and weight of argument......Page 75
4.2 Probability as the degree of rational belief......Page 80
4.3 The epistemological dilemma between quantitative and qualitative probability......Page 83
4.4 Sufficient condition of comparability......Page 85
4.5 Comparative indifference principle......Page 88
4.6 Conclusion: epistemological advantages of comparative probability......Page 90
5.1 Two sides of uncertainty......Page 94
5.2.2 Polar and intermediate cases......Page 97
5.3.1 Ontological criteria and epistemic criteria......Page 101
5.3.2 Similarity relations and measures of distance......Page 103
5.4.1 Orders of similarity and similarity judgements......Page 105
5.4.2 Similarity, likelihood and uncertainty......Page 109
5.4.3 Short-term and long-term orders of likelihood......Page 110
5.5.1 Cognitive tension under fundamental uncertainty......Page 113
5.5.2 Balancing acts......Page 114
5.6 Non-exclusion, uncertainty, and similarity thresholds: concluding remarks......Page 116
6.1 Introduction......Page 125
6.2 Uncertainty and probability theory......Page 126
6.3 The concept of NL-computation......Page 130
6.4 The concept of precisiation......Page 131
6.5 The concept of cointensive precisiation......Page 134
6.6 A key idea—the meaning postulate......Page 137
6.7 The concept of a generalized constraint......Page 138
6.8 Principal modalities of generalized constraints......Page 139
6.9 The concept of bimodal constraint/distribution......Page 143
6.10 The concept of a group constraint......Page 146
6.11 Primary constraints, composite constraints, and standard constraints......Page 147
6.12 The generalized constraint language and standard constraint language......Page 148
6.13 The concept of granular value......Page 149
6.14 The concept of protoform......Page 150
6.15 The concept of generalized constraint-based computation......Page 153
6.16 Protoformal deduction rules......Page 156
6.17.1 The Robert example......Page 162
6.17.2 The tall Swedes problem......Page 163
6.17.3 Tall Swedes and tall Italians......Page 166
6.18 Concluding remark......Page 167
7.1 Introduction......Page 172
7.2 Definitions of ‘weight of argument\'......Page 173
7.3 Weight of argument and modalities of uncertainty......Page 175
7.4 Practical relevance of the weight of argument: preliminary analysis......Page 179
7.5 The weight of argument in the light of theory of decision under uncertainty......Page 181
7.6 The weight of argument in the General Theory......Page 184
7.7 Concluding remarks......Page 188
8.1 Introduction......Page 192
8.2 From the coefficient of influence to the relevance quotient......Page 193
8.3 The formal definition of the relevance quotient......Page 194
8.3.1 Regular probabilities......Page 195
8.3.2 Exchangeable probabilities......Page 197
8.3.3 Exchangeability, independence and relevance quotient......Page 199
8.3.4 Invariant probabilities......Page 201
8.3.5 The main theorem......Page 202
8.3.6 Inductive applications......Page 205
8.4 Particle statistics......Page 207
8.5 Closed dynamical systems......Page 211
8.5.1 Destruction and creation probabilities......Page 212
8.5.2 Unary moves......Page 214
8.6.1 Customers and shops: Ewens\'s limit......Page 215
8.6.2 Stock-price dynamics: thermodynamic limit......Page 219
8.7 The role of probability in economics......Page 221
9.1 Introduction......Page 232
9.2.1 Binary choice: model 1......Page 233
9.3 Two-parameter Poisson–Dirichlet distribution of innovation arrival processes......Page 235
9.4 GDP is non-self-averaging......Page 237
9.5 Mittag–Leffler function......Page 239
9.6.1 The non-self-averaging phenomenon in two blocks of economies......Page 240
9.6.2 The master equation, probability generating function and cumulant equations......Page 241
9.6.3 The dynamics for the mean and the covariance matrix elements......Page 242
9.6.4 The behaviour of the coefficients of variation......Page 243
9.7 Related simulation studies......Page 244
9.8 Non-self-averaging triangular urn models......Page 245
9.8.1 Balanced triangular urn models......Page 246
9.10 Appendix: Mittag–Leffler function and its distribution......Page 249
10.1 Introduction......Page 253
10.2 Induction and the \'atomic\' universe......Page 254
10.3 A model of ethical behaviour and the atomic hypothesis......Page 257
10.4 The Quarterly Journal of Economics article and the atomic hypothesis......Page 259
10.5 The General Theory and the atomic hypothesis......Page 262
10.6 The \'theory\' of effective demand......Page 265
10.7 The \'principle\' of effective demand: Pasinetti\'s view......Page 267
10.8 The Keynesian world view: deterministic uniformity in the macro world versus the uncertainty of an individual unit in the micro world......Page 269
10.9.1 Physicists\' views of natural laws......Page 271
10.9.2 The sociological view according to Emile Durkheim......Page 274
10.9.3 Saussure\'s view of \'système\'......Page 276
10.10 Sraffa\'s production system: a theory independent of the atomic hypothesis......Page 277
10.11 A critical reorientation of Keynes\'s economic theory......Page 279
11.1 Changing views about the future in a monetary economy......Page 293
11.2.1 Knight\'s and Keynes\'s distinction between risk and uncertainty......Page 294
11.2.2 Post-Keynesians, historical time and crucial decision making......Page 296
11.3.1 New Classical Economics and Keynes\'s stochastic processes......Page 300
11.3.2 Keynes\' conception of instrumental rationality......Page 303
11.3.3 Uncertainty and long-period expectations......Page 307
11.4 Concluding remarks......Page 310
12.1 Introduction......Page 315
12.2 Welfare theories based on the ethics of motive......Page 316
12.2.1 Traditional utilitarianism: Benthamism......Page 317
12.2.2 The neo-Humean view......Page 319
12.3 Instrumental rationality and ethics of motive......Page 321
12.3.1 Substantive rationality......Page 322
12.3.2 Maximization of expected utility, and bounded rationality......Page 323
12.4 Welfare theory and ethics of end: from Moore to Keynes......Page 326
12.4.1 The nature of good: the ideal as a state of mind......Page 327
12.4.2 Keynes\'s moral philosophy and theory of rational decisions......Page 329
12.5 Ethics of end and right conduct......Page 332
12.5.1 Keynes\' criticism of ideal utilitarianism......Page 333
12.5.2 Rational dualism......Page 338
12.5.3 Other procedures: conventional judgement......Page 341
12.6.1 Subjective values......Page 342
12.6.2 Objective values......Page 343
12.7 Conclusion......Page 345
Name Index......Page 352
Subject Index......Page 358