Frege and Other Philosophers

Preface......Page 1
Personal contact as well as intellectual influence genuinely made......Page 3
Proposition (3) is not only false, but could have been known by......Page 6
Michael Dummett......Page 16
Fig. 2.1. The Structure Of Definitions In Grundlagen......Page 27
1. The Problem and Its Background......Page 42
The proofs are straightforward......Page 45
2. Frege\'s Independence Problem Solved......Page 46
3. The Archimedean Condition......Page 47
4. All Independence Problems Resolved......Page 48
Michael Dummett......Page 51
Michael Dummett......Page 60
I stated in my book that one of the ingredients in Frege\'s notion of......Page 63
Michael Dummett......Page 72
1. Sluga\'s Claims......Page 74
2. Lotze on Objectivity......Page 75
3. Lotze\'s Notion of Validity......Page 80
4. Lotze on Plato......Page 83
5. Objectivity and Intersubjectivity......Page 84
6. Frege\'s Notion of Wirklichkeit......Page 87
7. Logical Objects and Functions......Page 88
8. Frege\'s Notion of Objectivity......Page 90
1. Frege\'s Terminology......Page 92
2. Relative and Absolute Justification......Page 95
3. The Justification of Non-Logical Laws......Page 98
4. Geometry Founded on Intuition......Page 100
5. What Is Intuition?......Page 102
6. Our Knowledge of Geometry......Page 105
7. Idealism......Page 108
1. General Aims......Page 113
2. Understanding......Page 118
3. Semantic Theories......Page 121
4. Reference......Page 122
5. Concepts......Page 125
6. Natural Languages and Formal Languages......Page 129
7. Sense and Truth-Conditions......Page 130
8. Language and Expression......Page 132
9. Logic......Page 134
10. Contingency......Page 135
11. Senses and Functions......Page 137
12. Alternative Analyses......Page 139
13. A Straightforward and Compelling Argument......Page 141
14. Type Ambiguities......Page 142
15. Conclusion......Page 143
1.  Are Judgeable contents Objects?......Page 144
2. Concepts as Functions......Page 149
4. Sense and Reference......Page 153
10 Which End of the Telescope?*......Page 156
1. Inference and Logical Consequences......Page 157
Wittgenstein and the Notion of Semantic Consequence......Page 158
Sentences and Thoughts......Page 159
Assertion......Page 161
Laws of Thought......Page 162
3. Contextual Definition and the Primacy of Sentences......Page 163
Contextual Definitions......Page 164
Names and Sentences......Page 165
The Context Principle Again......Page 166
Methodology......Page 169
Prospects for a New Interpretation......Page 170
Michael Dummett......Page 171
But a much more radical idea superseded this. It is marked, in......Page 178
Michael Dummett......Page 180
Michael Dummett......Page 189
1. Two Fundamental Theses......Page 207
2. Bell\'s First Accusation......Page 209
Why Did Frege Ever Assert Thesis T?......Page 210
Do Contents Have Structure?......Page 216
3. Bell\'s Second Accusation......Page 219
This solution cannot be adequate. It is not merely that senses can......Page 221
The Third Realm......Page 223
Spontaneity......Page 224
Michael Dummett......Page 225
This account of Frege\'s not merely treats language as prior to......Page 226