Faull and Nikpay, the EU law of competition

Assistant Editor
Contributors
Editors
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
Foreword to the 3rd Edition
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
Contents—Summary
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
List of Abbreviations
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
1. Table of EU/EC Treaties
Table Of Treaties and Legislation
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
(p. clxxxiii) 2. Tables of EU/EC Legislation
	A. Table of Regulations
	(p. cxcix) B. Table of Directives
	(p. ccv) C. Table of Decisions
3. Table of EU/EC Notices, Guidelines and Other Informal Texts
	A. Table of Guidelines and Notices (Chronological)
	(p. ccxxvi) B. Table of Recommendations
	(p. ccxxvii) C. Table of Communications
	(p. ccxxx) D. Table of Competition Reports
(p. ccxxxi) 4. Table of National Legislation
	Austria
	Finland
	France
	Germany
	Hungary
	Ireland
	Italy
	Latvia
	Lithuania
	Netherlands
	Romania
	Slovakia
	Spain
	Sweden
	United Kingdom
	United States
(p. ccxxxiii) 5. Table of International Treaties
Part I General Principles, 1 The Economics of Competition, A Introduction
	Luc Peeperkorn, Vincent Verouden
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
A. Introduction
	Footnotes:
Part I General Principles, 1 The Economics of Competition, B Structure, Conduct, Performance
	Luc Peeperkorn, Vincent Verouden
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
(p. 5) B. Structure, Conduct, Performance
	(1)  Early Developments
	(2)  The Harvard School
	(3)  The Chicago School
	(4)  More Recent Developments
	Footnotes:
Part I General Principles, 1 The Economics of Competition, C Static Welfare Analysis of Market Power
	Luc Peeperkorn, Vincent Verouden
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
C. Static Welfare Analysis of Market Power
	(1)  Introduction
	(2)  Basic Microeconomic Concepts
		(a)  Consumer Surplus
		(b)  Production Costs
		(c)  Short-Run Production Costs
		(d)  Profit Maximization
		(e)  Long-Run Production Costs
		(f)  Economies of Scale and Minimum Efficient Scale
		(g)  Entry Barriers
		(h)  Contestability
	(p. 20) (3)  Perfect Competition
		(a)  The Model
		(b)  The Outcome
	(4)  Monopoly
		(a)  The Model
		(b)  The Outcome
	(p. 25) (5)  Oligopoly
		(a)  Introduction
		(b)  Game Theory
		(c)  The Scope for Collusion Illustrated with the Prisoner’s Dilemma
		(d)  Some Results
	Footnotes:
Part I General Principles, 1 The Economics of Competition, D Dynamic Welfare Analysis of Market Power
	Luc Peeperkorn, Vincent Verouden
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
D. Dynamic Welfare Analysis of Market Power73
	(1)  Innovation and Welfare
	(2)  Different Views
	(p. 39) (3)  Some Empirical Results
	(4)  The ‘New Economy’
	(5)  Some Concluding Remarks
	Footnotes:
Part I General Principles, 1 The Economics of Competition, E Market Definition
	Luc Peeperkorn, Vincent Verouden
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
E. Market Definition95
	(1)  Product Market Definition
		(a)  Demand-Side Substitution
		(b)  The SSNIP Test
		(c)  Elasticity Concepts and the Diversion Ratio
		(p. 49) (d)  Supply-Side Substitution
	(2)  The Relevant Geographic Market
		(a)  Demand-Side Substitution
		(b)  Supply-Side Substitution
	(3)  Specific Issues in the Context of Market Definition
		(a)  Chains of Substitution
		(b)  Price Discrimination
		(c)  Captive Production
	(p. 55) (4)  Further Considerations
		(a)  Market Definition in Practice
		(b)  Defining the Market: Not an End in Itself
	Footnotes:
Part I General Principles, 1 The Economics of Competition, F Market Power and Dominance
	Luc Peeperkorn, Vincent Verouden
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
F. Market Power and Dominance135
	(p. 57) (1)  Market Power
		(a)  Concept
		(b)  Identification of (Static) Market Power
	(2)  Dominance
		(a)  Single Dominance
		(b)  Collective Dominance
	(3)  Enhancing Market Power
		(a)  Merger with a Competitor: Unilateral vs Coordinated Effects
		(b)  Exclusionary Strategies
	Footnotes:
Part I General Principles, 1 The Economics of Competition, G Empirical Methods for Market Definition and the Assessment of Market Power
	Luc Peeperkorn, Vincent Verouden
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
(p. 71) G. Empirical Methods for Market Definition and the Assessment of Market Power
	(1)  Analysis of Prices and Price Movements
		(a)  Price Correlation Analysis
		(b)  Extension: Stationarity/Co-Integration
	(2)  Analysis of Price Elasticities of Demand
	(3)  Critical Loss Analysis
	(4)  UPP
	(5)  Event Analysis
	(6)  Assessment Methods Relating Price to Market Structure
		(a)  Price Concentration Analysis
		(b)  Direct Evaluation of Competitive Constraints
	(7)  Analysis of Bidding Data
	(8)  Merger Simulation
	Footnotes:
Part I General Principles, 2 The Enforcement System Under Regulation 1/2003, A Direct Application of Articles 101 and 102
	Eddy De Smijter, Ailsa Sinclair
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
A. Direct Application of Articles 101 and 102
	(1)  Introduction
	(2)  The Aims and Results of the System Change
		(a)  Increased Application of Articles 101 and 102 at Member State Level
		(b)  The Commission’s Focus on Enforcement
	(3)  Self-assessment and Legal Certainty
	(4)  The Direct Effect of Articles 101 and 102
	(5)  Burden and Standard of Proof
	Footnotes:
Part I General Principles, 2 The Enforcement System Under Regulation 1/2003, B The Relationship Between EU Competition Law and National Competition Law
	Eddy De Smijter, Ailsa Sinclair
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
(p. 101) B. The Relationship Between EU Competition Law and National Competition Law
	(1)  Introduction
	(2)  Article 3(1): The Obligation to Apply Articles 101 and 102
		(a)  Scope of Article 3(1)
		(b)  Primary Functions of Article 3(1)
	(3)  The Convergence Rule of Article 3(2)
	(4)  The Legal Consequences of Infringing Article 3(1) and (2)
	(5)  Article 3 and the Primacy Rule
	(6)  Exceptions to Article 3
		(a)  National Competition Laws
		(b)  National Laws Implementing EU Law Directives
		(c)  Member State Measures Covered by Article 106
		(d)  National Merger Control Laws
		(p. 114) (e)  Criminal Sanctions on Natural Persons
	Footnotes:
Part I General Principles, 2 The Enforcement System Under Regulation 1/2003, C Powers and Decisions of National Competition Authorities
	Eddy De Smijter, Ailsa Sinclair
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
C. Powers and Decisions of National Competition Authorities
	(1)  Introduction
	(2)  The NCA
	(3)  The Decisions of an NCA
		(a)  Scope of Article 5
		(p. 119) (b)  The Decisions Listed in Article 5
	(p. 120) (4)  Triggering a Decision by an NCA
		(a)  The NCA Acts on its Own Initiative or on a Complaint
		(b)  National Notification Systems
	Footnotes:
Part I General Principles, 2 The Enforcement System Under Regulation 1/2003, D Commission Powers and Decisions
	Eddy De Smijter, Ailsa Sinclair
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
D. Commission Powers and Decisions
	(1)  Introduction
	(2)  Article 7: Finding and Termination of Infringements
		(a)  The Power to Find Infringements
		(b)  The Power to Impose Remedies
			(i)  General Principles
			(ii)  Structural and Behavioural Remedies
			(iii)  Break-ups
		(c)  Complaints
	(3)  Article 8: Interim Measures
	(4)  Article 9: Commitments
		(a)  Introduction
		(b)  The Nature of Article 9 Decisions
		(p. 130) (c)  The Purpose of Article 9 Decisions
		(d)  The Procedure for Adopting Article 9 Decisions
		(e)  Adoption of the Decision and Reopening of the Proceedings
		(f)  The Scope for Legal Challenge
	(5)  Article 10: Finding of Inapplicability
		(a)  Introduction
		(b)  The Nature and Purpose of Article 10 Decisions
		(c)  The Legal Effects of Article 10 Decisions
			(i)  The Relationship Between Articles 9 and 10
	Footnotes:
Part I General Principles, 2 The Enforcement System Under Regulation 1/2003, E Cooperation Between Enforcers
	Eddy De Smijter, Ailsa Sinclair
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
E. Cooperation Between Enforcers
	(1)  Introduction
	(2)  Cooperation within the ECN
		(a)  The Sharing of Work Amongst the Competition Authorities
		(b)  An NCA’s Request to Another NCA to Carry Out an Investigation
		(c)  Exchange of Information and Its Use in Evidence
			(i)  Exchange of Information within the ECN
				(i)  Empowering ECN Members to Exchange Information
				(ii)  Allowing ECN Members to Exchange Information
				(iii)  Exchanging Information Voluntarily Submitted by a Leniency Applicant
			(ii)  The Use of the Exchanged Information in Evidence
				(i)  The Relation Between Article 12 and the National Law Provisions Prohibiting NCAs from Divulging Confidential Information
				(ii)  A Wider Umbrella for the Protection of Confidential Information
			(p. 149) (iii)  The Use in Evidence of the Information Exchanged within the ECN
				(i)  The General Principles of EU Law
				(ii)  Information Exchanged Can Only Be Used in Evidence for the Application of EU Competition Rules
				(iii)  Information Exchanged Can Only Be Used in Evidence in Respect of the Subject Matter for Which it was Collected
				(iv)  The Limitations With Regard to the Use of Information in Evidence to Impose Sanctions on Natural Persons
				(v)  Experience with Article 12
		(d)  The Obligation of Professional Secrecy and the Need to Disclose Information
			(i)  Which Information is Covered by Professional Secrecy?
				(i)  The Wide Coverage of Professional Secrecy
				(ii)  Specific Sub-Category Within the Wider Concept of Professional Secrecy: Business Secrets and Other Confidential Information
				(iii)  Business Secrets
				(iv)  Other Confidential Information
			(ii)  The Disclosure of Information Acquired or Exchanged Pursuant to Regulation 1/2003
				(i)  Disclosure Necessary to Prove an Infringement of Article 101 or 102
			(iii)  Disclosure in granting access to the file
				(i)  Access to the File for the Addressee of a Statement of Objections
				(p. 159) (ii)  Access to Information by Other Parties with Legitimate Interest, in Particular Complainants
	(3)  Coherent Application within the ECN
		(a)  Introduction
		(b)  Information under Article 11(3)
		(c)  The Procedure in Article 11(4)
			(i)  The Scope of the Article 11(4) Procedure
			(ii)  The Article 11(4) Process and its Objective
			(iii)  The Legal Consequences of Failure to Comply with Article 11(4)
		(d)  Article 11(6): The Commission’s Power to Withdraw a Case
			(i)  The Legal Nature of Article 11(6)
			(ii)  The Authorities Covered by Article 11(6)
			(iii)  Circumstances in Which Withdrawal may be Envisaged
			(iv)  The Procedure for Applying Article 11(6)
	(4)  Coherent Application by National Courts
		(a)  The Competence of National Courts to Apply EU Competition Rules
		(b)  The Coherent Application of EU Competition Rules by National Courts
			(i)  Commission Initiatives towards Coherent Application of EU Competition Rules
				(i)  The Commission’s Policy Notices and Guidelines
				(ii)  Co-Financing the Training of National Judges in EU Competition Rules
				(iii)  A Database on National Judgments
			(ii)  Consistency in the Case of Parallel or Consecutive Application of EU Competition Rules
		(c)  Cooperation Between the Commission and the National Courts
			(i)  The Opportunity for the National Courts to ask the Commission for Information or for its Opinion
				(i)  The Opportunity to Ask the Commission for Information
				(ii)  The Opportunity to Ask the Commission for Its Opinion
			(ii)  The Submission of Observations
	Footnotes:
Part I General Principles, 3 Article 101, A Introduction
	Jonathan Faull, Lars Kjøbye, Henning Leupold, Ali Nikpay
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
A. Introduction
Part I General Principles, 3 Article 101, B Scope of Article 101
	Jonathan Faull, Lars Kjøbye, Henning Leupold, Ali Nikpay
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
B. Scope of Article 101
	(1)  Scope
	(2)  Coal and Steel
	(3)  Defence
	(p. 186) (4)  Environment and Culture
	(5)  Sport
	Footnotes:
Part I General Principles, 3 Article 101, C Article 101(1)
	Jonathan Faull, Lars Kjøbye, Henning Leupold, Ali Nikpay
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
C. Article 101(1)
	(1)  Undertakings
		(a)  Definition
		(p. 192) (b)  Professions
		(c)  Public Bodies Exception
		(d)  The Single Economic Unit Doctrine (No Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy in EU Law)
			(i)  A Subsidiary Wholly-Owned, or Almost Wholly-Owned, By Its Parent
			(ii)  A Parent Holding a Majority Shareholding in a Subsidiary But Less than 100 Per Cent
			(iii)  Parent Liability in the Context of Joint Control
			(iv)  Companies with Non-Controlling Stakes in Another Company
		(e)  Successor Undertakings
	(2)  Agreements
		(a)  General Definition
		(b)  Requires At Least Two Undertakings
		(c)  Form Irrelevant
		(d)  Does the Notion of ‘Agreement’ Presuppose that the Parties Jointly Intend to Limit Their Freedom of Action as Regards Future Conduct on the Market?
		(e)  Single Continuous Infringement Doctrine
		(f)  Tacit Acquiescence in Relation to the Particular Anti-Competitive Measure in Question is the Minimum Requirement in Vertical Cases
			(i)  Volkswagen II191
			(ii)  What Does Tacit Acquiescence Require?
			(p. 216) (iii)  Care Should be Taken in Applying the Bayer/Volkswagen II Approach
		(g)  Formal Termination May Not be Sufficient
		(h)  Judicial Settlement
	(3)  Decisions by Associations of Undertakings
	(4)  Concerted Practices
		(a)  Definition
		(b)  Can a Concerted Practice be Inferred from Circumstantial Evidence Alone?
		(c)  Vertical Concerted Practices
			(i)  ‘Hub and Spoke’ Concerted Practices
	(5)  Distinction Between Agreements and Concerted Practices
	(p. 227) (6)  State Compulsion
	(7)  The Notion of Restriction of Competition under EU Competition Law
	(8)  Restriction by Object
		(a)  Concept of Restriction by Object
			(i)  Category 1
			(ii)  Category 2
			(p. 241) (iii)  Category 3
				(i)  Allianz Hungary
		(b)  Restriction by Object and Appreciability
			(i)  The ‘Pre-Expedia’ Case Law
			(ii)  The Commission’s Approach to Appreciability in Object Cases
			(iii)  The Expedia Judgment
	(9)  Restriction by Effect425
		(a)  The EU Courts Had Broadly Endorsed the Commission’s Traditional Approach
		(p. 250) (b)  The EU Courts Have Modified the Traditional Approach in a Number of Important Ways
		(c)  Restrictions of Rivalry Must Be Assessed in Their Market Context
		(d)  Ancillary Restraints Doctrine
			(i)  Commercial Ancillarity
			(ii)  Public Interest Ancillarity
			(iii)  The Narrow Scope of the Ancillary Restraints Doctrine
				(i)  Directly Related and Subordinate
				(ii)  Necessary
				(iii)  Objective Necessity for the Implementation of the Main Operation
				(iv)  Proportionality
			(iv)  Concluding Remark: Ancillary Restraints Doctrine Difficult to Apply but Relevant for the Identification of the Relevant Counterfactual in Effects Analysis
		(e)  Exclusivity Necessary for Supply
			(i)  Exclusivity Must be Objectively Necessary
			(ii)  It is Unclear Whether this Doctrine Applies to Agreements Between Competitors
			(iii)  Doctrine Only Likely to Apply in Clear-Cut Cases
				(i)  Exception to General Rule
			(p. 266) (iv)  Does the Approach Apply to ‘Object’ Cases?
			(v)  Difference Between Exclusivity Necessary for Supply and Ancillary Restraints Doctrines
		(f)  Appreciability
		(g)  Cumulative Effects Doctrine
		(h)  The Purpose of the Market Analysis
			(i)  No Rule of Reason under Article 101(1)
			(ii)  Gøttrup-Klim604
			(iii)  Wouters609
			(iv)  Metro I and II616
			(v)  O2624
				(i)  Does O2 Signal a Change in Direction?
			(p. 278) (vi)  Explicit Rejection of the Rule of Reason under Article 101(1) by the General Court
		(i)  Extent of Market Analysis
		(j)  Restrictive Clauses Are Not a Necessary Condition for the Application of Article 101(1)
		(k)  The Commission’s Policy as set out in the Article 101(3) Guidelines
			(i)  Step 1: The Counterfactual
			(ii)  Step 2: Assessment of the Likely Effect of the Agreement Restraint on Prices, Output, Innovation, or the Variety or Quality of Goods or Services
		(l)  The Current State of Affairs: Developments in the Commission’s Policy and the EU Courts’ Case Law Subsequent to the Article 101(3) Guidelines
			(i)  Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines
			(p. 290) (ii)  Block Exemption Regulations
			(iii)  De Minimis Notice
	Footnotes:
Part I General Principles, 3 Article 101, D Jurisdiction
	Jonathan Faull, Lars Kjøbye, Henning Leupold, Ali Nikpay
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
D. Jurisdiction
	(1)  General
	(p. 292) (2)  The Concept of Trade Between Member States
	(3)  The Link Between Trade and the Agreement or Practice
	(4)  The Notion of ‘May Affect’
		(a)  Introduction
		(b)  A Sufficient Degree of Probability
		(c)  An Influence on the Pattern of Trade
			(p. 296) (i)  Direct or Indirect, Actual or Potential
	(5)  Appreciability
		(a)  General Principles
		(b)  Quantification
	(6)  Assessment of Various Types of Agreement and Practices
		(a)  Introduction
		(b)  Agreements and Practices Concerning Imports and Exports and Agreements and Practices Implemented in Several Member States
		(c)  Agreements and Practices Confined to the Whole or Part of a Member State
		(d)  Agreements and Practices Covering Part of a Member State
		(e)  Agreements and Practices Involving Third Countries
	Footnotes:
Part I General Principles, 3 Article 101, E Article 101(2)
	Jonathan Faull, Lars Kjøbye, Henning Leupold, Ali Nikpay
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
E. Article 101(2)
	Footnotes:
Part I General Principles, 3 Article 101, F The Article 101(3) Exception
	Jonathan Faull, Lars Kjøbye, Henning Leupold, Ali Nikpay
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
F. The Article 101(3) Exception
	(1)  Introduction
	(p. 309) (2)  The Relationship Between Article 101(1) and Article 101(3)
	(3)  General Principles for the Application of Article 101(3)
		(a)  Introduction
		(p. 311) (b)  The Nature of the Benefits that Can Be Taken into Account
		(c)  The Relevant Market as the Proper Framework for Applying Article 101(3)
		(d)  The Temporal Application of Article 101(3)
		(e)  Block Exemptions
	(4)  The Four Conditions of Article 101(3)
		(a)  Introduction
		(b)  The First Test of Article 101(3): Efficiency Gains
			(i)  Examples of Relevant Types of Efficiencies
			(ii)  The Substantiation of Efficiency Claims
		(c)  The Second Test of Article 101(3): Indispensability
		(d)  The Third Test of Article 101(3): A Fair Share for Consumers
		(e)  The Fourth Test of Article 101(3): No Elimination of Competition in Respect of a Substantial Part of the Products in Question
	Footnotes:
Part I General Principles, 4 Article 102, A The System of Enforcement of Article 102
	Miguel de la Mano, Renato Nazzini, Hans Zenger
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
A. The System of Enforcement of Article 102
	(1)  Introduction
		(a)  Elements of Article 102
		(b)  Relationship Between Article 101 and Article 102
		(c)  Purpose of Article 102: Protection of Competition or Protection of Competitors?
		(d)  Role of Efficiencies in Article 102 Assessment
	(2)  Categorization of Abuses: Exploitative vs Exclusionary
		(a)  Prohibition of Customer Exploitation
		(p. 335) (b)  Prohibition of Exclusionary Practices
	(3)  Consequences of Infringement of Article 102
		(a)  Introduction
		(b)  Guiding Principles
		(c)  Types of Sanctions and Remedies in Article 102 Cases
			(i)  Fines
			(p. 339) (ii)  Cease and Desist Orders
			(iii)  Behavioural Remedies
			(iv)  Structural Remedies
			(v)  Which Remedy is Most Appropriate?
		(d)  Procedural Issues
	(4)  Commitment Decisions (Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003)49
		(a)  Basic Principles
		(b)  Importance of Commitment Decisions in Article 102 Cases
		(c)  Concerns Regarding the Use of Commitment Decisions in Article 102 Cases
	(5)  Judicial Review of Article 102 Decisions
		(a)  Review of Facts and Law
		(p. 346) (b)  Review of ‘Complex Economic Matters’
	Footnotes:
Part I General Principles, 4 Article 102, B The Article 102 Enforcement Priorities Guidance
	Miguel de la Mano, Renato Nazzini, Hans Zenger
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
B. The Article 102 Enforcement Priorities Guidance
	(1)  The Emergence of the Effects-Based Approach
		(a)  Traditional Approach under EU Law
		(b)  Form- vs Effects-Based Approach
		(c)  Pros and Cons of an Effects-Based Approach
		(d)  The Recent Adoption by the EU Courts of a More Explicitly Effects-Based Approach
	(p. 351) (2)  The Commission’s Review of Article 102 Policy
		(a)  Purpose of the Review
		(b)  The Staff Discussion Paper
	(3)  The Article 102 Enforcement Priorities Guidance
		(a)  Adoption of Guidance as opposed to Guidelines
		(b)  Economics-Based Approach to Enforcement
		(p. 353) (c)  Impact of the Guidance on Future Cases
		(d)  Overview of the Guidance
		(e)  Brief Summary of the Approach to Abuse
			(i)  Anti-Competitive Foreclosure
			(ii)  Assessment of the Effect on Consumers
			(iii)  Objective Justifications and Efficiencies
	Footnotes:
Part I General Principles, 4 Article 102, C Dominance
	Miguel de la Mano, Renato Nazzini, Hans Zenger
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
C. Dominance
	(1)  Concept of Single Dominance
		(a)  Legal Definition of Single Dominance
		(b)  Concerns Regarding the Elements of the Definition of Dominance
		(c)  Approach Taken in the Guidance to the Test Elements
		(d)  Assessment of Market Power
		(e)  How Does the Guidance Approach Fit with the Legal Approach
	(2)  Factors Relevant to Single Dominance
		(a)  Economic Measurement of Market Power
		(b)  Factors Under the Case Law and the Commission’s Guidance
			(i)  The Position of the Undertaking Concerned and Its Competitors
				(i)  Market Definition
				(ii)  Market Shares
					Calculation methods
					Market share as indicators of market power
					Inferences from market share levels under the case law
					AKZO
					Inferences from market share levels under the Guidance
				(iii)  Profitability of the Undertaking
				(iv)  Conduct of the Undertaking
				(v)  The Position of Competitors
			(ii)  Barriers to Entry and Expansion
				(i)  Regulatory Barriers to Entry
				(ii)  Capacity Constraints
				(iii)  Economies of Scale and Scope
				(iv)  Network Effects
				(v)  Switching Costs
				(vi)  Vertical Integration and Exclusive or Preferential Access to Inputs or Customers
				(vii)  Financial Strength
				(viii)  Spare or Excess Capacity
				(ix)  Other Factors
			(iii)  Countervailing Buyer Power
	(3)  Concept of Collective Dominance
		(a)  Definition of Collective Dominance
		(b)  Non-Oligopolistic Collective Dominance
		(c)  Vertical Non-Oligopolistic Collective Dominance
		(d)  Oligopolistic Collective Dominance
	(4)  Abuse of a Collective Dominant Position
		(a)  Joint Abuses
		(b)  Single Abuses
	(5)  Dominance and Abuse in Neighbouring Markets
	(6)  Dominance in New Economy Markets
	Footnotes:
Part I General Principles, 4 Article 102, D Concept of Abuse
	Miguel de la Mano, Renato Nazzini, Hans Zenger
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
(p. 387) D. Concept of Abuse
	(1)  General Concept of Abuse
	(2)  Definition of Abuse Under the EU Courts’ Case Law
	(3)  The Test for Abuse
		(a)  Exploitative and Discriminatory Abuses
		(b)  Exclusionary Abuses
			(i)  Potential Tests Based on Economic Principles
			(ii)  Approach Taken in the Commission’s Guidance
				(i)  Anti-Competitive Foreclosure: General
				(ii)  Test for Foreclosure in Pricing Cases
				(iii)  When is Foreclosure Enough to be Anti-Competitive?
				(iv)  Likely Harm to Consumers
	(4)  The Special Responsibility of the Dominant Undertaking
	(5)  Objective Justification
		(a)  General
		(b)  Objective Necessity
		(c)  Efficiency Defence
	Footnotes:
Part I General Principles, 4 Article 102, E Predatory Pricing
	Miguel de la Mano, Renato Nazzini, Hans Zenger
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
E. Predatory Pricing
	(1)  What is Predatory Pricing?
		(a)  Definition
		(b)  Economic Theories of Predatory Pricing
		(p. 398) (c)  Distinguishing Predatory Pricing From Normal Competition
	(2)  Predation Under EU Law: The AKZO Test
		(a)  Whether and How to Assess the Intent of the Dominant Firm
		(b)  What is the Appropriate Cost-Based Benchmark?
		(c)  Is a Below Cost Test Appropriate?
			(i)  Above-Cost Price Cuts as Part of a Wider Exclusionary Strategy
			(ii)  Above-Cost Price Cuts by a Quasi-Monopolist Liable to Exclude its Only Competitor
			(iii)  Above-Cost Price Cuts Restricting Free Trade
		(p. 406) (d)  Difficulties With Relying on Price-Cost Tests
			(i)  Below Cost Pricing May Not Be a Necessary Condition
			(ii)  Below Cost Pricing May Not Be a Sufficient Condition
			(iii)  Below Cost Pricing May Be Pro-Competitive
			(iv)  Below-Cost Pricing Tests Create Measurement Difficulties
		(e)  The Post Danmark Test
		(f)  The Role of Recoupment?
	(3)  The Predation Test in the Article 102 Enforcement Priorities Guidance
		(a)  Profit Sacrifice
			(i)  Advantages and Disadvantages of Using AAC to Measure Profit Sacrifice
			(ii)  Possible Alternative: Comparing Incremental Revenues with Incremental Costs
			(iii)  Assessing Whether There are Other, More Profitable Actions
		(b)  Exclusion of an Equally Efficient Competitor
		(c)  Consumer Harm and Recoupment
			(p. 416) (i)  Entry is Unlikely After the Prey is Excluded or Disciplined
			(ii)  Re-Entry is Unlikely
			(iii)  Assessment of the Competitive Constraint Exercised by the Excluded Rival
			(p. 417) (iv)  Dominance Is Not Evidence of Recoupment
		(p. 418) (d)  Objective Justification
			(i)  Market-Expanding Efficiencies
			(ii)  To Facilitate Learning and Awareness of a Product Among Consumers
			(iii)  To Improve the Firm’s Positioning as a Low-Price Company
		(e)  Meeting Competition Defence
		(f)  Other Loss-Minimizing Strategies
	Footnotes:
Part I General Principles, 4 Article 102, F Exclusive Dealing: Exclusivity Obligations and Loyalty Rebates
	Miguel de la Mano, Renato Nazzini, Hans Zenger
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
F. Exclusive Dealing: Exclusivity Obligations and Loyalty Rebates
	(1)  Case Law and Commission Decisional Practice
		(a)  Definition and Types of Exclusivity
			(i)  Legal and De Facto Exclusivity
			(ii)  Requirements Contracts
			(iii)  English Clauses
			(iv)  Imposition of Exclusive Obligations on Suppliers
			(v)  Exclusivity Imposed by Distributors
		(b)  The Abuse Test in Exclusivity Cases
		(c)  Objective Justification
		(d)  Definition and Types of Conditional Rebates
		(e)  Abuse Test in Rebates Cases
			(i)  Rebates That Are Presumptively Lawful (Quantity Rebates)
			(ii)  Rebates That Are Nakedly Exclusionary
			(iii)  Fidelity Rebates
			(iv)  Individualized Target Rebates
			(v)  Standardized Rebates
	(2)  Policy and Effects-Based Approach
		(a)  Commission’s Approach Under the Article 102 Enforcement Priorities Guidance
		(b)  The Logic of the Commission’s Approach Towards Loyalty Rebates and Exclusive Dealing
			(i)  Economic Reasoning for Use of Rebate Schemes
			(ii)  Possible Anti-Competitive Harm From Use of Rebate Schemes
		(c)  Identifying Anti-Competitive Foreclosure Under the Article 102 Enforcement Priorities Guidance
			(i)  Step 1: The As-Efficient Competitor Test
			(ii)  Step 2: Assessment of Anti-Competitive Foreclosure
			(iii)  Countervailing Efficiencies and Objective Justification
		(d)  The Limits of the Article 102 Enforcement Priorities Guidance Approach
		(e)  The Commission’s Application of the New Approach
	Footnotes:
Part I General Principles, 4 Article 102, G Tying and Bundling
	Miguel de la Mano, Renato Nazzini, Hans Zenger
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
G. Tying and Bundling
	(1)  Introduction
		(a)  Definition of Tying and Bundling
		(b)  Relationship with Article 101
	(2)  Legal Analysis and Case Law on Tying
		(a)  A Dominant Position on the Tying Market
		(b)  The Two-Product Test
		(c)  Coercion
		(d)  Anti-Competitive Effect
			(i)  The Requirement to Prove Foreclosure of As-Efficient Competitors
		(e)  Objective Justification
			(i)  Reduction in Transaction Costs
			(ii)  Preservation of Goodwill, Quality Assurance, and Ensuring Compliance with Safety Requirements
			(iii)  Dynamic Efficiency
			(p. 453) (iv)  Standardization
	(3)  Case Law on Mixed Bundling
	(4)  Policy and Effects-Based Approach
		(a)  The Article 102 Enforcement Priorities Guidance Approach Towards Tying and Bundling
		(b)  No Presumption of Anti-Competitive Harm
		(c)  Anti-Competitive Tying and Bundling
		(p. 462) (d)  Price Discrimination and Multi-Product Rebates
	Footnotes:
Part I General Principles, 4 Article 102, H Refusal to Supply
	Miguel de la Mano, Renato Nazzini, Hans Zenger
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
H. Refusal to Supply
	(1)  Concept of Abusive Refusal to Supply
	(2)  Basic Elements
		(a)  Competitive Advantage on Downstream Market
		(b)  Enforcement of Other Abuse
		(c)  Constructive Refusal to Supply
		(p. 465) (d)  De novo Refusals vs Withdrawal of Supply
	(3)  Types of Refusal to Supply
		(a)  Refusal to Supply a Physical Product or Service
		(b)  Refusal to Provide Access to an Essential Facility
		(c)  Refusal to License IP Rights
		(d)  Refusal to Supply Information Needed for Interoperability
	(4)  Potential Anti-Competitive Effects of Refusals to Supply
	(5)  The Case Law on Refusal to Supply
		(a)  General Framework
		(b)  Indispensability
		(p. 471) (c)  The Foreclosure Effect
		(d)  Raising Rivals’ Costs as Exclusionary Effect?
		(e)  The Foreclosure Effect and the ‘Essential Facilities’ Doctrine in Commission Practice
		(f)  Consumer Harm
		(p. 475) (g)  Interoperability Cases Since Microsoft
		(h)  Refusal to Supply an Existing Customer
		(p. 476) (i)  Defences (Objective Necessity and Objective Justification)
	(6)  The Approach Under the Commission’s Guidance
		(a)  General Approach
		(b)  Necessary Conditions
			(i)  Objective Necessity
			(ii)  Elimination of Effective Competition
			(iii)  Consumer Harm (and Incentives Balancing Test)
			(p. 480) (iv)  Objective Justifications (Efficiencies)
	(7)  Refusal to Supply and Patents
	Footnotes:
Part I General Principles, 4 Article 102, I Margin Squeeze
	Miguel de la Mano, Renato Nazzini, Hans Zenger
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
I. Margin Squeeze
	(1)  Concept of a Margin Squeeze Abuse
	(2)  Legal Analysis of Margin Squeeze
		(a)  The Early Case Law
		(b)  Elements of the Abuse
			(i)  Margin Squeeze is a Stand-Alone Abuse
			(ii)  The Need to Demonstrate an Anti-Competitive Effect
			(iii)  Factors Relevant to Assessing Potential Anti-Competitive Effect
			(iv)  Anti-Competitive Effect is Assessed by Reference to the ‘As-Efficient Competitor’ Test
			(v)  Basis for Calculating Potential Effects is the Cost Data of the Dominant Undertaking
			(vi)  A Margin Squeeze is Capable of Objective Justification
			(vii)  Level of Dominance Goes to Effect, Not to the Existence of the Abuse
	(3)  Economic Assessment
		(a)  General
		(b)  The Cost Benchmark
		(c)  Profitability Analysis
		(d)  Assessment of the Spread
		(e)  Specific Considerations in Start-Up Phases
	(4)  Interplay Between Margin Squeeze and Refusal to Deal: Indispensability
	(5)  Interplay Between Margin Squeeze and Regulatory Obligations
	Footnotes:
Part I General Principles, 4 Article 102, J Specific Abusive Practices in Relation to IP Rights
	Miguel de la Mano, Renato Nazzini, Hans Zenger
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
(p. 490) J. Specific Abusive Practices in Relation to IP Rights
	(1)  Introduction
		(a)  Complementary Aims of IP Rights and Antitrust
		(b)  Appropriateness of Antitrust Intervention in the IP Rights Arena
		(c)  Potential Competition Concerns Arising out of IP Rights
	(p. 492) (2)  Supply of Misleading Information to Extend Patent Validity
		(a)  Nature of the Abuse
		(b)  Intent Not Determinative
		(p. 494) (c)  Evidence of Actual Effects
	(3)  Withdrawal of Marketing Authorization to Restrict Entry of Generics
	(4)  Patent Filing Strategies
		(a)  Early Cases on Strategic Use of Patents
		(p. 496) (b)  Defensive Patent Strategies: Blocking Patents
		(c)  Other Strategic Behaviour
	(5)  Patent Settlements With Reverse Payments (Pay for Delay)
		(a)  Overview: Potential Benefits and Harms From Patent Settlements
		(b)  Commission Practice
	(6)  Patent Hold-Up in the Context of Standard Setting
		(a)  Context: Standard Setting and Patent Hold-Up Possibilities
		(b)  Patent Ambush
			(i)  Definition
			(ii)  Anti-Competitive Effects of Patent Ambush
			(iii)  Conditions for Abuse: The Rambus Decision
		(c)  FRAND Hold-Up
			(i)  Definition of FRAND Hold-Up: The Qualcomm Case
			(ii)  Particular Issues Surrounding Article 102 Enforcement in FRAND Licensing
				(i)  FRAND is Not a Static or Pre-Defined Concept
				(ii)  What Constitutes ‘Fair’ and ‘Reasonable’?
					Practical difficulties
					Potential lack of commercially attractive alternatives
					Uncertainty
					Under-compensation
					Strategic behaviour by vertically integrated firms
				(iii)  What Constitutes ‘Non-Discriminatory’?
			(iii)  Importance of FRAND
	(7)  Anti-Competitive Litigation in Relation to Standard Essential Patents
	(8)  Issues Applicable Across IP Rights Cases
		(a)  Assessing Dominance in Pharmaceutical IP Rights Cases
			(i)  Inferring Dominance from Level of Rents864
			(ii)  Dominance Relative to a Competitive Counterfactual Post-Loss of Exclusivity
		(b)  Anti-Competitive Foreclosure and Objective Justification in IP Rights Cases
		(c)  Applicability of Article 102 to ‘Standard’ Strategies/Tactics Available Under IP Rights
		(d)  Intervention under Article 102 vs Enforcement of IP Law
	Footnotes:
Part I General Principles, 4 Article 102, K Exploitative Abuses
	Miguel de la Mano, Renato Nazzini, Hans Zenger
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
K. Exploitative Abuses
	(1)  Concept of Excessive Pricing
	(2)  The Test for Excessive Pricing Under EU Case Law
		(a)  The United Brands Test
		(b)  Difficulties in the Application of the United Brands Test: Port of Helsingborg
		(c)  Alternative Approaches under the Case Law
	(3)  Imposing Other Unfair Terms
	(4)  Economic Approach to Excessive Pricing
		(a)  Circumstances Suitable for Intervention
			(i)  To Restore Dynamic Competition
			(ii)  Exploitative Prices as a Result of Exclusionary Conduct
			(iii)  Exploitation of Dominance Resulting from Non-Competitive Forces
		(b)  Determining Whether Prices are Abusive
			(i)  The Price-Cost Difference is Excessive
			(ii)  Unfair Price in Itself or Compared to Others
				(i)  Discrimination-Based Benchmarks
				(ii)  Direct Price-Cost Comparisons
	(5)  Unfairly Low Prices Extracted by Dominant Buyers
	(6)  Limiting Production, Markets, or Technical Development
	Footnotes:
Part I General Principles, 4 Article 102, L Price Discrimination
	Miguel de la Mano, Renato Nazzini, Hans Zenger
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
L. Price Discrimination
	(1)  Concept of Price Discrimination
	(2)  Competition Concerns Regarding Price Discrimination
	(3)  Case Law and Commission Practice on Article 102(c) Discriminatory Pricing Abuses
		(a)  Discrimination Based on Nationality
		(b)  Geographical Price Discrimination
		(p. 528) (c)  Market-Distorting Price Discrimination
			(i)  Definition
			(ii)  Equivalent Transactions
			(iii)  Dissimilar Conditions
			(iv)  Competitive Disadvantage
				(i)  The Discriminatory Fees Were an ‘Important Part of a Supplier’s Cost Structure’964
				(ii)  A ‘Significant Effect’ Should Be Required
	(4)  Policy and Effects-Based Approach
		(a)  The Commission’s Current Enforcement Approach
	Footnotes:
Part I General Principles, 5 Mergers, A Introduction
	Claes Bengtsson, Josep Maria Carpi Badia, Massimiliano Kadar
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
(p. 540) A. Introduction
	(1)  Origins and Evolution of EU Merger Control
		(a)  Introduction of an EU Merger Control System
		(b)  The First Decade of Application of EU Merger Control
		(c)  The Judgments in Airtours, Tetra Laval, and Schneider
		(d)  The 2004 Reform
		(e)  Evolution of EU Merger Control Following the 2004 Reform
	(2)  Core Principles of EU Merger Control
		(a)  Compulsory Ex Ante Notification
		(b)  One-Stop Shop
		(c)  One-Tier Administrative Procedure Subject to Judicial Review
		(d)  Enforcement Objectives
	(3)  Statistics on Enforcement Over Time
	Footnotes:
Part I General Principles, 5 Mergers, B Jurisdiction
	Claes Bengtsson, Josep Maria Carpi Badia, Massimiliano Kadar
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
B. Jurisdiction
	(1)  Overview
		(p. 548) (a)  Two-Limbed Test to Determine Jurisdiction
			(i)  The Concept of a ‘Concentration’
			(ii)  The Requirement of an ‘EU Dimension’
		(b)  Regulatory Framework: The Merger Regulation and the Jurisdictional Notice
			Table 5.1  Main provisions on jurisdiction
		(c)  Discussions with the Commission on Jurisdiction in Individual Cases
	(2)  The Concept of a Concentration: Merger
	(3)  The Concept of a Concentration: Acquisition of Control
		(a)  Overview
		(b)  Control
			(i)  Who Acquires Control?
			(ii)  How Can Control Be Acquired?
			(p. 555) (iii)  The Object of Control
			(iv)  The Lasting Nature of the Change in Control
			(v)  Internal Restructurings and Concentrations Involving State-Owned Undertakings
		(c)  The Acquisition of Sole Control
			(i)  De Jure Sole Control
			(ii)  De Facto Sole Control
		(d)  The Acquisition of Joint Control
			(i)  Equal Voting Rights
			(ii)  Veto Rights
			(iii)  Joint Exercise of Voting Rights
		(p. 563) (e)  Changes in the Structure and/or Quality of Control
			Table 5.2  Typology of changes in the scenario of control
		(p. 564) (f)  Non-Controlling Minority Shareholdings (Structural Links)
		(p. 566) (g)  Exceptions Under Article 3(5) of the Merger Regulation
	(4)  Joint Ventures
		(a)  Introduction
		(p. 567) (b)  Concept of Joint Venture
		(p. 568) (c)  Identification of the Relevant Jurisdictional Test
			(i)  Creation of a Joint Venture
			(p. 569) (ii)  Joint Acquisitions of an Undertaking or Business
			(iii)  Other Operations Involving Joint Ventures
		(d)  The Requirement of Full-Functionality
			(i)  Overview
			(ii)  Sufficient Resources to Operate Independently on the Market
			(iii)  Relations Between the Joint Venture and its Parent Companies
			(iv)  Operating on a Lasting Basis
	(5)  Interrelated and Staggered Operations
		(a)  Interdependent Transactions
		(b)  Consecutive Transactions Between the Same Parties (Staggered Transactions)
	(6)  Ancillary Restraints
	(7)  The Requirement of an EU Dimension
		(p. 578) (a)  The Purpose of Turnover Thresholds
		(b)  The Principal Threshold under Article 1(2) of the Merger Regulation
		(p. 579) (c)  The Alternative Threshold under Article 1(3) of the Merger Regulation
		(d)  Appraisal of the Operation of the Turnover Thresholds
	(p. 581) (8)  The Calculation of Relevant Turnover
		(a)  Step 1: Identifying the Undertakings Concerned
			Table 5.3  Undertakings concerned per type of concentration227
			(i)  General Rule
			(ii)  Specific Scenarios on the Acquiring Side
			(iii)  Specific Scenarios on the Acquired Side
		(b)  Step 2: Methodology for the Calculation of Turnover
			(i)  Concept of Turnover
			(p. 585) (ii)  Attribution of Turnover Between Undertakings in a Group
			(iii)  Treatment of Internal Turnover
			(iv)  Geographic Allocation of Turnover
		(c)  The Relevant Date and Financial Accounts
	Footnotes:
Part I General Principles, 5 Mergers, C Interaction with Member States and Third Countries
	Claes Bengtsson, Josep Maria Carpi Badia, Massimiliano Kadar
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
C. Interaction with Member States and Third Countries
	(1)  Introduction
	(2)  Reallocation of Jurisdiction between the Commission and Member States (‘Referrals’)
		(a)  Purpose of the Referral System
		(p. 590) (b)  Use of the Referral System Over Time
		(c)  Guiding Principles Applied when Considering Referral Requests
			Table 5.4  Elements for assessing which authority should review a transaction
		(d)  Operation of the Referral System in Practice
			Table 5.5  Types of referral
			(i)  Referrals from the Commission to One or More NCAs
				(i)  Pre-Notification Referrals Requested by the Parties (Article 4(4))
					Overview
					Requirements for referral
					Factors relevant to the exercise of its discretion
					Referral process
				(ii)  Post-Notification Referrals Requested by an NCA (Article 9)
					Overview
					Requirements for referral
					Factors relevant to the exercise of the Commission’s discretion
					Referral process
					Request by two (or more) Member States
			(ii)  Referrals From One or More NCAs to the Commission
				(i)  Pre-Notification Referrals Requested by the Parties (Article 4(5))
					Overview
					Requirements for referral
					Factors relevant to the assessment
					Process
				(ii)  Post-notification Referrals Requested by an NCA (Article 22)
					Overview
					Requirements for referral
					Factors relevant to the assessment
					Process
		(e)  Evaluation and Reform of the Referral System
	(3)  Member State Action on Non-Competition Grounds
		(a)  Introduction
		(p. 607) (b)  Assessment of Legitimate Interests
			(i)  Recognized Interests
			(ii)  Non-Recognized Interests
	(p. 609) (4)  Concentrations in the Defence Sector
	(5)  Cooperation Between the Commission and Member States
		(a)  General Cooperation Obligations
		(b)  Cooperation During Specific Phases of an Investigation
			(i)  During the Referral Process
			(ii)  During Phase I
			(iii)  During Phase II
		(c)  Enhancing Cooperation Between Member States Through the ECN
	(6)  Merger Control in the EEA Context
		(a)  The Scope of the Merger Control System under the EEA
		(b)  Allocation of Jurisdiction Between the Commission and the EFTA Surveillance Authority
		(p. 613) (c)  Cooperation Between the Commission and the EFTA Surveillance Authority
	(7)  International Cooperation in Merger Control
		(a)  Framework for International Cooperation
		(p. 614) (b)  Practical Aspects of International Cooperation in Merger Cases
		(c)  Statistics on International Cooperation
	Footnotes:
Part I General Principles, 5 Mergers, D Merger Control Procedure
	Claes Bengtsson, Josep Maria Carpi Badia, Massimiliano Kadar
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
D. Merger Control Procedure
	(1)  Introduction
	(2)  Principal Features of the Procedural Framework
		(a)  Underlying Rationale: Proportionate, Effective Control
		(b)  Binding Procedural Deadlines
		(c)  The Instruments of the Procedural Framework
			Table 5.6  Main instruments governing the merger procedure
		(p. 619) (d)  The Different Actors in EU Merger Proceedings
			(i)  The Notifying Parties and Other Involved Parties
			(ii)  The Commission
				Table 5.7  Decisions in merger cases and level of adoption (excluding referral decisions and decisions concerning State measures)
			(iii)  Third Parties
			(iv)  Member State NCAs
			(v)  Non-EU Agencies
			(vi)  The EU Courts
	(3)  The Main Steps and Timetable for EU Merger Control Proceedings
	(4)  The Pre-Notification Phase
		(a)  Introduction
		(b)  Timing of Pre-Notification Contacts
		(c)  Initial Contact and Request for a Case Team
		(p. 627) (d)  Confidentiality
		(e)  Discussions on Jurisdiction
		(p. 628) (f)  Discussions on Substance, Procedure, and Timing
		(g)  Review of Draft(s) Form CO and Requests for Waivers
		(h)  Submission of Internal Documents
		(i)  Fact Finding: Contacts with Third Parties
		(j)  Green Light for Notification
	(5)  Notification of a Concentration
		(a)  Introduction
		(b)  Obligation to Notify and Standstill Obligation
			(i)  Automatic Exceptions: Public Bids and Series of Transactions in Securities
			(ii)  Ad Hoc Derogations at the Request of the Parties
			(iii)  Preventing Early Implementation
		(c)  Consequences of Failure to Notify
		(d)  Timing of Notification
		(p. 634) (e)  Notifying Parties
		(f)  Submission of Form CO
			Table 5.8  Forms used in EU merger control procedures
		(g)  Incompleteness
		(h)  Publication of the Fact of the Notification
	(6)  Phase I
		(a)  Introduction
		(b)  Timetable and Deadlines
		(c)  Fact-Finding
		(d)  Where Competition Concerns are Identified
		(p. 641) (e)  Decision
		(f)  Notification and Publication
			(i)  Notification To The Parties
			(ii)  Publication
	(7)  Phase II: In-Depth Investigation
		(a)  Introduction
		(p. 643) (b)  Procedural Safeguards in Phase II
		(c)  Timetable and Deadlines
		(d)  Initial Stage: Review of Key Documents, Reply to the Article 6(1)(c) Decision and State of Play Meeting
		(e)  In-Depth Investigation
		(f)  Where the Competition Concerns are Dispelled
		(g)  Where Competition Concerns Remain
		(p. 646) (h)  The Statement of Objections
			(i)  Purpose and Content
			(ii)  Timing
			(iii)  Scope of the SO
			(iv)  Other Parties
		(i)  Access to File
			(i)  Purpose
			(ii)  Timing
			(iii)  Scope
				(i)  Internal Documents
				(ii)  Business Secrets and Confidential Information
			(iv)  Protection of Business Secrets and Confidential Information
			(v)  Use of the Information/Access to Documents
		(j)  Reply to the SO and Oral Hearing
			(i)  Reply to the SO
			(ii)  Oral Hearing
				(i)  Attendees
				(ii)  Preparation
				(iii)  Conduct of the Hearing
				(iv)  Post-Hearing Report
		(k)  The Post-SO/Oral Hearing Stage
			(i)  Final State of Play Meetings
			(ii)  Peer Review Panel
			(iii)  Advisory Committee
		(l)  Decision
		(p. 656) (m)  Notification and Publication
		(n)  Post-Decision Remedies Process
	(8)  The Simplified Procedure
		(a)  Overview and Rationale
		(b)  The Commission’s Discretion in Applying the Simplified Procedure
		(c)  Use of the Simplified Procedure in Practice
		(p. 658) (d)  Impact of the Simplified Procedure on Deadlines
		(e)  The Scope of the Simplified Procedure: Categories of Suitable Cases
			(i)  Five Categories of Suitable Cases
			(p. 660) (ii)  Exclusions
		(f)  Procedural Aspects
		(g)  Decision
	(9)  Abandonment of a Concentration, Withdrawal and Re-submission of a Notification, Change of an Authorized Transaction
		(a)  Abandonment
		(b)  Withdrawal of a Notification
		(c)  Change in the Transaction Structure
	(10)  Particular Procedures
		(p. 663) (a)  Interim Measures
			(i)  General
			(ii)  Conditions Necessary for the Imposition of Interim Measures
			(iii)  Scope of Interim Measures
			(iv)  Process
		(b)  Revocation of a Clearance Decision
		(p. 665) (c)  Inspections and Requests for Information by Decision
		(d)  Imposition of Fines and Periodic Penalties
			(i)  Fines
			(p. 667) (ii)  Periodic Penalty Payments
	Footnotes:
Part I General Principles, 5 Mergers, E Substantive Assessment
	Claes Bengtsson, Josep Maria Carpi Badia, Massimiliano Kadar
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
E. Substantive Assessment
	(1)  Main Elements of the Assessment under Article 2 of the Merger Regulation
		(a)  ‘A concentration’
		(b)  ‘which would’
		(c)  ‘impede effective competition’
			(i)  Intermediate and Ultimate Consumers
			(ii)  Concept of Consumer Welfare
		(d)  ‘significantly’
		(e)  ‘in the common market or in a substantial part of it, ’
		(f)  ‘in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position.’
	(2)  Definition of the Relevant Market
		(a)  Relevant Product Market
			(i)  Demand-Side Substitution
			(ii)  Supply-Side Substitution
		(p. 678) (b)  Relevant Geographic Market
			(i)  Defining the Geographic Market on the Basis of Location of Customers or Producers
		(c)  The SSNIP Test and Critical Loss Analysis
		(d)  Price Discrimination Markets
		(e)  Factors Relevant to Market Definition and Types of Evidence Relied On
			(i)  Views on Functionality
			(ii)  Commercial Strategies and Marketing Material
			(iii)  Analysis of Price Levels
			(p. 687) (iv)  Analysis of Price Correlation
			(v)  Event Analysis
		(f)  Market Definition for Merger Cases and Antitrust Cases are Similar but Distinct
		(p. 691) (g)  Is Market Definition Really Necessary in an Effects-Based Analysis?
	(3)  Analysis of the Effects of a Concentration
		Table 5.9  Typology of effects
		(a)  The Move to a More Effects-Based Approach
		(b)  Gravitation Towards Unilateral Horizontal Effects
		(c)  Increasingly Complex Assessments
	(4)  Horizontal Mergers
		(a)  Non-Coordinated Effects (Unilateral Effects)
			(i)  Market Share Thresholds
				(p. 696) (i)  Which Market Shares are Relevant for the Assessment?
				(ii)  Market Shares Indicating a Lack of Substantive Concern
				(iii)  Market Shares Indicating a Likelihood of Substantive Concerns
			(ii)  Intervention Thresholds: Removal of a Significant Competitive Constraint
			(iii)  Assessment of Effect: Additional Factors
			(iv)  Differentiated Product Markets: Closeness of Competition
				(i)  Views of the Market Participants
				(ii)  Internal Documents
				(iii)  Bidding Data
				(iv)  Switching Data
				(v)  Price Analysis
				(vi)  Cross-Price Elasticities
				(vii)  Modelling the Market
			(v)  Homogeneous Product Markets: Capacity
			(vi)  Multi-Sourcing
			(vii)  Ability to Hinder Expansion
			(viii)  Merger with a Potential Competitor
			(ix)  Buyer Power Created by the Merger
		(b)  Coordinated Effects
			(i)  Concept and History
				(i)  Collective Dominance Under the 1989 Merger Regulation
				(ii)  The Airtours Benchmark
				(iii)  The SONY/BMG Jurisprudence
			(ii)  Analytical Framework
				(p. 715) (i)  The Airtours Criteria
				(ii)  The Approach Under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines
			(iii)  Creating Coordination or Strengthening Existing Coordination
				(i)  Creating Coordination
				(ii)  Strengthening Coordination
			(iv)  The Criteria for Coordination
				(i)  Reaching Terms of Coordination (A Conducive Market Environment)
				(p. 719) (ii)  Monitoring Deviations
				(iii)  Adequate Deterrent Mechanisms
				(p. 721) (iv)  Reactions of Outsiders
	(5)  Non-Horizontal Assessment
		(a)  Non-Coordinated Effects (Unilateral Effects)
			(i)  Theories of Harm
				(p. 724) (i)  Example of Input Foreclosure: UTC/Goodrich862
				(ii)  Example of Customer Foreclosure: Mobile Wallet Platform863
				(iii)  Example of Conglomerate Effects: Intel/McAfee865
			(ii)  Who is Entitled to Protection From the Potential Effects of Non-Horizontal Mergers?
			(iii)  Framework for Analysing Foreclosure
			(i)  Ability to Foreclose
				Distinction between situation of sole control and joint control
			(ii)  Incentive
			(iii)  Effect
				Efficiencies: The Importance of the Elimination of Double Mark-Ups
			(iv)  The Diminished Role of Dominance in Non-Horizontal Cases
				(i)  Dominance is Not Necessary
				(ii)  Effects May Come Faster Than Dominance
		(b)  Coordinated Effects
			(i)  Reaching Terms of Coordination
			(ii)  Monitoring Deviations
			(p. 733) (iii)  Deterrent Mechanisms
			(iv)  Reactions From Outsiders
	(6)  Countervailing Factors
		(a)  Buyer Power
			(i)  The Exercise of Buyer Power
				(i)  Immediately Switch Supplier
				(ii)  Vertically Integrate Upstream
				(iii)  Sponsor Entry
				(iv)  Refuse to Buy Other Products
			(ii)  Buyer Power Must Benefit All Customers
		(b)  Entry
			(i)  Types of Entry Barrier
			(ii)  Link Between Entry Barriers and Market Definition
			(iii)  Conditions for Entry to be Sufficient Countervailing Factor
				(i)  Entry Must Be Likely
					History of entry
					Market characteristics affecting whether entry would be attractive
					Reaction from incumbents
				(ii)  Entry Must Be Timely
				(iii)  Entry Must Be Sufficient
		(c)  Efficiencies
			(i)  Historic Treatment of Efficiencies: The ‘Efficiency Offence’?
			(ii)  Recent Practice
			(iii)  Criteria for an Efficiency Defence
				(i)  Efficiencies Must Benefit Consumers
				(ii)  Efficiencies Must Be Merger-Specific
				(iii)  Efficiencies Must Be Verifiable
		(d)  Failing Firm Defence
			(i)  Conditions Necessary for Failing Firm Defence
				(i)  Exit Due to Financial Difficulties
				(ii)  No Less Anti-Competitive Solution
				(iii)  Exit From the Market
			(ii)  Failing Division
			(iii)  Parties Must Provide the Evidence
	Footnotes:
Part I General Principles, 5 Mergers, F Remedies
	Claes Bengtsson, Josep Maria Carpi Badia, Massimiliano Kadar
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
F. Remedies
	(1)  Overview
		Table 5.10  Main provisions on merger remedies
	(2)  General Principles
		(a)  Roles of Notifying Parties and Commission
		(b)  Attachment to Decision as Conditions or Obligations
		(c)  Distinction Between Remedies, ‘Take-Note’ Commitment, and Facts Taken Into Account
			(i)  Take-Note Commitments
			(p. 759) (ii)  Facts Taken Into Account
			(iii)  Potential Remedy for Breach
	(3)  Conditions That Remedies Must Meet
		(p. 760) (a)  Remedies Must Eliminate the Competition Concerns
		(b)  Remedies Must Be Proportionate
		(c)  Remedies Must Be Capable of Effective Implementation
			(p. 762) (i)  Timely Implementation
			(ii)  Lasting and Workable Solution
			(iii)  Capable of Adequate Monitoring
		(d)  Remedies Must Not Lead to New Competition Concerns
	(4)  Remedies in Phase I and Phase II
		(a)  Phase I Remedies
			(i)  Substantive Requirements
			(ii)  Formal Requirements
			(p. 766) (iii)  Timing
			(iv)  Assessment Process
			(v)  Modifications
			(vi)  Outcome
		(b)  Phase II Remedies
			(i)  Substantive Requirements
			(ii)  Formal Requirements
			(iii)  Time Limits
			(iv)  Assessment Process
			(p. 770) (v)  Modifications
			(vi)  Outcome
	(5)  Types of Remedies
		(a)  Typology and Terminology
		(b)  Acceptability of the Various Categories
		(c)  Divestiture of a Business
			(i)  Overview
			(ii)  Purpose
			(iii)  Divestiture of a Viable and Competitive Stand-Alone Business
			(iv)  Carve-Out Divestitures
			(p. 776) (v)  Alternative to Carve-Outs
			(vi)  Alternative Divestitures: Crown Jewels
			(vii)  Suitable Purchaser
				(p. 777) (i)  Standard Requirements
				(ii)  When a Suitable Purchaser Must Be Identified
		(d)  Removal of Links with Competitors
		(e)  Access Remedies
		(f)  Commitments to Enter Into, Modify, or Terminate Long-Term Agreements
		(g)  Conduct Remedies in Conglomerate Cases
		(h)  Other Conduct Remedies
	(p. 783) (6)  Implementation and Modification of Remedies Post-Decision
		(a)  Implementation of Remedies
			(i)  Timing
			(ii)  Obligations of the Parties in the Interim Period
			(iii)  Hold-Separate Manager
			(iv)  Monitoring Trustee
			(v)  Proposal for a Suitable Purchaser
			(vi)  Divestiture Trustee
		(b)  Modification of Remedies Post-Decision
			(i)  Extension of First Divestiture Period
			(ii)  Other Modifications Requested by the Parties
			(iii)  Other Modifications Requested by the Commission
		(c)  Breach of Remedies
			(i)  Breach of Obligations
			(ii)  Breach of Conditions
			(iii)  Fines
	Footnotes:
Part I General Principles, 5 Mergers, G Judicial Review
	Claes Bengtsson, Josep Maria Carpi Badia, Massimiliano Kadar
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
G. Judicial Review
	(1)  Introduction
	(2)  Types of Acts That Can Be Reviewed
	(3)  Legal Standing in Actions for Annulment
		(a)  Member States, Parliament, and Council
		(b)  Natural and Legal Persons
			(i)  The Notifying Parties
			(p. 793) (ii)  Other Parties to the Concentration
			(iii)  Third Parties
	(4)  Grounds for Challenge
		(a)  Lack of Competence
		(b)  Infringement of an Essential Procedural Requirement
		(p. 798) (c)  Infringement of the Treaties or of Any Rule of Law Relating to Their Application
		(d)  Misuse of Powers
	(p. 799) (5)  Procedure
		(a)  General
		(p. 800) (b)  Interim Measures
		(c)  Expedited Procedure
		(d)  Appeals from the General Court to the Court of Justice
	(6)  The Scope of Review
		(a)  Introduction
		(b)  Burden of Proof
		(c)  Standard of Proof
		(d)  Standard of Review: The Margin of Appreciation
		(e)  Full Jurisdiction Over Fines and Periodic Penalty Payments
	(7)  Consequences of Annulment
		(a)  Introduction
		(p. 806) (b)  The New Examination
	(8)  Actions for Damages
		(a)  Introduction
		(b)  Unlawful Conduct
		(p. 808) (c)  Harm
		(d)  Causal Link
	Footnotes:
Part I General Principles, 6 Article 106—Exclusive or Special Rights and other Anti-Competitive State Measures, A Introduction
	José Luis Buendia Sierra
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
A. Introduction
	(i)  Competition Law Normally Deals Only With the Behaviour of Undertakings
	(ii)  State Defence Doctrine
	(iii)  State Liability Under Competition Law
	Footnotes:
Part I General Principles, 6 Article 106—Exclusive or Special Rights and other Anti-Competitive State Measures, B Application of Articles 4(3) and 3(3) TEU and Articles 101 and 102 TFEU to Anti-Competitive State Measures
	José Luis Buendia Sierra
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
B. Application of Articles 4(3) and 3(3) TEU and Articles 101 and 102 TFEU to Anti-Competitive State Measures
	(i)  Initial Position (Broad Interpretation)
	(ii)  Court Narrows Interpretation
	(iii)  Impact of the Lisbon Treaty
	(iv)  Application of Articles 106, 107, and 108 to Anti-Competitive State Measures
	Footnotes:
Part I General Principles, 6 Article 106—Exclusive or Special Rights and other Anti-Competitive State Measures, C Article 106(1): State Measures in Respect of Public or Privileged Undertakings
	José Luis Buendia Sierra
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
C. Article 106(1): State Measures in Respect of Public or Privileged Undertakings
	(1)  Addressees and Regulatory Content
	(2)  State Measures
		(i)  Formal Criteria Are Not Decisive in Defining ‘State Measures’
		(p. 814) (ii)  The Function of the Act is the Decisive Factor in Defining ‘State Measures’
		(iii)  The Form of the Act Creates a Presumption, But Its Function is the Decisive Criterion in Defining It as a ‘State Measure’
		(iv)  State Measures May Be Adopted By Any Type of Public Authority
	(3)  Related to Public or Privileged Undertakings
		(a)  ‘Economic Activity’
			(i)  Article 106(1) Applies to State Regulation of Economic Activities
			(p. 815) (ii)  Definition of ‘Economic Activity’
			(iii)  Criteria Used By the Court of Justice
			(p. 817) (iv)  ‘Public’ Undertaking
			(v)  Definition of Public Undertaking
			(vi)  A Separate Legal Entity is Not Necessary
			(vii)  Public Undertakings After Privatization
			(viii)  ‘Privileged’ Undertakings
		(p. 818) (b)  Exclusive Rights
			(i)  Notion of ‘Exclusive Right’
			(ii)  Exclusive Right and Dominant Position are Different Things
			(iii)  Exclusive Rights are Created by State Measures
			(iv)  Need for a Discretionary Decision by the State
			(v)  Special Rights
		(p. 821) (c)  The Connection Between the Measure and the Undertaking
			(i)  Types of Connection Required by Article 106(1)
			(ii)  State Measures Which Benefit the Undertaking
			(iii)  State Measures Which Use the Undertaking as an Instrument
			(iv)  State Measures Granting an Exclusive Right
			(v)  The Dual Role of Exclusive Rights Within Article 106(1)
			(vi)  General Measures Do Not Fall Under Article 106(1)
	(4)  Contrary to Another Provision of the TFEU
	(5)  Article 106(1) in Combination with the Competition Rules Addressed to Undertakings
		(a)  Article 106(1) in Combination with Article 102
			(i)  Dominant Position
			(ii)  State Measures Leading to Actual Abusive Behaviour of the Undertakings
			(iii)  Different Types of Abuse
			(iv)  Only the State is Responsible for State-Imposed Abuses
			(v)  Both the State and the Undertaking are Liable for State-Induced Abuses
			(vi)  State Inactivity
		(b)  State Measures Affecting the Structure of Competition and Leading to Potential Abusive Behaviour of Undertakings
			(i)  No Requirement for Actual Abuse
			(ii)  The Granting of Regulatory Powers to an Undertaking
			(p. 827) (iii)  The ‘Bundling’ of Regulatory and Commercial Activities
			(iv)  The Granting of an Exclusive Right
			(v)  The Demand Limitation Doctrine
			(p. 828) (vi)  The Conflict of Interest Doctrine
			(vii)  Presumption of Causal Link
			(viii)  Effects Similar to Those of Abusive Behaviour
			(ix)  The Doctrine of the Extension of a Dominant Position
			(x)  The Automatic Abuse Doctrine
			(xi)  The La Crespelle Case
			(xii)  More Recent Cases
			(xiii)  The Current Status Quo
			(xiv)  Effect on Intra-EU Trade
		(c)  Article 106(1) in Combination with Article 101
	(p. 836) (6)  Article 106(1) in Combination with the Treaty Rules Addressed to the Member States
		(a)  The Double Function of Article 106(1)
			(i)  Article 106(1) as a ‘Reminder’ of Prohibitions
			(ii)  ‘Lifting the Veil’
		(b)  Article 106(1) in Combination with the Rules on Free Movement of Goods: Articles 34 and 37
			(i)  The General Regime: Measures of Equivalent Effect and Article 34
			(p. 839) (ii)  The Special Regime: State Monopolies and Article 37
			(iii)  ‘State monopolies of a commercial character’
			(iv)  Obligations Contained in Article 37
			(v)  Obligations During the Transitional Period
			(vi)  Obligations After the Transitional Period
			(vii)  The Borderline Between the General and Special Regimes
		(c)  Article 106(1) in Combination with the Rules on Freedom to Provide Services and on Establishment: Articles 49 and 56
			(i)  Article 106(1) in Combination with Article 56
			(ii)  Article 106(1) in Combination with Article 49
			(iii)  Obligation to Select the Operator of a Public Service Concession Through a Competitive Tender
			(iv)  Need for a Cross-Border Element
	(7)  Direct Effect
	Footnotes:
Part I General Principles, 6 Article 106—Exclusive or Special Rights and other Anti-Competitive State Measures, D Article 106(2): Services of General Economic Interest and Other Public Interest Objectives
	José Luis Buendia Sierra
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
(p. 846) D. Article 106(2): Services of General Economic Interest and Other Public Interest Objectives
	(1)  The Undertakings to which Article 106(2) Relates
		(p. 847) (i)  Undertakings
		(ii)  Undertakings Entrusted With the Operation of Services of General Economic Interest
		(iii)  Services of General Economic Interest
		(iv)  Entrustment
		(p. 852) (v)  Revenue-Producing Monopolies
	(2)  Article 106(2) as an Exception Applicable to the Behaviour of Undertakings and to State Measures
	(3)  Conditions for the Application of Article 106(2)
		(i)  The Necessity of the Measure
		(ii)  The Proportionality Principle
		(iii)  The Old Approach: A Strict Interpretation of the Proportionality Test
		(iv)  The Need for a More Flexible Interpretation
		(v)  Universal Service as a Justification for Exclusive Rights
		(vi)  The Corbeau Case
		(vii)  The Almelo Case
		(viii)  Other Cases
		(ix)  Case law of the General Court
		(x)  Need for an Economic Analysis
		(xi)  The Dynamic Character of Proportionality
		(xii)  Different Approaches Depending on the Sector
		(xiii)  The Strict Approach and the Flexible Approach
		(xiv)  Universal Services and Other Services of General Economic Interest
		(xv)  Examples of Measures Considered Non-Proportional
		(xvi)  The Interest of the EU
	(4)  Invocation of Article 106(2) and Burden of Proof
	(5)  Relationship between Article 106(2) and Other Exceptions
		(i)  ‘Mandatory Requirements’ Within the Framework of Article 106(2)
		(ii)  Article 101(3)
	(6)  Relationship between Article 106(2) and Article 14
Article 1 
Article 2 
	Footnotes:
Part I General Principles, 6 Article 106—Exclusive or Special Rights and other Anti-Competitive State Measures, E Article 106(3): Procedural Rules Applying to Anti-Competitive State Measures
	José Luis Buendia Sierra
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
E. Article 106(3): Procedural Rules Applying to Anti-Competitive State Measures
	(1)  Article 106(3) Decisions
		(i)  General Issues
		(ii)  Analogy With Other Procedures
		(iii)  Discretionary Character of the Procedure Under Article 106(3)
		(p. 870) (iv)  Lodging of Complaints and Ex Officio Cases
		(v)  Dismissal of Complaints
		(a)  The Infringement Procedure
			(i)  Interim Measures
			(ii)  Letter of Formal Notice
			(iii)  The Rights of the Member State and of the Undertaking that Benefits from the Measure
			(iv)  End of the Procedure Without a Formal Decision
			(v)  The Formal Decision and Its Effects
			(vi)  Binding Effects
			(vii)  Action for Annulment Against an Article 106(3) Decision
			(p. 874) (viii)  Action for Failure to Implement an Article 106(3) Decision
	(2)  Article 106(3) Directives
		(i)  Preventive Functions of Article 106(3) Directives
		(ii)  Article 106(3) Directives as Instruments for Detecting Future Infringements
		(iii)  Article 106(3) Directives as Instruments for ‘Specifying’ the Provisions of the Treaty
	(3)  Legal Regime of Article 106(3) Directives
		(i)  The Exclusive Competence of the Commission
		(ii)  Limits to the Commission’s Competence
		(iii)  Article 106(3) Directives Cannot Deal With the Autonomous Behaviour of Undertakings
		(iv)  Formal Limits to the Commission’s Power under Article 106(3)
		(v)  Binding Effects
		(vi)  Lack of Direct Effect
		(vii)  Relationship Between Directives Under Article 106(3) and Harmonizing Directives
		(viii)  Article 106(3) Overlaps With Other Treaty Provisions
		(ix)  Article 106(3) Overlaps with Article 14
		(x)  The Dissuasive Role of Article 106(3)
	Footnotes:
Part II Specific Practices, 7 Horizontal Cooperation Agreements, A Introduction
	Luc Peeperkorn, Vincent Verouden
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
(p. 884) A. Introduction
	(1)  Definition of Horizontal Agreements and Practices
	(2)  Background to Horizontal Agreements and Practices
	Footnotes:
Part II Specific Practices, 7 Horizontal Cooperation Agreements, B Assessment of Horizontal Cooperation Agreements under Article 101
	Luc Peeperkorn, Vincent Verouden
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
B. Assessment of Horizontal Cooperation Agreements under Article 101
	(1)  Purpose and Scope
	(p. 888) (2)  Framework of Analysis
	Footnotes:
Part II Specific Practices, 7 Horizontal Cooperation Agreements, C Joint Ventures Involving Joint Control
	Luc Peeperkorn, Vincent Verouden
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
C. Joint Ventures Involving Joint Control
	(1)  Definition and Constitution of a Joint Venture
		(a)  Definition
		(p. 891) (b)  Constitution of a Joint Venture
	(2)  Distinction Between Cooperative and Concentrative Joint Ventures
	(3)  The Rationale Behind the Difference in Treatment Between Full-Function Concentrative and Full-Function Cooperative Joint Ventures
	(4)  The Application of Article 101(1) by the Commission to Cooperative Joint Ventures Prior to the Entry into Force of the 1997 Amendment to the First Merger Regulation
	(5)  The Notion and Role of Potential Competition in Assessing the Validity of Joint Ventures under Article 101
	(6)  Conditions Leading to the Incentive to Coordinate (Spillover Effects)
		(a)  Introduction
		(b)  Spillovers on the Same Market As That of the Joint Venture
		(c)  Spillovers on to Other Markets
			(i)  Spillovers on to Downstream Markets
			(ii)  Spillovers on to Adjacent Product Markets
			(iii)  Spillovers on to Adjacent Geographic Markets
		(d)  Network Effects
	(7)  Direct Contractual Restrictions Between Parents
	(8)  Intra-Group Agreements and Joint Ventures
	(9)  Spillovers under the Merger Regulation
	Footnotes:
Part II Specific Practices, 7 Horizontal Cooperation Agreements, D Research and Development Agreements
	Luc Peeperkorn, Vincent Verouden
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
D. Research and Development Agreements
	(1)  Overview
	(2)  Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines
		(a)  Relevant Markets
		(b)  Calculation of Market Shares
		(c)  Competitive Assessment under Article 101(1)
		(d)  Competitive Assessment under Article 101(3)
		(e)  Time of Assessment
	(3)  The R&D BER
		(a)  Background and Overview
		(b)  Key Concepts of the R&D BER
			(i)  Article 1 of the R&D BER: Definitions
			(ii)  Article 2 of the R&D BER: Scope of Application
			(iii)  Article 3 of the R&D BER: Positive Exemption Criteria
			(iv)  Article 4 of the R&D BER: Market Share Threshold and Duration of Exemption
			(v)  Article 5 of the R&D BER: Hardcore Restrictions
			(vi)  Article 6 of the R&D BER: Excluded Restrictions
			(vii)  Article 7 of the R&D BER: Application of the Market Share Threshold
	Footnotes:
Part II Specific Practices, 7 Horizontal Cooperation Agreements, E Production Agreements
	Luc Peeperkorn, Vincent Verouden
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
(p. 941) E. Production Agreements
	(1)  Introduction
	(2)  Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines
		(a)  Main Changes Compared to the 2001 Text
		(b)  Scope
		(c)  Relevant Markets
	(3)  Competitive Assessment under Article 101(1)
		(a)  Main Competition Concerns
		(b)  Restrictions of Competition by Object
		(c)  Restrictions of Competition by Effect
			(i)  ‘Commonality of costs and collusive outcomes—Example 1’244
			(ii)  ‘Anti-competitive foreclosure on a downstream market—Example 3’247
		(d)  Safe Harbour
	(4)  Competitive Assessment under Article 101(3)
	(5)  The Specialisation BER
		(a)  Background and Overview
		(b)  Key Concepts of the Specialisation BER
			(i)  Article 1: Definitions
				(i)  Specialization Agreement: Article 1(1)(a)
				(ii)  Unilateral Specialization Agreement: Article 1(1)(b)
				(iii)  Reciprocal Specialization Agreement: Article 1(1)(c)
				(iv)  Agreements on Joint Production: Article 1(1)(d)
				(v)  Agreement: Article 1(1)(e)
				(vi)  Product: Article 1(1)(f)
				(vii)  Production: Article 1(1)(g)
				(viii)  The Preparation of Services: Article 1(1)(h)
				(ix)  Relevant Market: Article 1(1)(i)
				(x)  Specialization Product: Article 1(1)(j)
				(xi)  Downstream Products: Article 1(1)(k)
				(xii)  Competing Undertaking: Article 1(1)(l); Actual Competitor: Article 1(1)(m); and Potential Competitor: Article 1(1)(n)
				(xiii)  Exclusive Supply Obligation: Article 1(1)(o)
				(xiv)  Exclusive Purchase Obligation: Article 1(1)(p)
				(xv)  Joint: Article 1(1)(q)
				(xvi)  Distribution: Article 1(1)(r)
				(xvii)  Undertaking, Parties, and Connected Parties: Article 1(2)
			(ii)  Article 2: The Exemption—Scope of Application
				(i)  Assignment or Licensing of IP Rights
			(iii)  Article 3: Market Share Threshold
				(i)  The Different Market Share Thresholds
			(iv)  Article 4: Hardcore Restrictions
				(i)  Price-Related Restrictions: Article 4(a)
				(ii)  Limitation of Output or Sales: Article 4(b)
				(iii)  The Allocation of Markets and Customers: Article 4(c)
			(v)  Article 5: Application of the Market Share Thresholds
				(i)  The Calculation of Market Shares: Article 5(a), (b), and (c)
			(vi)  Article 6: Transitional Period
			(vii)  Article 7: Period of Validity
	Footnotes:
Part II Specific Practices, 7 Horizontal Cooperation Agreements, F Joint Selling Agreements
	Luc Peeperkorn, Vincent Verouden
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
F. Joint Selling Agreements
	(1)  Introduction
		(a)  Definition
		(b)  Potential or Actual Competitors
		(c)  Consortia
		(d)  Main Competition Issues
	(2)  Application of Article 101(1) to Joint Selling Agreements
		(a)  Restrictions of Competition By Object
		(b)  Restrictions of Competition By Effect
		(c)  Safe Harbour
	(3)  Factors Addressed in Commission Decisions and the Guidelines
		(a)  Market Structure; Oligopolistic Markets
		(p. 966) (b)  Market Entry
		(c)  Price Restrictions
		(d)  Output Restrictions
		(e)  Exclusivity Clauses
		(f)  Collusion
	(4)  Application of Article 101(3) to Joint Selling Agreements
		(a)  Efficiencies
		(b)  Specific Circumstances Allowing for an Exemption of Price Fixing
	Footnotes:
Part II Specific Practices, 7 Horizontal Cooperation Agreements, G Joint Purchasing Agreements
	Luc Peeperkorn, Vincent Verouden
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
G. Joint Purchasing Agreements
	(1)  Introduction
		(a)  Definition
		(b)  Relevant Markets
		(c)  Potential or Actual Competitors
		(d)  Main Competition Issues
		(p. 973) (e)  Buying Power
	(2)  Application of Article 101(1) to Joint Purchasing Agreements
		(a)  Restrictions of Competition By Object
		(b)  Restrictions of Competition By Effect
		(c)  Safe Harbour
		(d)  Collusive Outcome
	(3)  Factors Addressed in Commission’s Guidelines and Decisions
		(a)  The Existence of Downstream Market Power
		(b)  The Existence of Upstream Market Power
		(c)  Measurement of Buyer Power
		(d)  SMEs
		(e)  Countervailing Power of Strong Suppliers
		(f)  Exclusive Purchasing Obligations
	(4)  Application of Article 101(3) to Joint Purchasing Agreements
	Footnotes:
Part II Specific Practices, 7 Horizontal Cooperation Agreements, H Information Exchange Agreements
	Luc Peeperkorn, Vincent Verouden
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
H. Information Exchange Agreements
	(1)  Introduction
	(2)  Main Competition Issues
		(a)  Information Exchanges May Facilitate Coordination
			(i)  Information Exchanges to Help Firms to Reach a Focal Point for Coordination
			(ii)  Information Exchanges to Help Firms to Monitor and Punish Deviations From Coordination
			(iii)  Information Exchanges to Enhance External Stability of Coordinated Outcomes
		(b)  Information Exchanges That Exclude Competitors
		(c)  Competition Issues Absent Coordination or Exclusionary Concerns
	(3)  Potential Benefits
		(p. 987) (a)  Enhanced Consumer Transparency
		(b)  Enhanced Allocative Efficiencies
		(c)  Reduction in Asymmetric Information Problems
		(p. 989) (d)  Benchmarking
	(4)  Criteria for Assessment
		(a)  Restrictions of Competition By Object
		(b)  Meaning of Future Intentions
		(c)  Frequency as a Determinative Criteria for Object Assessment
		(d)  Cartel Agreements vs Exchange of Information Agreements
		(p. 992) (e)  Concerted Practices
	(5)  Assessment of Likely or Actual Effects
		(a)  Characteristics of Relevant Market
			(i)  Degree of Concentration
			(ii)  Stability of Supply and Demand
			(iii)  Symmetric Costs and Market Structures
			(iv)  Frequency of Firms’ Interactions
			(v)  Barriers to Entry
		(b)  Characteristics of Information Exchanged
			(i)  Coverage of Relevant Market
			(ii)  Strategic Significance of Information
			(iii)  Public vs Non-Public Information
			(iv)  Exchanges Made Publicly vs Exchanges Made Non-Publicly
			(v)  Degree of Aggregation
			(p. 1004) (vi)  Age of Data
			(vii)  Frequency of Exchange
	Footnotes:
Part II Specific Practices, 7 Horizontal Cooperation Agreements, I Standardization Agreements
	Luc Peeperkorn, Vincent Verouden
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
I. Standardization Agreements
	(1)  Introduction
	(2)  Recent Investigations in the Area of Standard-Setting Agreements
	(3)  Agreements on Standards under the 2010 Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines
		(a)  Definition
		(b)  Relevant Markets
		(c)  Theories of Harm
		(d)  When Could There Be a Restriction By Object?
		(e)  The Safe Harbour Principles
		(f)  FRAND Benchmarks
		(g)  Effects-Based Assessment
		(p. 1017) (h)  Article 101(3): Efficiencies
	Footnotes:
Part II Specific Practices, 7 Horizontal Cooperation Agreements, J Standard Terms
	Luc Peeperkorn, Vincent Verouden
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
J. Standard Terms
	(1)  Introduction
	(2)  Standard Terms under the 2010 Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines
		(a)  Relevant Markets
		(p. 1019) (b)  Theories of Harm
		(c)  Restriction By Object
		(d)  Effects-Based Assessment
		(e)  Efficiency Gains
		(f)  Indispensability
		(g)  Pass-On to Consumers
		(h)  No Elimination of Competition
	Footnotes:
Part II Specific Practices, 8 Cartels, A Introduction
	Antoine Colombani, Jindrich Kloub, Ewoud Sakkers
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
A. Introduction
	(1)  Definition1
	(2)  The Per Se Prohibition of Cartels in EU Competition Law
	(3)  Harm Caused by Cartels
	Footnotes:
Part II Specific Practices, 8 Cartels, B Typology of Cartel Arrangements and Common Features of Collusion
	Antoine Colombani, Jindrich Kloub, Ewoud Sakkers
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
B. Typology of Cartel Arrangements and Common Features of Collusion
	(1)  Typology of Cartel Arrangements
		(a)  Direct or Indirect Fixing of Purchase or Selling Prices or Any Other Trading Conditions
			(i)  Uniform Prices and Price Formulae
			(ii)  Minimum Prices
			(iii)  ‘Target’ Prices
			(iv)  Recommended Prices
			(v)  Discussion of Prices for Individual Customers/Customer Lists
			(vi)  Agreement on Part of the Price or on Price Supplements
			(vii)  Maximum Rebates
			(viii)  Agreements on Other Trade Conditions
			(ix)  Agreement on the Purchase Price of Raw Materials
			(x)  Coordinated Price Increase ‘Campaigns’
		(b)  Limitation or Control of Production, Markets, Technical Development, or Investment
			(i)  Production or Sales Quotas
			(ii)  Other Types of Joint Limitation or Control of Production
			(iii)  The Control or Limitation of Commercial Investment
			(iv)  Collusive Product Specialization
			(v)  Channelling Output/Grant of Reciprocal Selling Rights and Joint Sales Arrangements
			(p. 1037) (vi)  Standard Setting
			(vii)  Other Practices Limiting Production or Technological Development
		(c)  Sharing of Markets, Customers, or Sources of Supply
			(i)  Allocation of Market Shares
			(ii)  Allocation of Territories or Distribution Channels
			(iii)  Allocation of Customers and Other Customer-Specific Practices
			(iv)  Bid Rigging
			(v)  Sharing Sources of Supply
		(d)  Coordinated Boycotts, Bans on Imports, Concerted Refusal to Deal
			(i)  Keeping Competitors Away From the Cartel’s Market
			(ii)  Placing Certain Competitors at a Competitive Disadvantage
			(iii)  Boycott of Reluctant Undertakings
		(e)  Exchange of Commercially Sensitive Information/Unilateral Signalling/Hub-and-Spoke Cartels
			(i)  Exchange of Information: Often a Constituent Part of the ‘Cartel Offence’, But Also a Violation in Its Own Right?
			(ii)  Focusing on the ‘Object’
			(iii)  The 2010 Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines
			(iv)  Collusion With Only an Indirect Effect on Prices Also Prohibited
			(v)  Form of Collusion is Immaterial if Object is Established
			(vi)  Information Exchanges Illicit Based on Evidence of ‘Effect’?
			(vii)  Conclusion as to Information Exchange
			(viii)  Unilateral Signalling
			(ix)  ‘Hub-and-Spoke’ Cartels
		(f)  The Problem of ‘Tacit Collusion’
			(i)  The Theory of Tacit Collusion
			(ii)  Does Tacit Collusion Amount to Cartel Behaviour?
			(iii)  Conclusion on Tacit Collusion
		(g)  Assessment of Cartels under Article 101(3)
	(2)  Common Features of Collusion
		(a)  Factors Conducive to the Establishment of Cartels
			(i)  Oligopolistic Markets
			(ii)  Collusive Business Values and Established Communication Channels
			(iii)  Exogenous Triggering Events
			(iv)  The Determining Role of Instigators
		(p. 1057) (b)  Organizational Aspects of Cartels
			(i)  Regular Meetings
				(i)  From Informal Contacts to Highly Institutionalized Schemes
				(ii)  Multiple Working Levels
				(iii)  ‘Pre-Meetings’ and ‘Ad Hoc Meetings’
			(ii)  The Role of Trade Associations and Fiduciary Companies and Their Liability
				(p. 1060) (i)  Liability of Trade Associations in Earlier Cases
				(ii)  Towards a Discretionary Approach in Trade Association Liability
				(iii)  Addressing the Role Played by Certain Fiduciary Companies in Facilitating Collusion: Earlier Cases
				(iv)  Towards a Systematic Sanctioning of Facilitating Companies as Co-Perpetrators
			(iii)  Concealment Measures
				(i)  Covering the Cartel’s Tracks
				(ii)  Paperless Policy
				(iii)  Storing Cartel Documents in Private Homes
				(iv)  Using Code Names
				(v)  Other Measures
		(c)  Running the Business of Collusion
			(i)  Managing the Elimination of Competition
				(i)  Getting Other Market Operators on Board
				(ii)  Achieving Comparability of the Products
				(iii)  Collection of Data and Circulation of Detailed Implementation Documents
				(p. 1069) (iv)  ‘Coordinators’ and ‘Market Leaders’
			(ii)  Enforcing Cartel Arrangements between the Participants
				(i)  Monitoring Schemes
				(ii)  Penalties and Compensation Measures
				(iii)  Threats, Boycotts and Coordinated Attacks on Competitors
			(iii)  The Instability of Collusive Schemes
				(i)  Claims for Higher Quotas
				(ii)  Mutual Suspicion of Cheating
				(iii)  Leniency Programmes as an Additional Factor of Instability
	Footnotes:
Part II Specific Practices, 8 Cartels, C Investigating Hardcore Cartels
	Antoine Colombani, Jindrich Kloub, Ewoud Sakkers
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
(p. 1074) C. Investigating Hardcore Cartels
	(1)  The Initiation of a Case: Information Sources
		(a)  Market Monitoring and Information From Other Investigations
			(i)  Sector Inquiries
		(b)  Information Received From Other Authorities
			(i)  Pre-Investigation Exchanges of Information within the European Competition Network
			(ii)  Exchange of Information with Third Country Authorities
		(p. 1078) (c)  Complaints (Formal and Informal)
		(d)  Informants/Whistleblowers
		(e)  Applications under the Leniency Notice
	(2)  Leniency: Inducing Insiders to Break Rank
		(a)  Rationale and Origins of the EU Leniency Policy
			(i)  The Problem of Detecting and Deterring Cartel Behaviour
			(ii)  Difficulties in Detecting and Proving Cartels
			(iii)  The Rationale for a Leniency Policy: The Prisoner’s Dilemma
			(iv)  Introduction and Development of the Commission’s Leniency Policy
			(v)  Temporal Scope of the Notices
			(vi)  Structure
		(b)  The 2002 and 2006 Leniency Notices and the Reasons for Revision of the 1996 Policy
			(i)  Content and Application of the 1996 Leniency Notice
				(i)  Basic Principles
				(ii)  Section B: 75–100 Per Cent Reduction (Total Exemption) in the Fine
				(iii)  Section C: 50–75 Per Cent Reduction in the Fine
				(iv)  Section D: Reductions of 10–50 Per Cent of the Fine
				(v)  Retraction of Non-Contestation
				(vi)  Procedural Aspects (Section E)
			(ii)  Issues Regarding the Effectiveness of the 1996 Leniency Notice
			(p. 1087) (iii)  The 2002 Leniency Notice and its 2006 Revision
				(i)  Principles Governing the 2002 Revision of the 1996 Leniency Notice
					Full immunity: a major incentive to report or contribute to prove a cartel
					Alignment of the reductions of fines to the real value of the cooperation
					Greater certainty and transparency
				(ii)  Changes Introduced in the 2006 Leniency Notice
				(iii)  Content and Implementation of the 2002 and 2006 Leniency Notices
			(iv)  Criteria for immunity under the 2002 and 2006 Leniency Notices
				(i)  Substantive Tests
					‘8(a)’ test
					‘8(b)’ test
				(ii)  The Scope of the Leniency Policy: Are Stand-Alone Concerted Practices Covered?
				(iii)  Only One Immunity Per Cartel
				(iv)  Other Conditions Which Must Be Satisfied in Order to Qualify for Immunity
					Duty to cooperate genuinely, fully, on a continuous basis, and expeditiously
					Obligation not to reveal immunity application without the Commission’s approval
					Obligation to end involvement in the cartel
					Obligation not to destroy, falsify, or conceal evidence
					Obligation not to disclose the fact or any of the content of a contemplated application, except to other competition authorities
					Coercion of other companies as a cause for exclusion from immunity
				(v)  Procedural Aspects
					First contact
					(p. 1096) ‘Marker’ system
					Hypothetical application
					Oral application
					(p. 1099) No subsequent application will be considered before a position is taken on a prior one
					Acknowledgement of receipt and verification of evidence submitted
					‘Non eligibility letter’
					‘Rejection decision’
					‘No action’ letter
					‘Non-processing’ letter
					Conditional immunity decision
					Withdrawal of conditional immunity
					Time-barred infringements
					Content requirement for a successful immunity application
					Specificity of ‘8(a)’ applications
					‘One infringement, one immunity decision’
					Immunity only for one legal entity
					Joint ventures
			(v)  Reduction in the Fine under the 2002 and 2006 Leniency Notices
				(i)  Substantive Tests
					‘Significant added value’ (SAV) test
					Greater value of ‘compelling evidence’
					Partial immunity within the context of an application for a reduction of a fine
				(ii)  Available Bands of Reduction and Relevant Criteria
					Available bands of reduction
					Relevant criteria for the determination of the reduction within each band
				(iii)  Procedural Aspects
					Requirement to make a formal application for a reduction in fines
					Acknowledgement of receipt upon request
					A reduction in fines under the Leniency Notice is not an alternative in case of revocation of conditional immunity
					Applications are considered until the issuance of the statement of objections
					Informing the undertaking that SAV has been provided and of the band of reduction within which the application falls
					Notification of failure to meet the SAV test
					Provisional decisions on the SAV test are not deemed challengeable
					Successive submissions and their assessment by the Commission
					Duty of full and continuous cooperation for applicants for a reduction in a fine
				(iv)  Non-Contestation of Facts is Not Rewarded Under the 2006 and 2002 Leniency Notices
				(v)  ‘Significant Added Value’ Test: Commission Practice
					Requirements for ‘SAV’
					‘Evidence’
					‘Compelling evidence’
					Contemporaneous vs ‘subsequently’ established evidence
					‘Direct’ vs ‘indirect’ evidence
					Evidence ‘of the alleged cartel’
					Requirement to supply ‘added value’
					Requirement to supply ‘significant’ added value
					Consequences of failure to meet the SAV test
					Criteria for the determination of appropriate reduction in fines within each band
			(vi)  Judicial Review of the Commission’s Leniency Policy Under the 2002 and 2006 Notices
				(i)  Significant Court Approval of the Commission’s Practice under the 2002 Leniency Notice
				(ii)  Legality of the Leniency Notice
				(p. 1118) (iii)  The Commission’s Discretion in the Assessment of Leniency Applications
				(iv)  Limits to the Commission’s Discretion: Manifest Error
				(v)  Leniency and Equal Treatment
				(vi)  Cooperation Under the Leniency Notice Must Be Differentiated from Cooperation as an ‘Attenuating Circumstance’
			(vii)  Protection of Information Submitted Under the 2002 and 2006 Leniency Notices and Incentives for Applications
				(i)  A Sensitive Aspect of the Commission’s Leniency Policy
				(ii)  Identity of Immunity Applicants
					(p. 1121) Access for third parties to statements made, and documents submitted, under the Notice and the use of such information in other proceedings
				(iii)  Limitations in the Conditions of Access to Corporate Statements
				(iv)  Consequences of Violation of the Limitation Imposed in Respect of Access to the File
				(v)  Leniency and Public Access to Documents
				(p. 1124) (vi)  Can Leniency Documents be Protected from Public Access?
				(vii)  Communication of Leniency Documents to Other Enforcement Authorities
				(viii)  Disclosure of Leniency Documents in Civil Litigation
					Discovery in jurisdictions outside the EU
					Discovery in EU Courts
		(c)  Leniency and Settlements
			(i)  Leniency and Settlements are Complementary in Nature
			(ii)  The Reductions Granted Under Each Policy are Cumulative
			(iii)  Interactions Between Leniency and Settlements
		(d)  Leniency within the ECN
			(i)  Advantages of the New System and Measures Taken to Tackle Potential Risks
			(ii)  Leniency Applications and Article 11 of Regulation 1/2003
			(iii)  Leniency Applications and Article 12 of Regulation 1/2003
			(iv)  Guarantees to be Provided by the Receiving Authority
			(v)  Guarantees Regarding Information Relating to Individuals
			(vi)  Binding Nature of the Policy Set Out in the Network Notice
			(vii)  Leniency Applications and Transmission of Information to National Courts
			(viii)  Where (Best) to File a Leniency Application within the ECN
			(ix)  Favouring Convergence: The ECN Model Leniency Programme
			(x)  A Significant Tool of Convergence: The ‘Summary Application System’
	Footnotes:
Part II Specific Practices, 8 Cartels, D The Commission’s Powers of Investigation: Information Requests, Interviews, Inspections
	Antoine Colombani, Jindrich Kloub, Ewoud Sakkers
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
D. The Commission’s Powers of Investigation: Information Requests, Interviews, Inspections
	(1)  Preliminary Observations
		(a)  Documented Evidence as the Principal Basis for Commission Cartel Decisions
		(b)  Applicability to the Transport Sector694
		(c)  Relevance of Interpretation Under Regulation 17
		(d)  Outline for Discussion
	(2)  General Aspects of the Commission’s Fact-Finding Powers
		(a)  Principles of Law and Fundamental Rights Applicable to Commission Investigations
			(i)  The Applicability of General Principles of Law and Fundamental Rights
			(ii)  General Principles and Fundamental Rights Particularly Relevant to Cartel Investigations
		(b)  The Rights of Defence
			(i)  The Privilege Against Supplying Self-Incriminating Information
				(i)  An EU Competition Law Version of ‘the Right to Remain Silent’
				(ii)  Compatibility of the Right Against Self-Incrimination as Established in Orkem with the ECHR and its Case Law
				(iii)  Precise Scope of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: The Elements of ‘Compulsion’ and ‘Admission’
				(iv)  Pre-Existing Documents and Factual Information Must Be Supplied
			(ii)  Legal Professional Privilege
				(i)  The Right to the Protection of Lawyer-Client Correspondence
				(ii)  Scope of LPP under EU Law
				(iii)  Summaries of External Advice Prepared by In-House Counsel May Be Protected
				(iv)  The Commission Is Not Permitted to Read a Document for Which Legal Privilege is Claimed
				(v)  Procedure for Claiming Legal Privilege
				(vi)  ‘Cursory Look’ and Envelope Procedure in Inspections
				(vii)  Role of the Hearing Officer
				(viii)  Abusive Claims for Legal Privilege
			(iii)  The Right to Legal Assistance
			(iv)  The Right to be Informed on the Subject Matter and Purpose of the Investigation
			(p. 1154) (v)  No Right to be Heard Prior to Investigative Measures
		(c)  Other General Features of the Commission’s Investigative Powers
			(i)  Application of the Principle of Proportionality: Practical Implications
				(i)  The Investigative Action Must Be Proportionate to the Goal Pursued
				(ii)  ‘Necessity’
				(iii)  The Principle of Proportionality and the Quantity of Information Requested/Burden on the Undertaking
			(ii)  The Content and Form of Information/Business Records That May Be Requested
				(p. 1157) (i)  Content
				(ii)  Form
			(iii)  The Undertakings From Which Information May Be Sought: Suspected Cartel Participants As Well As Other Parties
			(iv)  The Territorial Scope of the Commission’s Investigation Powers
				(i)  The Jurisdictional Scope of the Commission’s Investigative Powers: Subject Matter Jurisdiction vs Enforcement Jurisdiction
				(ii)  State Sovereignty
			(v)  The Timing of Any Investigative Steps/Application of Limitation Periods
			(vi)  The Duty of Active Cooperation and its Implication for Requests for Information and Inspections
		(d)  Requests for Information: Article 18
			(i)  The Use of Requests for Information in Cartel Cases
			(ii)  Two Types of Request for Information: ‘Simple Requests’ and ‘Requests by Decision’
				(i)  Procedural Requirements: The Duty to State the Legal Basis and Purpose of the Request and to Set a Time Limit
				(ii)  Sanctions for Late, Incomplete, Incorrect, or Misleading Replies
					Procedural sanctions for late and incomplete replies to requests by decision
					Procedural sanctions for incorrect or misleading replies
				(iii)  Incomplete or Untruthful Replies are Considered to Obstruct the Investigation
				(p. 1167) (iv)  Article 18 Requests, the Duty of Cooperation, and Reductions of Fines for Voluntary Submissions
				(v)  Various Other Aspects of Requests for Information
					No right to be heard
					Formal requirements as regards the justification for issuing an information request
					No duty on the Commission to issue requests for information or to issue them simultaneously to all undertakings concerned by an investigation
					Answers may be provided by the undertakings or their lawyer
		(e)  Interviews (the Power to Take Statements): Article 19
			(i)  Rationale
			(ii)  Legal Basis
			(iii)  Possible Interviewees: Natural and Legal Persons
			(iv)  Procedural Aspects and Rights of the Interviewee
		(f)  Inspections of Business Premises: Article 20
			Outline of discussion
			(i)  The Difference Between ‘Announced’ and ‘Unannounced’ Inspections
			(ii)  General Aspects Common to Inspections by Authorization and Inspections by Decision
				(i)  Commission Inspections and the Principle of the Protection of the Private Sphere of the Undertaking
					Intrusion into the private sphere of undertakings must not be arbitrary or excessive
					(p. 1177) Subject matter of the investigation
					Role of the national courts
				(ii)  Determining the Addressee of an Inspection Decision: The Notion of ‘Undertaking’ for the Purpose of Inspections
					(p. 1180) Inclusion of the address of the undertaking is not a requirement
				(iii)  Notification of the Inspection Decision
				(iv)  The Commission’s On-the-Spot Powers
				(v)  ‘To enter any premises, land and means of transport of undertakings and associations of undertakings’
					Entry953
					To enter any premises of the undertaking
				(vi)  ‘Means of transport of undertakings’
				(vii)  ‘To examine the books and other records related to the business, irrespective of the medium on which they are stored’
					To examine the books and other records…but no fishing expeditions
					Duty of active cooperation to indicate the location of information
					Document retention
					Production of business records located outside the premises
					Books and other records relating to the business
					Stored on any medium
				(viii)  ‘To take or obtain in any form copies of or extracts from such books or records’
					To take or obtain
					In any form
					Copies of or extracts
				(ix)  ‘To seal any business premises and books or records for the period and to the extent necessary for the inspection’
					Geographical/physical scope: which places can be sealed?
					Temporal scope: the duration of the application of seals
					Consequences of breaking the seals
				(x)  ‘To ask any representative or member of staff of the undertaking or association of undertakings for explanations of facts or documents relating to the subject-matter and purpose of the inspection and to record the answer’
					Explanations of facts or documents
					Specific procedural provisions contained in Regulation 773/2004
					To ask any representative or member of staff of the undertaking
					An obligation on staff members to remain present during an inspection for providing explanations?
					Procedure regarding oral explanations
					Misleading, incorrect, or incomplete answers, and applicable penalties
					Procedure for rectifications, amendments, supplements
					Explanations that may be self-incriminating for the undertaking
			(iii)  Other Practical Aspects Relating to Inspections
				(i)  Procedure Upon Arrival of the Commission Inspectors
				(ii)  Activity of Inspectors During the Inspection
				(iii)  Right to Legal Assistance
				(p. 1198) (iv)  Penalties in the Case of a Refusal to Submit to (or Obstruct) an Inspection by Decision
				(v)  Commission Present During Normal Business Hours
				(vi)  Protocols Made Up During an Inspection and the Possibilities for Submitting Exculpatory Information
				(vii)  Taking of Copies and Creating a Document Inventory
				(viii)  Treatment of Business Secrets and Confidential Information
				(ix)  End of the Inspection
				(x)  Post-Inspection Procedure
			(iv)  The Adoption of Inspection Decisions under Article 20(4)
				(i)  Requirements Relating to the Substance of the Inspection Decision
					Reference in the decision to the subject matter and purpose
					Requirement to mention the starting date
					Reference to procedural penalties for non-compliance
					Reference to the possibility of Court review
				(ii)  Procedural Formalities Relating to the Adoption of Inspection Decisions
					Inspection decisions can be signed by the Director General of Competition
					Consultation of the Member State concerned
			(p. 1204) (v)  Additional Substantive and Procedural Aspects of Inspections by Written Authorization (Announced Inspections)
				(i)  Substantive Elements of the Authorization
				(ii)  Prior Notice To—Not Consultation Of—the Member State Concerned
			(vi)  Opportunities to Challenge the Inspection Decision and/or the Use of the Evidence Collected in Inspections
				(i)  Little Scope in Practice for Preventing the Inspection From Going Forward
				(ii)  Challenging the Admissibility and Use of Evidence Collected
			(vii)  The Role of the Member States in Commission Inspections under Article 20
				(i)  General Duty to Provide Assistance
				(ii)  Role in Case of Opposition
				(iii)  Review by National Courts is Limited to the Arbitrariness and Proportionality of the Coercive Measures
				(iv)  Coercive Measures Can Lead to Sanctions Under National Law—Even Against Private Persons
			(viii)  Inspections Carried Out by the Competition Authorities of the Member States on Behalf of the Commission: Article 22(2)
				(i)  Member States are Obliged to Execute Article 22(2) Inspections When Requested
				(ii)  Inspections Under Article 22 are Executed Under National Law
				(iii)  Commission Officials May Participate in the Inspection Carried Out By the Member State
		(g)  Inspections on Other Premises (Private Homes): Article 21
			(i)  Rationale and Use
				(i)  Meaning of ‘Other Premises’, Land, and Means of Transport
				(ii)  Applicability of Principles of Law and Fundamental Rights
				(iii)  ‘Reasonable Suspicion’ About Information Being Stored at the Premises
				(iv)  Only To Be Used in Case of ‘Serious Violations’
			(ii)  Legal Framework
				(i)  A Two-Part Basis Required for Executing an Inspection under Article 21
			(iii)  Procedural Aspects
				(i)  The Commission Decision
				(ii)  Authorization by a National Judicial Authority
				(iii)  Addressee of the Decision
				(iv)  Notification of the Decision and the Judicial Authorization
				(v)  On-The-Spot Powers
				(vi)  Assistance by Officials From the National Authorities
				(vii)  Sanctions for Non-Compliance, Pursuant to National Law
			(iv)  Other Aspects
				(i)  Right to Legal Assistance
				(p. 1216) (ii)  A Duty of Active Cooperation for the Addressee?
		(h)  European and International Cooperation in Cartel Investigations
			(i)  European Cooperation
				(i)  The ECN
				(ii)  Cooperation with the ESA
			(ii)  International Cooperation, Multilateral and Bilateral1145
				(i)  Multilateral Cooperation
					OECD
					ICN
					WTO
					UNCTAD
				(ii)  Bilateral Cooperation
	Footnotes:
Part II Specific Practices, 8 Cartels, E Evidence in Cartel Cases
	Antoine Colombani, Jindrich Kloub, Ewoud Sakkers
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
E. Evidence in Cartel Cases
	(1)  Introduction
		What does the Commission need to prove?
	(p. 1224) (2)  What Needs to be Proven
		(a)  The Concept of Cartel Offence
		(b)  The EU Courts’ Purposive View of What Constitutes Illegal ‘Cartel’ Behaviour
		(c)  Agreement vs Concerted Practice
		(d)  Cartels are Infringements By Object: No Need to Prove Actual Effects
		(e)  No Market Definition Required
		(f)  No Need to Demonstrate the Precise Mechanism By Which the Restrictive Object was Attained
		(g)  No Requirement to Prove Subjective Intent
		(h)  Complex Infringement
		(i)  Single and Continuous Infringement
			(i)  Liability for a Single and Continuous Infringement
			(ii)  Consequences of Lack of Awareness of the Overall Conduct
			(iii)  ‘Single’ and ‘Continuous’
			(iv)  The ‘Single’ Nature of an Infringement
			(v)  The ‘Continuous’ Nature of an Infringement
			(vi)  The ‘Repeated’ Nature of an Infringement
			(vii)  Duration of an Undertaking’s Participation in an Infringement
	(3)  The Burden of Proof
		(a)  The Burden of Proof on the Commission
		(b)  ‘Shifting’ of the Burden of Proof
	(4)  The Standard of Proof1233
		(a)  The EU Courts’ Reluctance to Use the Term ‘Standard of Proof’
		(b)  What Matters is the Balance of Evidence as a Whole
	(5)  Admissibility of Evidence
		(a)  Evidence Collected or Used in Contravention of General Principles or Fundamental Rights is Not Admissible
			(i)  Information Covered by Legal Privilege
			(ii)  Self-Incriminating Information
			(iii)  Evidence on Which the Undertakings Have Not Been Heard is Inadmissible
		(b)  Documents Obtained in an Inspection That Turned Out to be Unlawful are Inadmissible
		(c)  Documents Which Do Not Fall Within the Scope of an Inspection Decision are Inadmissible
		(d)  Confidential Information is Admissible as Evidence
		(e)  Evidence Provided Orally is Admissible
		(f)  Anonymous Evidence Can Be Admissible
		(g)  Lack of Cross-Examination of Witnesses Does Not Render Their Statements Inadmissible
	(6)  Probative Value of Evidence
		(p. 1242) (a)  Whether, On Its Face, the Evidence Appears Sound and Reliable
		(b)  The Time When the Evidence Came Into Being
		(c)  The Level of Detail of the Evidence
		(d)  The Source of the Information Has Direct Knowledge
		(e)  Evidence Which Goes Against the Interests of the Source Providing it has Greater Probative Value
		(f)  Evidence From an Undertaking That Has Resolved to Cooperate With the Investigation Has High Probative Value
		(p. 1244) (g)  Evidence Provided Where There is a Risk of Sanction
		(h)  Evidence Provided After Mature Reflection is More Credible
		(i)  Evidence or Statements Provided by Executives of Companies are of Greater Probative Value
		(j)  Evidence Supplied by One Entity May Be Used Against Another
		(k)  Motives of the Witness
		(l)  Information Provided by Applicants for Immunity or for a Reduction of Fines
		(m)  Anonymous or Unidentified Sources of Evidence
	(7)  Types of Evidence
		(a)  Documentary Evidence
		(b)  Oral Evidence
			(i)  Qualified Obligation to Hear Witnesses
			(ii)  Traditional Reliance on Documentary Evidence: Increased Use of Oral Evidence
		(c)  Direct and Indirect (Circumstantial) Evidence
		(d)  When is Corroboration Necessary?
		(e)  Economic Evidence
			(p. 1251) (i)  The Use of Economic Evidence as an Exculpatory Factor
	Footnotes:
Part II Specific Practices, 8 Cartels, F Establishing Liability
	Antoine Colombani, Jindrich Kloub, Ewoud Sakkers
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
F. Establishing Liability
	(1)  The ‘Undertaking’ as the Infringing Entity
	(2)  Attribution of Liability to the Undertaking as a Whole: Underlying Reasons
	(3)  Principal Grounds for Liability
		(a)  Parent Company Liability: The Concept of the ‘Actual Exercise of Decisive Influence’
			(i)  The Parent Company’s Shareholding in the Subsidiary
				(i)  Subsidiary Wholly Owned (or Almost Wholly Owned) by the Parent: Existence of a Rebuttable Presumption
				(p. 1261) (ii)  Subsidiary Owned (Significantly) Less Than 100 Per Cent by the Parent
				(iii)  Joint Ventures
			(ii)  The Articles of Association/Statutes
			(iii)  The Parent Entity Being Active on the Same or Adjacent Markets
			(iv)  The Use of the Same Commercial Name By the Parent and Subsidiary
			(v)  Instructions From a Parent Company to a Subsidiary
			(p. 1264) (vi)  Functional Links Through Personnel
			(vii)  The Attitude of the Parent Company During the Administrative Procedure
		(b)  Sister Companies
	(4)  Liability in Cases of Succession
		(a)  Cases of Change of Legal Denomination, Resulting in the Dissolution of the Previous Legal Person
		(b)  Transfer of a Liable Entity, Which Remains in Existence, To Another Undertaking
		(p. 1268) (c)  Transfer of Assets/Activities to Another Undertaking, the Entity Previously Operating the Business Remaining in Existence
		(d)  Transfer of a Legal Entity or of Assets/Activities, the Entity Previously Operating the Business Ceasing to Exist
		(e)  Scenarios of Intra-Group Restructuring and Succession
	(5)  Voluntary Acceptance of Liability by the Acquiring Undertaking
	(6)  Determination of Liability and the Application of the Leniency Notice
	Footnotes:
Part II Specific Practices, 8 Cartels, G Cartel Fines
	Antoine Colombani, Jindrich Kloub, Ewoud Sakkers
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
G. Cartel Fines
	(1)  Overview
	(2)  The Basic Amount of the Fine
		(a)  Calculation of the Value of Sales
			(i)  General Principles
			(ii)  Sales of Products or Services To Which the Infringement Relates
			(iii)  Sales in the Relevant Geographic Area Within the EEA
			(p. 1278) (iv)  Last Full Year Before the End of the Infringement
		(b)  Gravity: The Percentage Applicable to the Value of Sales
			(i)  General Principles
			(ii)  Nature of the Infringement
			(iii)  Geographic Scope
			(iv)  Combined Market Share
			(v)  Implementation
		(c)  Duration of the Infringement
			(i)  General Principles
			(p. 1284) (ii)  Previous Practice
			(iii)  Method for Calculating Duration
		(d)  Additional Amount
			(i)  General Principles
		(e)  Conclusion on the Basic Amount
	(p. 1288) (3)  Individualizing ‘Subjective’ Responsibility: Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances
		(a)  Individual Conduct vs Overall Gravity of the Infringement
		(b)  The Commission is Bound by the Fining Guidelines, But Not By Prior Decisions
		(c)  Method of Calculation When Both Aggravating and Attenuating Circumstances Apply
			(p. 1291) (i)  Aggravating Circumstances
				(i)  General Principles
				(ii)  Repeated Infringements of the Same Type by the Same Undertaking
					Rationale
					(p. 1292) Court review
					Three cumulative conditions
					Commission’s practice
				(iii)  Refusal to Cooperate With or Obstruction of the Commission in Carrying Out its Investigations
					Supplying misleading information
					Obstruction of on-the-spot investigations
				(iv)  Role of Leader in, or Instigator of, the Infringement
					Rationale
					The need to distinguish between role of ‘instigator’ and role of ‘leader’
					Role of ‘instigator’ or ‘leader’ must be established for each particular infringement
					Role of ‘instigator’ vs role of ‘leader’
					Indicia of a role of ‘instigator’ or ‘leader’: the Commission’s practice and Court review
					Market power not relevant for the purpose of establishing leadership
					(p. 1302) Critical role in the set-up or management of the cartel
					Evidence of prominent decision-making power, such as conduct of price increases
					(p. 1304) Pressure on others to join the cartel
					Percentage increase and number of ringleaders
				(v)  Steps to Coerce Other Undertakings and/or Retaliatory Measures Against Other Undertakings with a View to Enforcing the Practices Constituting the Infringement
					Forcing undertakings to take part in the infringement
					Retaliatory measures aimed at expelling a reluctant undertaking from the market
					Threats in order to expand the cartel arrangements
				(vi)  Other Aggravating Circumstances
					Continued infringement after the initiation of the investigation
					Breach of a compliance programme
			(ii)  Mitigating Circumstances
				(i)  Termination of the Infringement As Soon As the Commission Intervenes (Not Applicable to Cartels)
				(ii)  Infringement Committed as a Result of Negligence
				(iii)  Substantially Limited Involvement in the Infringement
					Commission practice concerning passive role prior to the 2006 Fining Guidelines
					Commission practice concerning non-implementation prior to the 2006 Fining Guidelines
					Commission’s practice under the 2006 Fining Guidelines
					Court review
				(iv)  Effective Cooperation by the Undertaking Outside the Scope of the Leniency Notice and Beyond Its Legal Obligation To Do So
					Not normally applicable in cartel cases
					Provision of valuable evidence to the Commission
					Anticipated application of point 23 of the 2002 Leniency Notice
					Reward for cooperation under the Fining Guidelines after the revocation of conditional immunity from fines
					Non-contestation of facts
					(p. 1319) Other circumstances
				(v)  Anti-Competitive Conduct Authorized or Encouraged by Public Authorities or by Legislation
					Intervention by public authorities
					Sectoral regulatory regimes
				(vi)  Other Accepted Attenuating Circumstances
					Crisis in the sector concerned: progressively abandoned
					Compensation paid to prejudiced customers
					Existence of reasonable doubt on the part of the undertaking as to whether its restrictive conduct does indeed constitute an infringement
				(vii)  Rejected Arguments
					No benefit from the cartel
					Positive contribution to the European economy
					Defensive measures against ‘distortions of competition’
					Customers not opposing the illegal practice
					First time violation of EU competition law
					Cessation of the infringement before the Commission intervened
					Coercion or pressure exercised by the ringleader
					Gradual drift to illegality
					Compliance programmes and disciplinary measures
					Poor financial situation of the company
					Other arguments
	(4)  Specific Increase for Deterrence
		(a)  Increase for Undertakings With a Large Turnover
			(i)  Concept and Rationale
			(ii)  Commission’s Practice
		(b)  Legality of the Deterrence Multiplying Factor
		(c)  Limited Scope of the Duty to State Reasons
		(d)  Basis for the Assessment and Level of the Deterrence Multiplying Factor
		(e)  Increase to Exceed the Improper Gains
	(5)  Legal Maximum of 10 Per Cent of Annual Group Turnover
		(a)  Upper Limit Set By Article 23(2)
		(b)  10 Per Cent of the Total Turnover
		(c)  Preceding Business Year
		(d)  Application to Each Infringement
		(e)  Joint and Several Liability Within the Same Undertaking
		(f)  The 10 Per Cent Cap is Calculated Before Leniency
		(g)  The 10 Per Cent Cap Applies Only to the Final Amount (Before Leniency)
		(h)  Impact of the Legal Maximum
	(6)  Application of the Leniency Notice
	(7)  Application of the 10 Per Cent Reduction of the Settlement Notice
	(8)  Ability to Pay
		(a)  Inability to Pay Claims Systematically Rejected before 2006 Fining Guidelines
		(b)  Application of Inability to Pay Reductions by the Commission
		(c)  Procedure for Inability to Pay Requests
		(d)  Commission Analysis of Inability to Pay Claims under the 2006 Fining Guidelines
		(e)  Court Review
		(f)  Assessment of the Ability to Pay Policy
	(9)  Other Factors That May Be Taken into Account
		(a)  Ad Hoc Adjustments
		(b)  Poor Financial Situation and Previous Payment of Fines in Other Proceedings
		(c)  Excessive Duration of Administrative Procedure
	Footnotes:
Part II Specific Practices, 8 Cartels, H Procedural Aspects of the Adoption of Decisions in Cartel Cases and ‘Direct Settlements’
	Antoine Colombani, Jindrich Kloub, Ewoud Sakkers
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
H. Procedural Aspects of the Adoption of Decisions in Cartel Cases and ‘Direct Settlements’
	(1)  Main Common Aspects of the Adoption of Cartel Decisions
		(a)  The Commission ‘2011 Best Practices’ and Outline of the Procedure Leading to a Decision
			(i)  The Adoption of a Cartel Decision Follows a Model That Is Common For All Commission Decisions
			(ii)  General Outline of the Standard Procedure Followed Between the Fact-Finding Stage and the Final Decision—and the Alternative of the Settlement Procedure
			(iii)  The Commission May Halt an Investigation at Any Stage
		(b)  Particular Aspects Relating to Access to File in Cartel Cases
		(p. 1355) (c)  The Statement of Objections and Indications on the Parameters of the Fine
		(d)  The Oral Hearing and State of Play Meetings
	(2)  Direct Settlements in Cartel Cases
		(a)  The Lead Up to the Adoption of the 2008 System of ‘Direct Settlements’ in Cartel Cases
		(b)  Sequence of the Regular Procedure and Potential Benefits of the Settlement Process
		(c)  The Main Features of the Settlement System1906
			(i)  Stakes on Both Sides: the Parties and the Commission
			(ii)  Not To Be Mistaken for ‘Commitment’ Decisions
			(p. 1359) (iii)  Based on a ‘Common Understanding’ Between the Parties and the Commission, But Not a Negotiation
		(d)  The Settlement Procedure Dissected
			(i)  Based on a Full Investigation
			(ii)  Deciding That a Case is Fit for Settlement/ Initial Contact with the Parties
			(iii)  Start of the Settlement Process
			(iv)  Three Rounds of Meetings
			(v)  Confidentiality of Discussions
			(vi)  Formal Settlement Submission, Statement of Objections, Decision
			(vii)  Interaction with Leniency
			(viii)  Lessons from Settlement Decisions/Hybrid Cases
			(ix)  Miscellaneous Aspects
	Footnotes:
Part II Specific Practices, 9 Vertical Agreements, A Introduction
	Andrei Gurin, Luc Peeperkorn
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
A. Introduction
	(1)  Applicability of Article 101 to Vertical Restraints
	(p. 1365) (2)  Early Application of Article 101 to Vertical Restraints
	(3)  Theory of Active/Passive Sales
	(4)  System of Block Exemption Regulations
	(5)  Green Paper on Vertical Restraints
	(p. 1369) (6)  Two Council Regulations Enabling the Adoption of the Commission’s Policy
	(7)  A New Type of Block Exemption Regulation and Guidelines
	Footnotes:
Part II Specific Practices, 9 Vertical Agreements, B The New Block Exemption Regulation and Guidelines
	Andrei Gurin, Luc Peeperkorn
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
B. The New Block Exemption Regulation and Guidelines
	(1)  Background
	(2)  The De Minimis Notice
	(3)  Agency Agreements
		(a)  Introduction
		(p. 1377) (b)  Agency Agreements in the Vertical Restraints Guidelines
		(c)  Agency Agreements and the Internet
	(4)  Subcontracting Agreements
	(5)  The Underlying Philosophy of the BER and the Vertical Restraints Guidelines
	(6)  The Scope of the BER and Guidelines
		(a)  Definition of Vertical Agreements
		(b)  Vertical Agreements between Competitors
		(p. 1387) (c)  Vertical Agreements Concluded by Associations of Retailers
		(d)  Vertical Agreements Containing IP Rights Provisions
		(e)  The Interface Between the BER and Other Block Exemption Regulations
	(7)  Hardcore Restrictions under Article 4 of the BER
		(a)  Vertical Price Fixing Under Article 4(a)
		(b)  Territorial and Customer Sales Restrictions under Article 4(b)
		(p. 1399) (c)  Selective Distribution Systems and Sales Restrictions under Article 4
		(d)  Internet Selling and Sales Restrictions Under Article 4
		(e)  The Combination of Selective and Exclusive Distribution
		(p. 1404) (f)  Aftermarkets
		(g)  Individual Assessment of Hardcore Resale Restrictions
	(8)  Excluded Restrictions under Article 5 of the BER
		(a)  Non-Compete Obligations Exceeding Five Years
		(b)  Post-Term Non-Compete Obligations
		(c)  Boycott Under Selective Distribution
	(9)  Transitional Period and Expiry Date of the BER
	(10)  Withdrawal of the benefit of the BER
	(p. 1411) (11)  Disapplication of the BER
	(12)  Market Share Thresholds and Market Share Calculation
	(13)  The Framework of Analysis for Individual Assessment
		(a)  Anti-Competitive Effects
		(b)  Efficiencies
	Footnotes:
Part II Specific Practices, 9 Vertical Agreements, C Analysis of Different Categories of Vertical Restraints
	Andrei Gurin, Luc Peeperkorn
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
C. Analysis of Different Categories of Vertical Restraints
	(1)  Single Branding
		(a)  Market Position of the Supplier
		(b)  Incidence and Duration of the Single-Branding Obligation
		(c)  Market Position of Competitors
		(d)  Barriers to Entry
		(p. 1425) (e)  Countervailing Power
		(f)  Level of Trade
		(g)  Possible Efficiencies
	(2)  Exclusive Distribution
		(p. 1427) (a)  Supplier’s Market Position
		(b)  Competitors’ Market Position
		(c)  Buying Power
		(d)  Level of Trade
		(e)  Maturity of the Market
		(f)  Combination with Exclusive Sourcing
		(g)  Possible Efficiencies
	(3)  Exclusive Customer Allocation
	(4)  Selective Distribution
		(a)  Qualitative vs Quantitative Selective Distribution
		(b)  Quantitative Selective Distribution
		(c)  Supplier’s Market Position
		(d)  Competitors’ Market Position
		(e)  Barriers to Entry
		(f)  Buying Power
		(g)  Maturity of the Market
		(h)  Possible Efficiencies
	(5)  Franchising
	(6)  Exclusive Supply
		(a)  Buyer’s Market Share
		(b)  Duration of the Agreement
		(c)  Competitors’ Market Position
		(d)  Countervailing Power
		(e)  Level of Trade and Nature of the Product
		(f)  Possible Efficiencies
	(7)  Upfront Access Payments
	(8)  Category Management Agreements
	(9)  Tying
	(10)  Recommended and Maximum Resale Prices
	Footnotes:
Part II Specific Practices, 10 Intellectual Property, A Introduction
	Kevin Coates, Lars Kjøbye, Luc Peeperkorn
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
A. Introduction
	(1)  Overview
	(2)  Purpose of IP Rights
	(p. 1445) (3)  The Relationship between IP Protection and EU Law
		(a)  IP Protection and the Free Movement Provisions
		(b)  IP Protection and the Competition Rules
			(i)  General Approach
			(ii)  Block Exemptions
	(4)  Form of the Following Analysis
	Footnotes:
Part II Specific Practices, 10 Intellectual Property, B IP Rights and EU Law
	Kevin Coates, Lars Kjøbye, Luc Peeperkorn
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
B. IP Rights and EU Law
	(1)  Introduction
	(2)  Existence vs Exercise and the Specific Subject Matter of an IP Right
		(a)  Existence and Exercise
		(b)  Specific Subject Matter
	(3)  The Specific Subject Matter of IP Rights
		(a)  Patents
		(b)  Know-How
		(c)  Copyright
		(d)  Trademarks
		(e)  Plant Breeders’ Rights
	(4)  Exhaustion of IP Rights
		(a)  Exhaustion Requires Consent
			(i)  Centrafarm v Sterling Drug28
			(ii)  Consent Does Not Have To Be Explicit
		(b)  For a Sale to Exhaust IP Rights It Is Not Necessary for that Sale to be Made in a Jurisdiction Where It Enjoys IP Right Protection
			(i)  Merck v Stephar31
		(c)  Exhaustion Requires the Consent of the Right Holder Even if the Goods were Lawfully Put on the Market in Another Member State Without That Consent
			(i)  EMI/Patricia32
			(ii)  Keurkoop/Nancy Kean Gifts33
		(p. 1452) (d)  Exhaustion Requires an Actual Sale
		(e)  Exhaustion Depends on the Specific Subject Matter of the Right in Question
			(i)  Warner v Christiansen35
		(p. 1453) (f)  Exhaustion for the Purposes of EU Law Requires Use in the EEA
		(g)  Exhaustion and Licensing Under the Competition Rules
	(5)  Exhaustion Concept in EU IP Legislation
	Footnotes:
Part II Specific Practices, 10 Intellectual Property, C Technology Transfer Agreements
	Kevin Coates, Lars Kjøbye, Luc Peeperkorn
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
C. Technology Transfer Agreements
	(1)  Introduction
	(2)  The Basic Framework and Underlying Philosophy of the TTBER and the Technology Transfer Guidelines
	(p. 1458) (3)  The Scope of the TTBER and the Technology Transfer Guidelines
		(a)  Agreements for the Production of Contract Products
		(b)  Technology Transfer Agreements
		(p. 1461) (c)  The Interface between the TTBER and Other Block Exemptions
	(4)  Competitors vs Non-Competitors
	(p. 1465) (5)  The Hardcore Restrictions
		(a)  Price Fixing
		(b)  Output Limitations
		(c)  Territorial and Customer Sales Restrictions
			(i)  Territorial and Customer Sales Restrictions between Competitors
			(p. 1471) (ii)  Territorial and Customer Sales Restrictions between Non-Competitors
		(d)  Restrictions on the Use of Own Technology or to Carry Out R&D
	(6)  Excluded Restrictions
	(7)  The Safe Harbours
	(8)  Withdrawal and Disapplication
	(9)  Application Outside the Scope of the Block Exemption
		(a)  Introduction
		(b)  Royalty Obligations
		(p. 1479) (c)  Exclusive Licences and Sales Restrictions
		(d)  Output Restrictions
		(e)  Field of Use Restrictions
		(f)  Captive Use Restrictions
		(g)  Tying and Bundling
		(h)  Exclusive Dealing
		(i)  Settlements
		(j)  Licensing of Future Developments
	(10)  Technology Pools
		(a)  The Nature of the Pooled Technologies
		(b)  Competition Concerns Relating to the Creation of the Pool
		(c)  Assessment of Individual Restraints
	Footnotes:
Part II Specific Practices, 10 Intellectual Property, D Trademark Licences
	Kevin Coates, Lars Kjøbye, Luc Peeperkorn
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
D. Trademark Licences
	(1)  Licences and Assignments
		(a)  Territorial Protection
		(b)  Prohibition on Competing Products
		(c)  No-Challenge Clauses (Ownership)
		(d)  No-Challenge Clauses (Validity)
		(e)  Prohibition on Sub-Licensing or Assignment
		(f)  Quality Control Measures
	(p. 1494) (2)  Trademark Delimitation Agreements
		(a)  Market Partitioning
		(b)  Confusion of Marks
	Footnotes:
Part II Specific Practices, 10 Intellectual Property, E Copyright
	Kevin Coates, Lars Kjøbye, Luc Peeperkorn
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
E. Copyright
	(1)  EU Directives Relating to Copyright
	(p. 1496) (2)  Territorial Protection through Exclusive Licences
		(a)  Exclusive Territory Does Not Necessarily Infringe Article 101(1)
		(p. 1497) (b)  Collective Refusals to License
		(c)  Specific Subject Matter of Copyright and Article 101(1)
	(3)  Collecting Societies
		(a)  Artists’ Licences to a Collecting Society
		(p. 1499) (b)  Licensing Agreements Between Collecting Societies
		(c)  Licences from Collecting Societies to Manufacturers
	Footnotes:
Part II Specific Practices, 10 Intellectual Property, F Article 102
	Kevin Coates, Lars Kjøbye, Luc Peeperkorn
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
F. Article 102
	(1)  Introduction
	(2)  IP and Market Definition
	(3)  IP and Dominance
	(4)  Abuse
		(a)  Refusals to License IP Rights
			(i)  The IBM Undertaking
			(ii)  Volvo/Veng252
			(iii)  Magill
			(iv)  IMS Health
			(v)  Microsoft
		(b)  Licensing of IP Rights and Article 102
		(c)  Misuse of Regulatory Process
		(d)  Conclusions on Abuses
	Footnotes:
Part III Special Sectors, 11 Financial Services, A Introduction
	Nicholas Banasevic, Stephen Ryan, Rita Wezenbeek
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
A. Introduction
	(1)  General Remarks on Financial Services
	(2)  Developments in the Commission’s Approach
	(3)  The Post-2007 Financial Crisis and Consequences for Competition in the Financial Sector
	(4)  Competition and Regulation in the Financial Sector
	(5)  Social Security
	Footnotes:
Part III Special Sectors, 11 Financial Services, B Banking
	Nicholas Banasevic, Stephen Ryan, Rita Wezenbeek
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
B. Banking
	(1)  Preliminary Remarks
	(2)  Payment Systems
		(a)  Introduction to Payment Systems
		(b)  Regulation, Self-Regulation, and Competition Law Enforcement
		(c)  Pricing Issues (Interchange Fees)36
		(d)  Issues Relating to Access
			(i)  SWIFT/La Poste
			(ii)  Visa International and Visa Europe
			(iii)  Groupement des Cartes Bancaires
			(iv)  European Payments Council
	(p. 1536) (3)  Non-Payment Banking Antitrust Cases
	(p. 1539) (4)  Banking Mergers
		(a)  Introduction
		(b)  Turnover Calculation for Credit Institutions and Other Financial Institutions
		(c)  The Approach to Market Definition
		(d)  Significant Cases
		(e)  Nationalization and Recapitalization
		(f)  Looking Forward
	Footnotes:
Part III Special Sectors, 11 Financial Services, C Capital Markets
	Nicholas Banasevic, Stephen Ryan, Rita Wezenbeek
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
C. Capital Markets
	(1)  Preliminary Remarks
		(a)  Importance of Clearing
		(b)  MiFID II
	(2)  Antitrust Cases
		(a)  Clearstream
		(b)  Recent Enforcement
		(p. 1555) (c)  Standard & Poor’s
		(d)  Reuters Instruments Codes (RICs)
		(e)  Credit Default Swaps
	(p. 1558) (3)  Deutsche Börse/NYSE Euronext Merger Case
		(a)  Introduction
		(b)  The Parties and the Deal
		(c)  Market Definition
		(d)  Competitive Assessment
		(e)  Claimed Efficiencies
		(f)  Remedies231
		(g)  Conclusion
	Footnotes:
Part III Special Sectors, 11 Financial Services, D Insurance
	Nicholas Banasevic, Stephen Ryan, Rita Wezenbeek
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
D. Insurance
	(1)  Introductory/Preliminary Remarks
		(a)  Some Characteristics of Insurance
		(b)  Market Definition Issues in the Insurance Sector
	(2)  The Commission’s Antitrust Policy in the Insurance Sector
		(a)  Commission Antitrust Case Law on Insurance
		(b)  Commission Block Exemption Regulation for the Insurance Sector
		(c)  Sector Inquiry in Business Insurance
	(3)  Specific Types of Practices in the Insurance Sector
		(a)  Agreements on Prices
		(b)  Jointly Produced Compilations, Tables, and Studies
		(c)  Standard Policy Clauses
		(d)  Co-Insurance and Co-Reinsurance Pools
			(i)  Pools in the Block Exemption
			(ii)  Commission Decisions and Other Cases on Pools
		(e)  Security Devices
		(f)  Agreements on Settlement of Claims and on Registers of Aggravated Risks
		(g)  Insurance Distribution
	Footnotes:
Part III Special Sectors, 11 Financial Services, E Conclusions
	Nicholas Banasevic, Stephen Ryan, Rita Wezenbeek
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
E. Conclusions
	Footnotes:
A. Introduction
Part III Special Sectors, 12 Energy, A Introduction
	Céline Gauer, Lars Kjøbye
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
	(1)  Liberalization and the Regulatory Framework
	(2)  Regulation and Competition Enforcement
	(3)  Findings of the Commission’s Energy Sector Inquiry
		(a)  Market Concentration
		(b)  Vertical Foreclosure
		(c)  Market Integration
		(p. 1587) (d)  Downstream Markets
	Footnotes:
B. Market Definition
	(1)  Product Market
		(a)  Gas Markets
Part III Special Sectors, 12 Energy, B Market Definition
	Céline Gauer, Lars Kjøbye
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
		(b)  Electricity Markets
	(2)  Geographic Market
		(a)  Exploration, Production, and Sales of Crude Oil and Gas
		(b)  Supply Markets
		(c)  Transport Markets
		(d)  Flexibility of Markets in Gas
	(p. 1595) (3)  Conclusion
	Footnotes:
C. Obstacles to Market Integration and Discrimination
	(1)  Horizontal Market Partitioning
Part III Special Sectors, 12 Energy, C Obstacles to Market Integration and Discrimination
	Céline Gauer, Lars Kjøbye
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
	(2)  Curtailment of Networks
	(3)  Territorial Restrictions and Destination Clauses in Vertical Agreements
	(4)  Conclusion
	Footnotes:
D. Vertical Contractual Restraints
	(p. 1602) (1)  Use Restrictions
Part III Special Sectors, 12 Energy, D Vertical Contractual Restraints
	Céline Gauer, Lars Kjøbye
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
	(2)  Customer Foreclosure
	(3)  Exclusive Distribution and Volume Reduction Clauses
	(4)  Conclusion
	Footnotes:
E. Horizontal Contractual Restraints
	(1)  Non-Compete Clauses
Part III Special Sectors, 12 Energy, E Horizontal Contractual Restraints
	Céline Gauer, Lars Kjøbye
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
	(2)  Joint Investment and Joint Operation of Production Capacity
	(3)  Network Effects and Minority Shareholdings
	(4)  Joint Purchasing
	(5)  Joint Selling
		(a)  Pure Joint Selling
		(b)  Joint Selling as Part of Supply Chain
	(6)  Exchange of Information
	(7)  Conclusion
	Footnotes:
F. Network Foreclosure
	(1)  Refusal to Supply by Vertically Integrated Undertakings
Part III Special Sectors, 12 Energy, F Network Foreclosure
	Céline Gauer, Lars Kjøbye
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
		(a)  Access to Transport Networks is Indispensable
		(b)  Refusals to Access Networks in Various Forms
		(c)  Elimination of Effective Competition and Objective Justification
	(2)  Input Foreclosure
		(a)  Long-Term Capacity Reservations: The GDF and E.ON Gas Cases268
		(p. 1631) (b)  Pre-Emptive Capacity Reservation: The ČEZ Case
	(3)  Remedies
		(a)  The RWE and ENI Cases
		(b)  The GDF and E.ON Gas Foreclosure Cases
		(c)  The ČEZ Case
	(4)  Conclusion
	Footnotes:
G. Exploitative Abuses
	(p. 1635) (1)  Energy Markets are Prone to Exploitative Conduct
Part III Special Sectors, 12 Energy, G Exploitative Abuses
	Céline Gauer, Lars Kjøbye
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
	(2)  The Commission’s Practice
		(p. 1636) (a)  E.ON Electricity: The German Electricity Wholesale Market Case
		(p. 1638) (b)  E.ON Electricity: The German Electricity Balancing Case
	(3)  Conclusion
	Footnotes:
H. State Measures and Article 106 TFEU
Part III Special Sectors, 12 Energy, H State Measures and Article 106 TFEU
	Céline Gauer, Lars Kjøbye
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
	Footnotes:
I. Final Remarks
	(1)  The Energy Sector: Five Years After the Energy Sector Inquiry
Part III Special Sectors, 12 Energy, I Final Remarks
	Céline Gauer, Lars Kjøbye
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
	(2)  Competition Policy: The Contribution of Energy Cases
		(a)  New Types of Infringements
		(b)  First Structural Remedies
		(c)  Deterrence vs Swift Impact on the Market
	(3)  Conclusion
	Footnotes:
(p. 1648) A. Introduction
Part III Special Sectors, 13 Communications (Telecoms and Internet), A Introduction
	David Gabathuler, Eduardo Martinez Rivero
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
(p. 1649) B. EU Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications
	(1)  Introduction
Part III Special Sectors, 13 Communications (Telecoms and Internet), B EU Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications
	David Gabathuler, Eduardo Martinez Rivero
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
	(2)  Opening the Market to Competition (1990s)
		(a)  Progressive Liberalization (Reliance on Article 106 Directives)
		(b)  Harmonization Measures
	(3)  The Regulatory Framework
		(a)  The Regulatory Package
		(b)  Functioning of the Regulatory Framework
		(c)  Article 7 consultation mechanism
		(d)  Article 7 Oversight Extended to Regulatory Remedies
		(e)  Functional Separation
		(f)  Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC)
	(4)  Specific Regulatory Measures
		(a)  International Mobile Roaming
		(b)  Radio Spectrum Policy
	(5)  Completing the Telecoms Single Market: Commission’s ‘Connected Continent’ Proposal
	Footnotes:
C. Move from Copper Networks to Next Generation Access Networks
	(1)  The Emergence of Next Generation Access Networks
Part III Special Sectors, 13 Communications (Telecoms and Internet), C Move from Copper Networks to Next Generation Access Networks
	David Gabathuler, Eduardo Martinez Rivero
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
	(2)  The NGA Recommendation
	(3)  The Recommendation on Non-Discrimination and Costing Methodologies
	Footnotes:
D. Interaction Between Ex Post Competition Enforcement and Ex Ante Regulation
	(1)  The Applicability of the Competition Rules to the Electronic Communications Sector
Part III Special Sectors, 13 Communications (Telecoms and Internet), D Interaction Between Ex Post Competition Enforcement and Ex Ante Regulation
	David Gabathuler, Eduardo Martinez Rivero
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
	(2)  A Complementary Approach
	(p. 1675) (3)  Resolving Conflicts Between Sector Regulation and Competition Enforcement137
	(4)  The Influence of Competition Law Principles on the Regulatory Framework
	(p. 1678) (5)  Economic Incentives to Invest
	(6)  No Exemption for Emerging Markets
	(7)  Ex Ante Regulation as a Mitigating Circumstance
	Footnotes:
E. Commission’s Antitrust Enforcement in the Electronic Communications Sector
	(1)  Margin Squeeze (Deutsche Telekom, Telefónica, TeliaSonera): An Autonomous Type of Abuse
Part III Special Sectors, 13 Communications (Telecoms and Internet), E Commission’s Antitrust Enforcement in the Electronic Communications Sector
	David Gabathuler, Eduardo Martinez Rivero
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
		(a)  Deutsche Telekom (2003)
		(b)  Telefónica (2007)169
		(c)  TeliaSonera (2011)174
	(2)  Predatory Pricing (Wanadoo Interactive): Leveraging of Incumbent Power into an Emerging Market
	(3)  Refusal to Supply (Telekomunikacja Polska): Competition Enforcement in Addition to Regulatory Intervention
	(4)  Market Sharing (Telefónica/Portugal Telecom): First Case in the Electronic Communications Sector where the Commission Found an Article 101 Violation Extending to More Than One Member State
	Footnotes:
(p. 1689) F. Mergers in the Electronic Communications Sector
	(1)  Introduction
	(2)  Mobile Telecommunications
Part III Special Sectors, 13 Communications (Telecoms and Internet), F Mergers in the Electronic Communications Sector
	David Gabathuler, Eduardo Martinez Rivero
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
		(a)  Horizontal Overlap
			(i)  T-Mobile Austria/tele.ring
			(ii)  Hutchison 3G Austria/Orange Austria
			(iii)  T-Mobile/Orange Netherlands
			(iv)  T-Mobile/Orange in the UK
		(b)  Vertical Relationships
	(3)  Fixed-Line Telecommunications
	(4)  Alternative Infrastructure: Cable and Satellite
		(a)  Cable
		(b)  Satellite
	(5)  Some Notable Merger Decisions in Other Markets
	Footnotes:
G. Internet
	(1)  Overview
	(2)  Net Neutrality Regulation
Part III Special Sectors, 13 Communications (Telecoms and Internet), G Internet
	David Gabathuler, Eduardo Martinez Rivero
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
	(3)  Proposed Net Neutrality Measures at EU Level
	(4)  Situation at the National Level
	(p. 1701) (5)  Net Neutrality and Competition Law Enforcement
	(6)  Google: Online Search and Advertising
	Footnotes:
H. Other Developments
	(1)  Network Sharing in Mobile Telephony
Part III Special Sectors, 13 Communications (Telecoms and Internet), H Other Developments
	David Gabathuler, Eduardo Martinez Rivero
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
	(2)  State Aid to Broadband250
	(3)  Standard Essential IPR Relating to Mobile Telephony Standards
	Footnotes:
A. Introduction
	(1)  Main Features of the Media Sector
Part III Special Sectors, 14 Media, A Introduction
	Krzysztof Kuik, Anthony Dawes
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
		(i)  Music Industry
		(ii)  Audiovisual Industry
		(iii)  Book Production, Publishing, and Distribution
		(p. 1712) (iv)  Advertising Markets
	(2)  Regulatory Framework
	(3)  Issues Arising Across the Media Sector
		(i)  Enforcement at Both EU and National Level
		(ii)  Cultural Diversity
		(iii)  Copyright
		(iv)  Exclusivity
		(v)  Two-Sided Markets
	(4)  Structure
	Footnotes:
B. Competition Issues under Article 101
	(1)  Horizontal Agreements
		(a)  Price-Fixing
Part III Special Sectors, 14 Media, B Competition Issues under Article 101
	Krzysztof Kuik, Anthony Dawes
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
		(i)  Contractual Systems of Fixed Book Prices
		(ii)  Arrangements Akin to Price Fixing
			(i)  Agreements or Concerted Practices Seeking to Influence the Retail Prices of Physical Recordings
			(ii)  Agreements or Concerted Practices Restricting the Freedom to Grant Rebates
			(iii)  Concerted Practices Leading to an Increase in Retail Prices
		(b)  Customer and Territorial Allocation
			(i)  Restrictions on the Collective Licensing of Content
			(ii)  Restrictions on the Ability of Right Holders to Entrust the Licensing of Content to the Person of Their Choice
			(iii)  Agreements or Concerted Practices Resulting in Territorial Allocation
		(p. 1726) (c)  Joint Selling of Television Rights
			(i)  Does Joint Selling of Rights Fall Within Article 101(1)?
			(ii)  Horizontal Aspects of Joint Selling of Rights
			(iii)  Specificity of Sport
			(iv)  Absence of Downstream Exclusivity
		(d)  Joint Purchasing of Television Rights
			(i)  Appreciable Restriction of Competition
			(p. 1731) (ii)  Main Competition Concerns
			(iii)  Joint Purchasing of Sports Rights by Public Broadcasters
	(2)  Vertical Agreements
		(a)  Exclusivity Clauses Over Premium Content
			(i)  Commission’s Policy Objective
			(ii)  The Approach in ARD
			(iii)  A More General Framework of Assessment
			(iv)  Possible Limits on the Duration and Scope of Such Agreements
			(v)  The Impact of the FA Premier League and Murphy Cases on the Level of Remuneration a Right Holder Can Obtain in Return for Exclusivity
		(b)  Most-Favoured-Nation Clauses
			(i)  Most-Favoured-Supplier Clauses
				(i)  Pay Television Film Output Agreements
				(ii)  Universal/EMI
			(ii)  Most-Favoured-Customer Clauses
			(iii)  Cross-Platform Parity Clauses
			(iv)  Conclusion
		(c)  Territorial Restrictions
			(i)  Territorial Restrictions in Bilateral Reciprocal Agreements Between Collecting Societies
			(ii)  Absolute Territorial Protection Before FA Premier League and Murphy
			(p. 1744) (iii)  Absolute Territorial Protection After FA Premier League and Murphy
			(iv)  Territorial Restrictions in the Online World
	Footnotes:
C. Competition Issues under Article 102
	(1)  Market Definition
Part III Special Sectors, 14 Media, C Competition Issues under Article 102
	Krzysztof Kuik, Anthony Dawes
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
	(2)  Dominance
		(i)  Assessing the Economic Strength of a Content Provider
		(ii)  Assessing the Economic Strength of a Broadcaster
	(p. 1747) (3)  Abuse
		(a)  Unfair Trading Conditions
		(b)  Excessive Pricing
		(c)  Discriminatory Pricing
		(p. 1751) (d)  Exclusionary Abuses
	Footnotes:
D. The Competition Directive: Market Entry, Special or Exclusive Rights, and Spectrum Assignments
Part III Special Sectors, 14 Media, D The Competition Directive: Market Entry, Special or Exclusive Rights, and Spectrum Assignments
	Krzysztof Kuik, Anthony Dawes
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
	(1)  Member States Prohibited From Granting Exclusive or Special Rights
	(2)  Member States Required to Assign Spectrum on the Basis of Appropriate Criteria
		Conclusion
	Footnotes:
E. Mergers in the Media Sector
	(1)  General Remarks
		(i)  Consolidation
Part III Special Sectors, 14 Media, E Mergers in the Media Sector
	Krzysztof Kuik, Anthony Dawes
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
		(ii)  Digital Markets
		(iii)  Content
		(iv)  Vertical Issues
	(2)  The Scope of the Competition Assessment under the Merger Regulation
	(3)  Concentrations in Selected Media Industries
		(a)  Concentrations in the Music Industry
			(i)  Music Publishing
				(i)  Relevant Product Markets248
				(ii)  Relevant Geographic Markets249
				(iii)  The Assessment of Non-Coordinated Effects
				(iv)  The Assessment of Coordinated Effects
			(ii)  Recorded Music
				(i)  Relevant Product Markets257
				(ii)  Relevant Geographic Markets258
				(iii)  The Assessment of Non-Coordinated Effects
				(iv)  The Assessment of Coordinated Effects
		(b)  Concentrations in the Audiovisual Industry
			(i)  Relevant Product Markets
			(ii)  Relevant Geographic Markets
			(iii)  The Assessment of Pay-TV Mergers
				(i)  Prohibitions Following the Lack of Satisfactory Remedies
				(ii)  Focus on Vertical Issues (Input Foreclosure)
				(iii)  Vertical Issues Remain in Mergers with Limited Horizontal Overlaps
		(c)  Concentrations in the Book Publishing Industry (Including E-Books)
			(i)  Relevant Product Markets
			(ii)  Relevant Geographic Markets
			(iii)  The Assessment of Non-Coordinated Effects
			(iv)  The Assessment of Coordinated Effects
		(d)  Concentrations in the Written Press
			(i)  Relevant Product Markets318
			(ii)  Relevant Geographic Markets
			(iii)  The Assessment of Non-Coordinated Effects
			(iv)  The Assessment of Coordinated Effects
			(v)  The Assessment of Conglomerate Effects
		(e)  Concentrations in Advertising Markets
			(i)  Product Markets
			(ii)  Relevant Geographic Markets
			(iii)  The Assessment of Coordinated/Non-Coordinated Effects
			(p. 1777) (iv)  Vertical Effects
	(4)  Conclusion
	Footnotes:
A. The Economic Importance of Transport
Part III Special Sectors, 15 Transport, A The Economic Importance of Transport
	Hubert de Broca, Marta Mielecka Riga, Anatoly Suboès
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
	Footnotes:
B. Competition Law Framework
	(1)  Historical Evolution
Part III Special Sectors, 15 Transport, B Competition Law Framework
	Hubert de Broca, Marta Mielecka Riga, Anatoly Suboès
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
	(2)  Modernization of Competition Rules in the Transport Sector
	Footnotes:
C. Air Transport
	(1)  Introduction
Part III Special Sectors, 15 Transport, C Air Transport
	Hubert de Broca, Marta Mielecka Riga, Anatoly Suboès
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
	(2)  Legal Framework
		(a)  Liberalization of the EU Aviation Market
		(b)  International Aspects
			(i)  Air Service Agreements with Third Countries
			(ii)  Open Skies Agreement and Other Comprehensive Air Transport Agreements
		(c)  Application of EU Competition Rules in Air Transport
	(3)  Market Definition in Airline Cases
		(a)  Introduction
		(b)  Air Transport of Passengers
			(i)  Supply of Air Transport Services to End Customers
				(i)  Starting Point: Origin-and-Destination (O&D) Approach
				(ii)  Type of Passenger
				(iii)  Airport Substitutability
				(iv)  Non-Stop vs One-Stop Flights76
				(v)  Charter Services
				(vi)  Inter-Modal Competition
			(ii)  Supply of Airline Seats to Tour Operators
		(c)  Air Transport of Cargo
	(4)  Competitive Assessment of Airline Alliances and Mergers
		(a)  Introduction
		(b)  Determination of Affected Markets
		(c)  Counterfactual
		(d)  Assessment of Restrictions of Competition
			(i)  Restriction of Competition by Object
			(ii)  Restriction of Competition by Effect
		(e)  Efficiencies
			(i)  Introduction
			(ii)  General Assessment Framework Under Article 101(3)
			(iii)  Efficiency Gains
			(iv)  Pass-on to Consumers
			(v)  Indispensability
			(vi)  No Elimination of Competition
		(f)  Commitments
			(i)  Introduction
			(ii)  Slot Releases
			(p. 1810) (iii)  Special Prorate Agreements
			(iv)  Fare Combinability Agreements
			(v)  Frequent Flyer Programmes
			(vi)  Intermodal Agreements
			(vii)  Other Commitments
	(5)  Prohibited Airline Mergers: Ryanair/Aer Lingus and Olympic/Aegean
	(6)  Hardcore Restrictions
		(a)  Price Fixing
		(b)  Market Sharing
	(7)  Abuses of a Dominant Position
	Footnotes:
D. Maritime Transport
	(1)  Introduction
	(2)  The Repeal of the Conference Block Exemption
Part III Special Sectors, 15 Transport, D Maritime Transport
	Hubert de Broca, Marta Mielecka Riga, Anatoly Suboès
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
	(3)  The Exemption of Maritime Consortia
		(a)  Background
		(b)  Objectives of the Latest Review
		(c)  The Scope of the Exemption
		(d)  The Content of the Exemption
		(e)  The Conditions for the Exemption
			(i)  Market Share Threshold
			(ii)  Notice Period
	(4)  The Maritime Guidelines
	(5)  Individual Exemption
	(6)  Market Definition
	(7)  Agreements and Abuses of Dominant Position
	Footnotes:
(p. 1828) E. Inland Transport
	(1)  Road Transport
		(a)  Transport of Goods
Part III Special Sectors, 15 Transport, E Inland Transport
	Hubert de Broca, Marta Mielecka Riga, Anatoly Suboès
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
		(b)  Transport of Passengers
	(2)  Inland Waterways
	(3)  Rail Transport
		(a)  Transport of Goods by Rail
		(p. 1831) (b)  Transport of Passengers by Rail
		(c)  EU Liberalization in the Railway Sector: The Railway Packages
			(i)  First Railway Package
			(ii)  Second Railway Package
			(iii)  Third Railway Package
			(iv)  Rail Recast Directive
			(v)  Fourth Railway Package
			(vi)  Railway Interoperability
	(4)  Controlled Competition for Public Transport: Regulation 1370/2007
	(5)  Antitrust Rules Applicable to Inland Transport
		(a)  Article 2 of Regulation 169/2009: Technical Agreements
		(b)  Article 3 of Regulation 169/2009: Exemption for Groups of Small and Medium-Sized Companies
	(6)  Market Definition
		(a)  Freight
		(b)  Passenger Transport
	(7)  Prohibited Agreements
	(8)  Abuses of a Dominant Position
	Footnotes:
F. Transport Infrastructure (and Related Services)
	(1)  Applicability of Competition Rules to Transport Infrastructure (and Related Services)
		(a)  Economic Activity
Part III Special Sectors, 15 Transport, F Transport Infrastructure (and Related Services)
	Hubert de Broca, Marta Mielecka Riga, Anatoly Suboès
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
		(b)  Services of General Economic Interest
	(2)  Airport Infrastructure
		(a)  Market Definition
			(i)  Product Market
			(p. 1863) (ii)  Geographic Market
		(b)  Discriminatory Landing Fees
		(c)  Access to Airport Services (Ground-Handling)
	(3)  Maritime Infrastructure
		(a)  Market Definition
			(i)  Product Market
			(ii)  Geographic Market
		(p. 1867) (b)  Competition Concerns
	Footnotes:
A. Introduction
Part III Special Sectors, 16 Pharma, A Introduction
	Harald Mische, Elena Kamilarova, Dominik Schnichels
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
B. Overview of the Pharma Sector
	(1)  Pharmaceuticals
	(2)  Market Players
		(i)  Manufacturers
Part III Special Sectors, 16 Pharma, B Overview of the Pharma Sector
	Harald Mische, Elena Kamilarova, Dominik Schnichels
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
		(ii)  Generic Companies
		(iii)  Distribution
		(iv)  Demand
	(3)  Regulatory Framework
		(i)  Patents
		(ii)  SPC
		(iii)  Marketing Authorization
		(iv)  ‘Data Exclusivity’ and ‘Marketing Exclusivity’
		(v)  National Pricing and Reimbursement Rules35
	(4)  Antitrust Enforcement Priorities before the Sector Inquiry
	(p. 1877) (5)  Sector Inquiry and Follow-Up
		(i)  Sector Inquiry
		(ii)  Follow-Up
	Footnotes:
C. Market Definition
	(1)  Pharmaceutical Markets in Case Law
	(2)  ATC Classification
Part III Special Sectors, 16 Pharma, C Market Definition
	Harald Mische, Elena Kamilarova, Dominik Schnichels
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
	(3)  Medicine Characteristics
	(4)  Galenic Formulation
	(5)  Product Life Cycle
	(6)  Future Markets
	(7)  Distribution Channels
	(8)  Upstream Markets
	(9)  Supply Side
	(10)  Geographic Markets
	(11)  Recent Antitrust Decisions
	Footnotes:
D. Dominance in Abusive Conduct Cases
	(1)  Commission Practice
		(i)  AstraZeneca
	(2)  National Cases
		(i)  UK Cases (Reckitt Benckiser and Napp)
Part III Special Sectors, 16 Pharma, D Dominance in Abusive Conduct Cases
	Harald Mische, Elena Kamilarova, Dominik Schnichels
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
		(ii)  The French Sanofi-Aventis Case
	Footnotes:
E. Restrictive Practices Between Originators and Generic Companies
	(p. 1885) (1)  Main Competition Concerns and the Economic and Legal Context of Generic Competition
		(a)  Main Competition Concerns
Part III Special Sectors, 16 Pharma, E Restrictive Practices Between Originators and Generic Companies
	Harald Mische, Elena Kamilarova, Dominik Schnichels
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
		(b)  Dynamics of Competition Between Originator and Generic Companies
		(p. 1888) (c)  The Competitive Process Leading to Generic Entry
	(2)  Pay-for-Delay Settlement Agreements
		(i)  Terminology
		(ii)  Forms of Value Transfer
		(iii)  Overview of US and EU Debate
		(a)  Pay-for-Delay Settlements in the US
			(i)  Hatch–Waxman Act
			(ii)  Potential Scope of the Patent Test
			(iii)  Presumption of Restraint of Trade
			(p. 1893) (iv)  US Supreme Court’s ‘Rule of Reason’ Test
		(b)  Pay-for-Delay Patent Settlement Agreements under Article 101
			(i)  Review of Patent Settlements Under the 2008/2009 Sector Inquiry
			(ii)  Pay-for-Restriction in Settlement Agreements
			(iii)  Commission Decision in Lundbeck
			(p. 1897) (iv)  Commission Decision in Fentanyl
			(v)  EU and UK Investigations in Servier and Paroxetine Under Article 101
			(vi)  Relevant Jurisprudence
	(3)  Acquisition of Patent Rights and Exclusive Licensing
		(a)  Acquisition of API Technology
		(b)  Merger Regulation vs Articles 101 and 102
		(c)  Relevant Jurisprudence
		(d)  Exclusive Licensing
	(4)  Exclusive Supply Agreement
	Footnotes:
F. Competition Between Manufacturers of Generic Medicines
	(1)  National Pricing Systems and Their Impact on Generic Competition
Part III Special Sectors, 16 Pharma, F Competition Between Manufacturers of Generic Medicines
	Harald Mische, Elena Kamilarova, Dominik Schnichels
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
	(2)  The German Sickness Funds and the Dutch Preference Policy
	Footnotes:
G. Case Law under Article 102 and National Law: Abuses by Originators
	(1)  Misleading Representations in Government Procedures and Misuse of Procedures (AstraZeneca)
Part III Special Sectors, 16 Pharma, G Case Law under Article 102 and National Law: Abuses by Originators
	Harald Mische, Elena Kamilarova, Dominik Schnichels
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
		(a)  Misleading Representations in Government Procedures
		(b)  Misuse of Procedures
	(p. 1908) (2)  Acquisition of Competing API Technology (Servier Investigation)
	(3)  Pay-for-Delay Settlement Agreements (Servier and Paroxetine Investigations)
	(4)  Exclusionary Pricing Discounts in the Hospital Segment (the OFT’s Napp Case)
	(p. 1909) (5)  Withdrawal and Delisting of a Product (the OFT’s Reckitt Benckiser Case)
	(6)  Denigration (the L’Autorité de la concurrence’s Schering-Plough and Sanofi-Aventis Cases)
	(7)  Abusive Practices Against Competing Originator Companies (Boehringer Case)
	Footnotes:
H. Parallel Trade in Pharmaceuticals
	(1)  Rationale
Part III Special Sectors, 16 Pharma, H Parallel Trade in Pharmaceuticals
	Harald Mische, Elena Kamilarova, Dominik Schnichels
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
		(a)  The Specificity of the EU Internal Market
		(b)  The Internal Market Objective
	(p. 1912) (2)  Restrictions of Parallel Trade and Article 101: Supply Quotas and Dual Pricing
		(a)  Supply Quotas and Article 101
			(i)  EU Case Law
			(ii)  National Case Law
		(b)  Dual Pricing
			(i)  EU Case Law: Restriction by Object
			(p. 1914) (ii)  Special Characteristics of the Pharmaceutical Sector
			(iii)  National Case Law
	(3)  Restrictions of Parallel Trade and Article 102: Supply Quotas
		(a)  EU Case Law: Absence of a Per Se Abuse Under Article 102
		(b)  National Case Law
			(p. 1917) (i)  The Case Law of the French Competition Authority
			(ii)  The Case Law of the Spanish Competition Authority
			(iii)  The Case Law of the Belgian Competition Authority
			(iv)  Conclusion
	Footnotes:
Part IV State Aid, 17 State Aid, A Why State Aid Control?
	Tim Maxian Rusche, Claire Micheau, Henri Piffaut, Koen Van de Casteele
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
A. Why State Aid Control?
	(1)  The Origins
Art.—Les Etats parties du présent traité s’engagent:
	(2)  Constant Conflict of Objectives
	(3)  The 2012–2014 State Aid Modernization
	Footnotes:
Part IV State Aid, 17 State Aid, A Why State Aid Control?
	Tim Maxian Rusche, Claire Micheau, Henri Piffaut, Koen Van de Casteele
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
A. Why State Aid Control?
	(1)  The Origins
Art.—Les Etats parties du présent traité s’engagent:
	(2)  Constant Conflict of Objectives
	(3)  The 2012–2014 State Aid Modernization
	Footnotes:
Part IV State Aid, 17 State Aid, B Notion of State Aid
	Tim Maxian Rusche, Claire Micheau, Henri Piffaut, Koen Van de Casteele
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
B. Notion of State Aid
	(1)  Aid Granted by the State or Through State Resources
		(a)  ‘Or’ is to be Read as ‘and’
		(b)  State Resources…May Be Private (As Long As They Are Under Control)
		(c)  Imputability: No Need for a Smoking Gun, But For Indications Showing the Unlikelihood of an Absence of State Intervention
	(2)  Advantage
		(a)  Beneficiary of the Advantage
			(i)  Notion of Undertaking
			(ii)  Indirect Beneficiary
		(b)  Notion of Advantage
			(i)  Economic Advantage
			(ii)  The Market Economy Investor Principle/Private Creditor Principle
				(i)  The Private Investor Principle
					Market economy investor principle
				(ii)  Private Creditor Principle
				(p. 1942) (iii)  Sale of State Property
					Guidelines on sales of land and buildings by public authorities
					Privatization of publicly owned companies
				(iv)  Extensions
				(v)  Infrastructure Projects
					Services of general economic interest112
			(iii)  Tax Advantage
	(3)  Selectivity
		(a)  Notion of Selectivity
		(b)  Tax Selectivity
			(i)  Material Selectivity
				(i)  De Jure and De Facto Selectivity
				(ii)  The Test of Tax Selectivity
				(iii)  Discretionary Power
				(iv)  Justification by the Logic of the Tax System
			(ii)  Regional Selectivity
	(4)  Distortion of Competition and Effect on Trade
		(a)  Affectation of Competition and Trade
		(b)  De Minimis Regulation
			(i)  Scope
			(ii)  Recipient
			(iii)  Calculation
			(iv)  Transparent Aid
			(v)  Application in Time
			(vi)  Further Conditions
			(vii)  Monitoring
			(viii)  Cumulation
			(ix)  Controversy on the Nature of the De Minimis Rule
		(c)  New SGEI De Minimis Regulation
	Footnotes:
Part IV State Aid, 17 State Aid, C Compatibility of State Aid with the Internal Market
	Tim Maxian Rusche, Claire Micheau, Henri Piffaut, Koen Van de Casteele
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
(p. 1962) C. Compatibility of State Aid with the Internal Market
	(p. 1963) (1)  Refined Economic Approach
		(a)  Well-Defined Objective of Common Interest
			Table 17.1  Criteria relevant to identifying market failure
		(b)  Well-Designed Instrument
		(c)  Balancing of the Positive and Negative Effects/Overall Positive Balance
		(d)  The Way Forward
	(2)  General Principles of Necessity (Incentive Effect) and Proportionality
	(3)  Compatibility on the Basis of Article 107(2)
		(a)  Aid Having a Social Character Granted to Individual Consumers
		(b)  Aid to Make Good Damage Caused by Natural Disasters or Exceptional Occurrences
		(c)  Aid to Compensate for the Economic Disadvantages Caused by the Division of Germany
	(4)  Compatibility Declared by the Commission on the Basis of Article 107(3)
		(a)  Aid to Promote the Economic Development of Areas where the Standard of Living is Abnormally Low or Where There is Serious Underemployment (Art 107(3)(a))
		(b)  Aid to Promote the Execution of an Important Project of Common European Interest (Art 107(3)(b) first alternative)
		(c)  Aid to Remedy a Serious Disturbance in the Economy of a Member State (Art 107(3)(b) second alternative)
		(d)  Aid to Promote Culture and Heritage Conservation (Art 107(3)(d))
		(e)  Aid to Facilitate the Development of Certain Economic Activities or of Certain Economic Areas (Art 107(3)(c))
			(i)  State Aid for Environmental Protection
				(i)  Investment Aid
				(ii)  Operating Aid
			(ii)  Aid for R&D
				(i)  Stage of R&D
				(ii)  Incentive Effect of R&D Aid
				(iii)  Eligible Costs
				(iv)  Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring Firms in Difficulty
					Common provisions for rescue and restructuring aid alike
					Eligible firms
					(p. 1982) Scope
					The ‘one time, last time’ principle
					Recovery against recipients of previous unlawful aid
					Rescue aid
					Restructuring aid
					Form of aid
					Restoration of long-term viability
					Avoidance of undue distortions of competition
					Aid must be limited to the minimum needed
					Other conditions and special provisions on restructuring aid
					Special provisions for rescue and restructuring aid schemes
					Conclusions
			(iii)  Other Soft Law of a Horizontal Nature
			(iv)  Soft Law Concerning Only Certain Sectors
		(f)  Other Categories to be Specified by Decision of the Council (Art 107(3)(e))
		(g)  Aid for the Coordination of Transport
	(5)  Compatibility Declared by the Council: Article 108(2)337
	(p. 1990) (6)  Services of General Economic Interest
		(a)  Introduction: Definition and Legal Basis
		(b)  Before Altmark: Compensation and State Aid Approach
		(c)  The Altmark Ruling
		(d)  Analysis of Altmark: Positive Effects and Open Questions
		(e)  The SGEI Package
			(i)  The Monti-Kroes Package
			(ii)  The New Package
				(p. 1996) (i)  Existence of an SGEI
				(ii)  Entrustment Act
				(iii)  Parameters of Compensation
				(iv)  Avoidance of Overcompensation
				(v)  Selection of the Provider
				(vi)  De Minimis Regulation
				(vii)  Block Exemption
				(viii)  Framework
	(7)  The General Block Exemption Regulation
	Footnotes:
Part IV State Aid, 17 State Aid, D State Aid Procedure
	Tim Maxian Rusche, Claire Micheau, Henri Piffaut, Koen Van de Casteele
	From: Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition)
	Edited By: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, Deirdre Taylor (Assistant Editor)
D. State Aid Procedure
	(1)  Legal Basis and Applicable Texts of Hard and Soft Law
	(2)  Notification and Assessment of New Aid (Chapter II Procedural Regulation)
		(a)  Objective of the Notification and Assessment Procedure
		(b)  Legal Basis and the Principle of Notification Requirement
		(c)  Steps in the Notification and Assessment Procedure
			(i)  Preparation and Filing of Notification
			(ii)  Pre-Notification
			(iii)  Preliminary Investigation
			(iv)  Formal Investigation Proceedings
		(d)  Internal Commission Decision-Making Procedure
		(e)  Delays and Mistakes in the Notification Procedure and How to Avoid Them
		(f)  Monitoring of Approved and Notification-Exempted State Aid
	(3)  Unlawful Aid (Chapter III of the Procedural Regulation)
		(a)  The Case Law on Unlawful Aid
		(b)  The Codification of the Case Law in the Procedural Regulation
		(c)  Innovation in the Procedural Regulation: The Recovery Injunction
		(d)  Recovery of Unlawful and Incompatible Aid
			(i)  Legal Basis and General Principles of Recovery
				(i)  Legal Basis of Recovery
					Interim measures
					Legitimate expectations created by national authorities
				(ii)  Immediate and Effective Recovery According to National Laws
				(iii)  Imposition of Compound Interest
			(ii)  Defences Against Recovery
				(i)  Defences That Can Be Invoked by the Member State
				(ii)  Defences That Can Be Invoked by the Beneficiary
			(iii)  Specific Problems and Situations of Recovery
				(i)  Domestic Motivation for Recovery
				(ii)  Recovery and Insolvency Proceedings
				(iii)  The Correct Addressee for the Recovery Claim
			(iv)  Recovery Practice of the Commission
	(4)  Existing Aid (Chapter IV Procedural Regulation)
		(a)  The Distinction Between New and Existing Aid
		(b)  Procedure for Existing Aid
		(c)  The Treatment of Borderline Cases
	(5)  The Rights of Third Parties, in Particular: The State Aid Complaint (Chapter V Procedural Regulation)
		(a)  Rights of Third Parties in General
		(b)  State Aid Complaints
		(c)  Challengeable Acts
			(i)  Existing Aid
			(ii)  Opening Decisions
			(iii)  Injunctions
			(iv)  Administrative Letters in Response to Complaints
	(6)  Action Seeking the Suspension and Provisional Recovery of State Aid in Front of National Courts
	(7)  The Scope of Judicial Review
		(a)  Judicial Review: Failure to Act
		(p. 2032) (b)  Judicial Review: Interim Relief
		(c)  Judicial Review: Action for annulment
	Footnotes: