Federalism and the Market: Intergovernmental Conflict and Economic Reform in the Developing World

Cover......Page 1
Half-Title......Page 3
Title......Page 5
Copyright......Page 6
Dedication......Page 7
Contents......Page 9
Acknowledgments......Page 11
1 Intergovernmental Bargaining and Economic Policy in Federations......Page 15
Peeling the Onion: Research Design, the Empirical Approach, and Outline of the Book......Page 24
Conclusion......Page 28
2 From Market-Preserving to Market-Distorting Federalism......Page 31
The Conventional Characterization of Federalism......Page 35
Federalism, Market Reforms, and the Challenge of Policy Coordination......Page 39
A Comparative Theory: From Market-Preserving to Market-Distorting Federalism......Page 45
The Empirical Focus: Macroeconomics in the Developing World......Page 59
Implications and Conclusion......Page 65
3 Federalism and the Decentralized Politics of Macroeconomic Policy and Performance......Page 67
Federalism and Macroeconomic Policy......Page 68
Implications for Central Government Policy......Page 73
Political versus Fiscal Federalism and Macroeconomics......Page 76
Hypotheses......Page 78
The Challenge of Operationalizing Federalism......Page 81
Research Design......Page 84
Results......Page 88
Discussion......Page 95
Appendix 2: Nations and Years Receiving Fully Federal (2) and Semifederal Codings (1)......Page 98
4 Testing the Model......Page 100
The Macroeconomic Experiences of Nine Federal Nations......Page 102
Parties, Regional Representation, Fiscal Systems, and Macroeconomic Policy......Page 107
Research Design......Page 122
Results......Page 124
Conclusions......Page 133
5 Partisan Harmony, Intergovernmental Coordination, and Market Transitions......Page 137
Partisan Harmony, Centralization, and Market Reforms......Page 140
The Case for the Case: Argentina, Party Centralization, and Economic Policy......Page 147
Fiscal Federalism, Soft Budget Constraints, and Provincial Profligacy in Argentina: The 1980s......Page 152
The Centralizing Response: Partisan Carrots, Sticks, and Market Reform in the 1990s......Page 155
The Limits of Carrots and Sticks: Centralism, Federal Rigidity, and Economic Crisis......Page 164
Implications and Conclusions......Page 171
6 Regional Competition, Fiscal Dependence, and Incentives in the Argentine Provinces......Page 176
Intraregional Variance, Political Competition, and Subnational Incentives......Page 180
Fiscal Federalism, Partisan Harmony, and Regional Variation in Argentina......Page 187
Budget Deficits and Crisis in the Argentine Provinces......Page 193
Provincial Fiscal Performance, 1984-1998: The Model, Data, and Results......Page 196
Fiscal Adjustments and Expansions......Page 202
Discussion and Conclusion......Page 206
7 The View from Below......Page 211
Regional Reform as a Two-Level Game......Page 215
Subnational Reform in Argentina: Córdoba, Mendoza, and Río Negro......Page 219
The Analysis......Page 224
Mendoza......Page 225
Córdoba......Page 228
Río Negro......Page 231
Discussion and Conclusions......Page 234
8 Conclusion......Page 237
Intergovernmental Finance, Bailouts, and Reforming the Federal Fiscal Bargain......Page 241
Economic Reform, Party Systems, and Federalism......Page 248
Looking to the Future: Comparative Federalism, Representation, and the Effects of Free Markets......Page 254
References......Page 263
Index......Page 287