From an Ontological Point of View

Contents......Page 12
1.1 The Inescapability of Ontology......Page 18
1.2 Consciousness......Page 19
1.3 Conceivability and Possibility......Page 20
1.4 The Picture Theory......Page 22
1.5 Levels of Being......Page 24
1.6 Propositions......Page 26
1.7 Ontology......Page 27
1.8 Applications......Page 30
ONTOLOGY......Page 32
2.1 The Levels Picture......Page 34
2.2 Horizontal and Vertical Laws......Page 36
2.3 Apparent Difficulties......Page 37
2.4 Looking Ahead......Page 38
3.1 Philosophical Puzzles......Page 39
3.2 Making the Picture Theory Explicit......Page 40
3.3 Principle (Φ)......Page 43
3.4 From Predicates to Properties to Levels of Being......Page 44
4.1 Anti-Reduction......Page 48
4.2 Causal Relevance......Page 49
4.3 Causation and Laws......Page 51
4.4 Further Difficulties......Page 53
4.5 The Burden of Proof......Page 55
5.1 Projectability and Similarity......Page 57
5.2 The Fruits of Analysis......Page 58
5.3 The Picture Theory at Work......Page 60
5.4 Higher-Level Causation......Page 62
5.5 Kinds......Page 63
5.6 Life without Levels......Page 66
6.1 The Analytical Project......Page 68
6.2 Truth Making and Entailment......Page 71
6.3 Absolutism, Eliminativism, Relativism......Page 73
6.4 Anti-Realism and Ontology......Page 75
7.1 The Need for Truth-Makers......Page 78
7.2 What Truth Making Is Not......Page 79
7.3 A Legacy of the Picture Theory......Page 82
7.4 Supervenience......Page 84
7.5 The Totality Fact......Page 85
7.6 Martin’s Objection......Page 89
7.7 Moving Beyond Levels of Being......Page 90
8.1 Properties and Powers......Page 92
8.2 Properties as Powers......Page 93
8.3 Terminological Preliminary......Page 95
8.4 Are Dispositions Relations?......Page 96
8.5 Dispositions and their Manifestations......Page 98
8.6 Dispositionality and Reciprocity......Page 100
9.1 Two Conceptions of Dispositionality......Page 102
9.2 Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson......Page 104
9.3 Armstrong on Dispositionality......Page 107
9.4 Humean Contingency......Page 109
9.5 What Is a Law of Nature?......Page 112
10.1 Pure Dispositionality......Page 114
10.2 Spatial Parts......Page 116
10.3 Campbell on Boscovich......Page 118
10.4 A World of Relations?......Page 119
10.5 An Argument from Armstrong......Page 122
10.6 Bundles and Substances......Page 124
11.1 Powers and Qualities......Page 128
11.2 Identity All the Way Down......Page 131
11.3 The Legacy of Functionalism......Page 132
11.4 Dispositional and Categorical Pluralism......Page 134
11.5 A Dual-Aspect Account......Page 135
11.6 Armstrong’s Thesis......Page 137
11.7 Meinongianism......Page 139
11.8 Moving Ahead......Page 141
12.1 Universals and Modes......Page 143
12.2 Possible Worlds and Properties as Sets......Page 145
12.3 In rebus Universals......Page 147
12.5 Being Wholly Present in Different Places at Once......Page 149
13.1 Benefits and Costs......Page 154
13.2 Modes and Tropes......Page 155
13.3 Individuating Modes......Page 157
13.4 A ‘Sparse’ Conception of Modes......Page 159
13.5 Modes and Explanation......Page 160
13.6 Parsimony......Page 162
13.7 Transcendent Universals......Page 164
13.8 ‘All Things that Exist are only Particulars’......Page 166
14.1 Similarity and Identity......Page 168
14.2 Objective Similarity......Page 169
14.3 Predicates and Similarity......Page 170
14.4 Grades of Similarity......Page 171
14.5 Imperfect Similarity as ‘Partial Identity’......Page 173
14.6 Similarity among Simple Properties......Page 174
14.7 Dissimilarity......Page 176
14.8 Functional Similarity......Page 177
14.9 Where this Leaves Us......Page 179
14.10 Secondary Qualities......Page 180
14.11 ‘Projections’......Page 183
15.1 Particular Substances......Page 186
15.2 Substrata......Page 187
15.3 Objects as Basic Entities......Page 188
15.4 Basic Objects......Page 190
15.5 Considerations Favouring Simple Objects......Page 192
15.6 What Are the Objects?......Page 194
16.1 Ordinary Objects......Page 196
16.2 Sortals......Page 197
16.3 The Indiscernibility of Identicals......Page 198
16.4 ‘Overlapping Objects’ and Eliminativism......Page 200
16.5 Historical and Modal ‘Properties’......Page 201
16.6 Modal Properties and Dispositions......Page 204
16.7 What Does Realism about Statues Require?......Page 205
16.8 Material Constitution......Page 207
16.9 Eddington’s Tables......Page 208
APPLICATIONS......Page 210
17.2 Dispositions......Page 212
17.3 Primary and Secondary Qualities......Page 216
17.4 What Ought We to Ask of a Philosophical Theory of Colour?......Page 217
17.5 Divide and Conquer......Page 221
18.2 Internalism and Externalism......Page 225
18.3 The Dart-Tossing Model......Page 227
18.4 The Self......Page 229
18.5 Swampman......Page 231
18.6 Causally Loaded States of Mind......Page 232
18.7 A Worry from Kripke......Page 233
18.8 Individuating Dispositions......Page 236
18.9 Infinite Use of Finite Means......Page 237
18.10 Intentionality and Dispositionality......Page 238
18.11 Natural Intentionality......Page 239
19.1 Experiences......Page 240
19.2 Mary’s Experience......Page 241
19.3 Qualities of Experiences and Qualities of Objects Experienced......Page 242
19.4 Prosthetic Vision......Page 244
19.5 Sensation and Perception......Page 246
19.6 The Representational Medium......Page 247
19.7 Qualia......Page 249
19.8 The Explanatory Gap......Page 252
19.9 Privacy and Privileged Access......Page 254
20.1 Philosophical Zombies......Page 257
20.2 Functionalism and Consciousness......Page 259
20.3 Logical and Natural Supervenience......Page 260
20.4 The Ontology of Zombies......Page 262
20.5 The Impossibility of Zombies......Page 264
20.6 Concluding Remark......Page 266
References......Page 267
C......Page 278
I......Page 279
N......Page 280
P......Page 281
R......Page 282
T......Page 283
Z......Page 284