Free Will: Historical and Analytic Perspectives

Contents
Notes on Contributors
1: Introduction
	1	 Aims and Scope
	2	 The Problem(s) of Free Will
	3	 Proposed Solutions to the Problem(s) of Free Will
	4	 Overview of the Contributions
	References
Part I: Free Will and Determinism
	2: What Is Determinism? Why We Should Ditch the Entailment Definition
		1	 What Is the Thesis We Are Worried About When We Worry About Free Will?
		2	 The Relationship Between (MD) and (ED)
		3	 Deciding on the Definition of Determinism
		4	 Why (MD) Is to Be Preferred to (ED) as a Definition of Determinism
		References
	3: Aristotle and the Discovery of Determinism
		1	 Preface: Three Types of Determinism in Aristotle
		2	 Logical Determinism: Future Truth
		3	 Physical Determinism
		4	 Ethical Determinism
		5	 Limitations on What Is ‘Up to Us’
		6	 Determinate But ‘Up to Us’?
		References
	4: Defending Free Will
		1	 Basic Issues
		2	 Digression: The Crucial Contrast Between Events and Eventuations
		References
	5: Some Free Thinking About ‘Thinking About Free Will’
		1	 Introduction: The Problem of Free Will
		2	 Peter van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument
		3	 The Fixity of Descriptions of the Past
			3.1	 How van Inwagen Justifies His Assumption
			3.2	 Why van Inwagen’s Attempt to Justify His Assumption Fails
				Identity of Necessarily Equivalent Propositions
				Descriptivism About Proper Names
				Deflationism About the Past
		4	 Conclusion
		References
	6: Local-Miracle Compatibilism: A Critique
		1	 The Consequence Argument: The Conditional Version
		2	 Local-Miracle Compatibilism
		3	 Reply to Multiple-Pasts Compatibilism
		4	 Reply to Local-Miracle Compatibilism
		5	 Freedom and Counterfactuals
		6	 The Fixed Future and the Open Past
		References
	7: Backtracking Counterfactuals and Agents’ Abilities
		1	 Introduction
		2	 Fixed-Laws Compatibilism: A Primer
		3	 Different Modalities?
		4	 Fischer’s Argument for (FPFL)
		5	 Counterfactuals and Rationality
		References
	8: Moral Necessity, Agent Causation, and the Determination of Free Actions in Clarke and Leibniz
		1	 Introduction
		2	 Brief Overview of Leibniz’s Theory of Freedom
		3	 Activity, Self-Motion, and Agent-Causation in Clarke
		4	 Determination, Moral Necessity, and Final Causation in Clarke
			4.1	 God’s Inability to Choose Sub-optimal Options
			4.2	 Divine Freedom and Moral Necessity
			4.3	 Human Freedom
			4.4	 Clarkean Determination and Freedom
			4.5	 The Determination by Final and Occasional Causes
		5	 Equipoise in Clarke
		6	 Comparison and Conclusion
		References
Part II: Free Will and Indeterminism
	9: Indeterministic Compatibilism
		1	 Introduction
		2	 The Compatibility of Compatibilism with Indeterminism
		3	 Indeterministic Causation and Probability-Raising
		4	 Indeterminism, Causal Underdetermination, and Causal Indeterminacy
		5	 Conclusions
		References
	10: The Culpability Problem and the Indeterminacy of Choice
		1	 Peter van Inwagen’s Description of the Problem
		2	 Are Forms of Determinism and Indeterminism Conceivable That Might Not Be Contradictory?
		3	 Personally Localized Indeterminism and Its Aporetic Consequences for the Possibility of Controlled Decision
		4	 Decisions in a Situation of Personally Localized Indeterminism
		5	 The Most Possible Course of Action According to Rational Principles: Aquinas’s Idea of a Rational Consilium of Free Decisions
		6	 Sameness of Laws of Nature with a Potential Difference of Principles of Choice
		7	 General Determinism and the Ability to Decide Otherwise
		References
	11: Ambivalent Freedom: Kant and the Problem of Willkür
		1	 The Problem of Willkür
		2	 The Conceptual History of Willkür
		3	 Kant and the Problem of Willkür
			3.1	 Willkür and Transcendental Freedom in the Critique of Pure Reason
			3.2	 Willkür and Autonomy in the Critique of Practical Reason
			3.3	 Willkür and Maxim in Kant’s Religion
			3.4	 Willkür and Will in the Metaphysics of Morals
		4	 Willkür and Free Will in the Analytic Debate on Freedom
		5	 Conclusion
		References
	12: Determination, Chance and David Hume: On Freedom as a Power
		1	 Freedom and the Distinctiveness of Blame
		2	 Freedom as Agent-Causation
		3	 Determination and Contingency
		4	 Hume’s Argument Again
		References
Part III: Free Will and Moral Responsibility
	13: Kant’s Justification of Freedom as a Condition for Moral Imputation
		1	 Moral Responsibility, Imputation and the Required Sense of Freedom
		2	 Making Room for Freedom: The Compatibility of Transcendental Freedom and Determinism
		3	 The Practical Justification of Freedom
		4	 Pereboom on Kant’s Practical Justification of Freedom
			4.1	 Does Kant’s Justification of Transcendental Freedom Suffice to Legitimate Practices of Holding Each Other Responsible?
		5	 Conclusion
		References
	14: Does “Ought” Imply “Can”?
		References
Name Index
Subject Index