Free Will A Defence Against Neurophysiological Determinism

Cover
Half Title Page
Title Page
Copyright Page
Original Title Page
Original Copyright Page
Dedication Page
Contents
Figures
Acknowledgments
I Introduction
	1 Varieties Of Freedom
		(i) Two Capital Distinctions
		(ii) Scalar And Absolute Freedom
		(iii) Complete And Incomplete Freedom
	2 Varieties Of Detenninism
	3 Formal Matters
		(i) The Problem
		(ii) The First Solution: Temporal Modal Logic
		(iii) The Second Solution: Barbara LXL
		(iv) The Third Solution: Relative Modality
		(v) The Fourth Solution: Elements Of A New System
II On The Dispute Between Compatibilists And Incompatibilists
	(i) On Kenny's Scotist Argument
	(ii) Some Considerations About Meaning
III The Correlation Thesis
	(i) Two Objections To A Correlation Thesis
	(ii) One-One Or One-Many, But Not Many-One
	(iii) Designating Neural Kinds
	(iv) Designating Mental Kinds
	(v) The 'Style' Of Correlation: Additive Versusnon-Additive
	(vi) How Correlations Are Established
	(vii) The Identity Theory
	(viii) Summary
IV Three Problems For The Libertarian
	(i) Neurophysiological Indeterminism
	(ii) The Mind's Dependence On The Brain
	(iii) The Random And The Free
V Hegemony
	(i) Proposal Of The Theory
	(ii) Systems Of Alternating Hegemony
	(iii) Decisions
VI The Random And The Free
	(i) Self-Determinism Or Agent Causality
	(ii) Activity And Passivity
	(iii) Purpose
	(iv) Theory Of Mind
	(v) The Conditions Of Freedom Of Decision
VII Paralipomena
	(i) Freedom Of Action
	(ii) Freedom Of Will And Strength Of Will
	(iii) Scalar Freedom And Responsibility
Notes
Bibliography
Index