Formal and Transcendental Logic

Cover......Page 1
Title Page......Page 3
Contents......Page 6
Introduction......Page 21
§ 1. Outset from the significations of the word logos: speaking, thinking, what is thought......Page 38
§ 2. The ideality of language. Exclusion of the problems pertaining to it......Page 39
§ 3. Language as an expression of \"thinking.\" Thinking in the broadest sense, as the sense-constituting mental process......Page 42
§ 4. The problem of ascertaining the essential limits of the \"thinking\" capable of the significational function......Page 45
§ 5. Provisional delimination of logic as apriori theory of science......Page 46
§ 6. The formal character of logic. The formal Apriori and the contingent Apriori......Page 49
§ 7. The normative and practical functions of logic......Page 51
§ 8. The two-sidedness of logic; the subjective and the Objective direction of its thematizing activity......Page 53
§ 9. The straightforward thematizing activity of the \"Objective\" or \"positive\" sciences. The idea of two-sided sciences......Page 56
§ 10. Historically existing psychology and scientific thematizing activity directed to the subjective......Page 58
a. Logic directed originally to the Objective theoetical formations produced by thinking......Page 59
b. Logic\'s interest in truth and the resultant relection on subjective insight......Page 62
c. Result: the hybridism of historically existing logic as a theoretical and normative-practical discipline......Page 64
§ 12. Discovery of the idea of the pure judgment-form......Page 68
a. The idea of theory of forms......Page 69
b. Universality of the judgment-form; the fundaental forms and their variants......Page 70
c. Operation as the guiding concept in the investiation of forms......Page 72
§ 14. Consequence-logic (logic of non-contradiction) as the second level of formal logic......Page 73
§ 15. Truth-logic and consequence-logic......Page 75
a. Modes of performing the judgment. Distinctness and confusion......Page 76
b. Distinctness and clarity......Page 80
c. Clarity in the having of something itself and clarity of anticipation......Page 81
§ 17. The essential genus, \"distinct judgment,\" as the theme of \"pure analytics\"......Page 82
§ 18. The fundamental question of pure analytics......Page 83
§ 19. Pure analytics as fundamental to the formal logic of truth. Non-contradiction as a condition for possible truth......Page 85
§ 20. The principles of logic and their analogues in pure analytics......Page 86
§ 21. The evidence in the coinciding of \"the same\" conused and distinct judgment. The broadest conept of the judgment......Page 88
§ 22. The concept defining the province belonging to the theory of apophantic forms, as the grammar of pure logic, is the judgment in the broadest sense......Page 90
a. The conceptual self-containedness of traditional logic as apophantic analytics......Page 92
b. The emerging of the idea of an enlarged analytics, Leibniz\'s \"mathesis universalis,\" and the melhodico-technical unification of traditional syllogistics and formal mathematics......Page 93
§ 24. The new problem of a formal ontology. Characterzation of traditional formal mathematics as formal ontology......Page 96
§ 25. Formal apophantics and formal ontology as beonging together materially, notwithstanding the diversity of their respective themes......Page 98
a. Lack of the concept of the pure empty form......Page 100
b. Lack of knowledge that apophantic formations are ideal......Page 101
c. Further reasons, particularly the lack of genuine scientific inquiries into origins......Page 103
d. Comment on Bolzano\'s position regarding the idea of formal ontology......Page 104
a. The first constitutional investigations of categorial objectivities, in the Philosophie der Arithmetik......Page 106
b. The way of the \"Prolegomena\" from formal apohantics to formal ontology......Page 108
§ 28. The highest level of formal logic: the theory of deductive systems; correlativcly, the theory of multiplicities......Page 110
§ 29. The theory of multiplicities and the formalizing reduction of the nomological sciences......Page 112
§ 30. Multiplicity-theory as developed by Riemann and his successors......Page 113
§ 31. The pregnant concept of a multiplicity-correlaively, that of a \"deductive\" or \"nomological\" system-clarified by the concept of \"defiileness\"......Page 114
§ 32. The highest idea of a theory of multiplicities: a universal nomological science of the forms of multiplicities......Page 117
§ 33. Actual formal mathematics and mathematics of the rules of the game......Page 118
§ 34. Complete formal mathematics identical with complete logical analytics......Page 119
a. Only deductive theory has a purely analytic system-form......Page 120
b. The problem of when a system of propositions has a system-form characterizable as analytic......Page 122
§ 36. Retrospect and preliminary indication of our further tasks......Page 124
§ 37. The inquiry concerning the relationship between formal apophantics and formal ontology; insuficiency of our clarifications up to now......Page 125
§ 38. Judgment-objects as such and syntactical forations......Page 126
§ 39. The concept of the judgment broadened to cover all formations produced by syntactical actions......Page 127
§ 40. Formal analytics as a playing with thoughts, and logical analytics. The relation to possible appliation is part of the logical sense of formal mahesis......Page 128
§ 41. The difference between an apophantic and an ontological focusing and the problem of clarifying that difference......Page 130
a. Judging directed, not to the judgment, but to the thematic objectivity......Page 131
b. Identity of the thematic object throughout changes in the syntactical operations......Page 132
c. The types of syntactical object-forms as the typical modes of Something......Page 133
d. The dual function of syntactical operations......Page 134
e. Coherence of the judging by virtue of the unity of the substrate-object that is being determined. Constitution of the \"concept\" determining the substrate-object......Page 135
f. The categorial formations, which accrue in the determining, as habitual and intersubjective posessions......Page 137
g. The objectivity given beforehand to thinking conrasted with the categorial objectivity produced by thinking — Nature as an illustration......Page 138
§ 3. Non-original manners of givenness of the judgment339......Page 0
a. The change of thematizing focus from objectrovinces to judgments as logic intends them......Page 140
a. The attitude of someone who is judging naively-slraigfUforwardly......Page 141
p. In the critical attitude of someone who intends to cognize, supposed objectivities as supposed are distinguished from actual objectivities......Page 142
§ 45. The judgment in the sense proper to apophantic logic......Page 146
§ 46. Truth and falsity as results of criticism. The double sense of truth and evidence......Page 147
§ 47. The adjustment of traditional logic to the critical attitude of science leads to its focusing on the apohansis......Page 150
§ 48. Judgments, as mere suppositions, belong to the region of senses. Phenomenological characteriation of the focusing on senses......Page 151
§ 49. The double sense of judgment (positum, propoition)......Page 154
§ 50. The broadening of the concept of sense to cover the whole positional sphere, and the broadening of formal logic to include a formal axiology and a formal theory of practice......Page 155
§ 51. Pure consequence-logic as a pure theory of senses. The division into consequence-logic and truthogic is valid also for the theory of multiplicities, as the highest level of logic......Page 157
§ 53. Elucidations by the example of the Euclidean multiplicity......Page 161
a. The problem......Page 163
b. The two correlative senses of formal logic......Page 164
c. The idea of formal ontology can be separated from the idea of theory of science......Page 167
§ 55. Is the development of logic as Objective-formal enough to satisfy even the idea of a merely formal theory of science ?......Page 169
§ 56. The reproach of psychologism cast at every conideration of logical formations that is directed to the subjective......Page 171
a. The motives for this psychologism......Page 173
b. The ideality of logical formations as their making their appearance irreally in the logico-psychic sphere......Page 174
§ 58. The evidence of ideal objects analogous to that of individual objects......Page 175
§ 59. A universal characterization of evidence as the giving of something itself......Page 176
§ 60. The fundamental laws of intentionality and the universal function of evidence......Page 179
§ 61. Evidence in general in the function pertaining to all objects, real and irreal, as synthetic unities......Page 182
§ 62. The ideality of all species of objectivities over against the constituting consciousness. The posiivistic misinterpretation of Nature is a type of psychologism......Page 185
§ 63. Originally productive activity as the giving of logical formations themselves; the sense of the phrase, their production......Page 186
§ 64. The precedence of real to irreal objects in respect of their being......Page 188
§ 65. A more general concept of psychologism......Page 189
§ 66. Psychologistic and phenomenological idealism. Analytic and transcendental criticism of cognition......Page 190
§ 67. The reproach of psychologism as indicating failure to understand the necessary logical function of transcendental criticism of cognition......Page 191
§ 68. Preliminary view of our further problems......Page 194
§ 69. Logical formations given in straightforward evience. The task of making this evidence a theme of reflection......Page 196
§ 70. The sense of the demanded clarifications as scienific inquiry into constitutive origins......Page 197
§ 71. Problems of the foundations of science, and constiutional inquiry into origins. Logic called on to lead......Page 201
§ 72. The subjective structures as an Apriori, correlative to the Objective Apriori. Transition to a new level of criticism......Page 202
§ 73. Idealizing presuppositions of mathematical anaytics as themes for constitutive criticism. The ideal identity of judgment-formations as a constiutional problem......Page 204
§ 74. Idealities of And-so-forth, of constructable infiniies, and the subjective correlate of these idealities......Page 208
§ 75. The law of analytic contradiction and its subective version......Page 209
§ 76. Transition to the problems of the subjective that arise in connexion with the logic of truth......Page 211
§ 77. The idealizing presuppositions contained in the laws of contradiction and excluded middle......Page 213
§ 78. Transmutation of the laws of the \"modus ponens\" and the \"modus tollens\" into laws pertaining to subjective evidences......Page 215
§ 79. The presupposition of truth in itself and falsity in itself; the presupposition that every judgment can be decided......Page 216
§ 80. The evidence pertaining to the presupposition of truth, and the task of criticizing it......Page 218
§ 81. Formulation of further problems......Page 220
§ 82. Reduction of judgments to ultimate judgments. The primitive categorial variants of something; the primitive substrate, individual......Page 222
§ 83. Parallel reduction of truths. Relation of all truths to an antecedent world of individuals......Page 224
§ 84. The hierarchy of evidences; the intrinsically first evidences those of experience. The pregnant conept of experience......Page 225
§ 85. The genuine tasks of so-called judgment-theory. The sense-genesis of judgments as a clue in our search for the hierarchy of evidences......Page 226
§ 86. The evidence of pre-predicative experience as the intrinsically primary theme of transcendental judgment-theory. The experiential judgment as the original judgment......Page 228
§ 87. Transition to evidences at higher levels. The question of the relevance of the cores to the evience of materially filled universalities and to the evidence of formal universalities......Page 232
§ 88. The presupposition implicit in the law of analytic contradiction: Every judgment can be made disinctly evident......Page 234
a. Sense as judgment and as \"judgment-content.\" Ideal existence of the judgment presupposes ideal existence of the judgment-content......Page 235
b. The ideal existence of the judgment-content deends on the conditions for the unity of possible experience......Page 237
§ 90. Application to the principles of truth-logic: They hold good only for judgments that are senseful in respect of content......Page 240
§ 91. Transition to new questions......Page 241
a. The relatedness of historically given logic to a real world......Page 243
b. Its naive presupposing of a world ranks logic among the positive sciences......Page 245
a. Naive presupposition of the validity of Objective logic......Page 247
b. Missing of the transcendental sense of the Caresian reduction to the ego......Page 248
§ 94. Every existent constituted in the subjectivity of consciousness......Page 252
§ 95. Necessity of starting, each from his own subectivity......Page 256
§ 96. The transcendental problems of intersubjectivity and of the intcrsubjective world......Page 257
b. The illusion of transcendental solipsism......Page 261
d. Concluding observations......Page 263
§ 97. Universal philosophic significance of the method that consists in uncovering constitution in conciousness......Page 264
§ 98. Constitutional investigations as a priori......Page 265
§ 99. Psychological and transcendental subjectivity. The problem of transcendental psychologism......Page 270
§ 100. Historico-critical remarks on the development of transcendental philosophy and, in particular, on transcendental inquiry concerning formal logic......Page 275
§ 101. The subjective foundation of logic is the transcenental phenomenology of reason......Page 287
§ 102. The relatedness of traditional logic to the world, and the inquiry concerning the character of the \"ultimate\" logic, which furnishes norms for its own transcendental clarification......Page 288
§ 103. Absolute grounding of cognition is possible only in the all-embracing science of transcendental subjectivity, as the one absolute existent......Page 291
§ 104. Transcendental phenomenology as self-expliation on the part of transcendental subjectivity......Page 293
§ 105. Preparations for concluding our transcendental criticism of logic. The usual theories of evidence misguided by the presupposition of absolute truth......Page 297
§ 106. Further criticisms of the presupposition of absoute truth and the dogmatistic theories of evidence......Page 299
a. The evidence of external (sensuous) experience......Page 303
b. The evidence of \"internal\" experience......Page 304
c. Hyletic Data and intentional functionings. The evidence of Data occurring in internal time......Page 306
d. Evidence as an apriori structural form of conciousness......Page 309
Appendix I / SYNTACTICAL FORMS AND SYNTACTICAL STUFFS; CORE-FORMS AND CORE-STUFFS......Page 314
§ 1. The articulation of predicative judgments......Page 313
§ 2. Relatedness to subject-matter in judgments......Page 316
§ 3. Pure forms and pure stuffs......Page 317
§ 4. Lower and higher forms. Their sense-relation to one another......Page 318
§ 5. The self-contained functional unity of the selfufficient apophansis. Division of the combinationorms of wholes into copulatives and conjunctions......Page 319
b. The distinctions connected with articulation can be made throughout the entire categorial sphere......Page 321
c. The amplified concept of the categorial propoition contrasted with the concept of the propoition in the old apophantic analytics......Page 322
§ 7. Syntactical forms, syntactical stuffs, syntaxes......Page 323
§ 8. Syntagma and member. Self-sufficient judgments, and likewise judgments in the amplified sense, as syntagmas......Page 324
§ 9. The \"judgment-content\" as the syntactical stuff of the judgment qua syntagma......Page 325
§ 10. Levels of syntactical forming......Page 326
§11. Non-syntactical forms and stuffs — exhibited within the pure syntactical stuffs......Page 327
§ 12. The core-formation, with core-stuff and core-form......Page 329
§ 14. Transition to complications......Page 330
§ 15. The concept of the \"term \" in traditional formal logic......Page 331
b. Passive recollection and its constitutional effect for the judgment as an abiding unity......Page 332
§ 1. Active judging, as generating objects themselves, contrasted with its secondary modifications......Page 333
a. Original consciousness and intentional modifiation. Static intentional explication. Explication of the \"meaning\" and of the meant \"itself.\" The multiplicity of possible modes of consciousness of the Same......Page 334
b. Intentional explication of genesis. The genetic, as well as static, originality of the experiencing manners of givenness. The \"primal instituting\" of \"apperception\" with respect to every objectategory......Page 336
c. The time-form of intentional genesis and the contitution of that form. Retentional modification. Sedimentation in the inconspicuous substratum (unconsciousness)......Page 338
a. The retentional form as the intrinsically first form of \"secondary sensuousness\". The livingly changing constitution of a many-numbered judgent......Page 339
c. The emergence of something that comes to mind apperceptionally is analogous to something coming to mind after the fashion of passive recolection......Page 342
§ 4. The essential possibihties of activating passive manners of givenness......Page 343
§ 5. The fundamental types of originally generative judging and of any judging whatever......Page 344
§ 6. Indistinct verbal judging and its function......Page 346
§ 7. The superiority of retentional and recollectional to apperceptional confusion; secondary evidence in confusion......Page 348
§ 1. The goal of formal non-contradiction and of formal consequence. Broader and narrower framing of these concepts......Page 350
§ 2. Relation of the systematic and radical building of a pure analytics, back to the theory of syntaxes......Page 354
§ 3. The characterization of analytic judgments as merely \"elucidative of knowledge\" and as \"tautologies\"......Page 357
§ 4. Remarks on \"tautology\" in the logistical sense, with reference to §§ 14-18 of the main text. (By Oskar Becker.)......Page 358