EU competition law and economics

Contents
	Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar, Nicolas Petit
	From: EU Competition Law and Economics
	Damien Geradin, Dr Anne Layne-Farrar, Nicolas Petit
About the Authors
	Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar, Nicolas Petit
	From: EU Competition Law and Economics
	Damien Geradin, Dr Anne Layne-Farrar, Nicolas Petit
General Court
Tables Of Cases
	Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar, Nicolas Petit
	From: EU Competition Law and Economics
	Damien Geradin, Dr Anne Layne-Farrar, Nicolas Petit
European Court of Justice
Permanent Court Of International Justice
France
United Kingdom
United States
Table Of Commission Decisions
	Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar, Nicolas Petit
	From: EU Competition Law and Economics
	Damien Geradin, Dr Anne Layne-Farrar, Nicolas Petit
European Treaties And Conventions
Tables of Legislation
	Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar, Nicolas Petit
	From: EU Competition Law and Economics
	Damien Geradin, Dr Anne Layne-Farrar, Nicolas Petit
(p. xxxiv) European Secondary Legislation
	Regulations
	Directives
National Legislation
	Canada
	Germany
	European
	United States
1 Introduction
	Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar, Nicolas Petit
	From: EU Competition Law and Economics
	Damien Geradin, Dr Anne Layne-Farrar, Nicolas Petit
(p. 1) 1  Introduction
I.  The Ubiquity of EU Competition Law
	A.  Impact of EU Competition Law on Public and Private Decision-Makers
	B.  The Positive Economic Effects of EU Competition Policy
		(1)  The beneficial macro and micro-economic effects of competition law
		(2)  Beneficial macro-economic effects
		(3)  Beneficial micro-economic effects
			(a)  General remarks
			(b)  Neoclassical price theory
			(c)  The market failure theory
		(4)  The ‘integrationist’ effects of competition law
	Illustration: the Volkswagen case
II.  The History of EU Competition Law
	A.  Origins of Competition Laws
	(p. 14) B.  Appearance of Modern Competition Laws
		(1)  The adoption of competition law in North America
		(p. 15) (2)  The emergence of competition regimes in Europe
			(a)  The ordo-liberal school
			(b)  Treaty establishing the European Economic Community
	C.  Modernization of EU Competition Law
III.  The Goals of EU Competition Law
	A.  Economic Goals
	B.  European Integration Goals
	Illustration: the GSK v Commission case
IV.  The Sources of EU Competition Law
	A.  Treaty Law
		(p. 27) (1)  Rules applying to undertakings—Articles 101 and 102 TFEU
		(2)  Rules applying to Member States—Articles 106 and 107 to 109 TFEU
		(3)  ‘Enforcement’ rules—Article 103, 104, and 105 TFEU
		(4)  Protocol on competition policy and the internal market
	B.  Secondary Law
	C.  Case Law
		(1)  Decisional practice of the Commission
		(2)  The case law of the European Courts
		(3)  National case law
V.  The Scope of Application of EU Competition Law
	A.  Scope Ratione Personae—To Whom Does EU Competition Law Apply?
		(1)  Jurisprudential definition of the concept of ‘undertaking’
		(2)  Jurisprudential restrictions of the concept of ‘undertaking’
	B.  Scope Ratione Materiae—To What Sectors Does Competition Law Apply?
		(1)  Agricultural products
		(p. 47) (2)  Transport
		(p. 49) (3)  Network industries
		(4)  The arms industry
	C.  Scope Ratione Loci—Where is EU Competition Law Applied and Enforced?
		(1)  The prescriptive jurisdiction of EU competition law
		(2)  Executive jurisdiction of EU competition law
			(a)  Investigative measures
			(p. 54) (b)  Orders
		(3)  The problem of global competition law
			(a)  Diagnosis—inadequacy of a competition law system that is not international
	(p. 55) Illustration: the Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas case
		(b)  Remedy—internationalization of competition law
		(4)  Conclusions
	Footnotes:
2 Elements of Competition Law Economics
	Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar, Nicolas Petit
	From: EU Competition Law and Economics
	Damien Geradin, Dr Anne Layne-Farrar, Nicolas Petit
(p. 59) 2  Elements of Competition Law Economics
I.  Introduction
II.  Epistemology of Competition Economics
	A.  Classical and Neoclassical Competition Economics
		(p. 63) (1)  The law of supply and demand
		(2)  The theory of ‘perfect competition’
		(3)  The monopoly and the cartel
		(4)  Evaluation of classical and neoclassical competition theories
	B.  The Normative Economics of Competition
		(p. 71) (1)  The Harvard School (or the ‘structuralist’ movement)
		(2)  The Chicago School (or the ‘behaviouralist’ movement)
		(3)  New industrial economics (or ‘Post-Chicago’ School)
(p. 78) III.  Methodology of Competition Economics
	A.  The Concept of Market Power
	Illustration: behavioural theory of anticompetitive conduct—the Alcoa/Reynolds case
	B.  Measuring Market Power
		(1)  Direct measurement of market power
			(a)  The Lerner index and the semantics of cost
			(b)  Measuring profits
			(c)  Price comparisons
			(d)  Price-elasticity of residual demand
	C.  Measuring Market Power, Indirectly
		(1)  Structural measurement
			(a)  Market shares
			(b)  Measuring concentration
		(2)  Additional measurement tools—assessment of obstacles to entry and expansion
			(a)  What is a barrier to entry?
			(b)  Characteristics of a barrier to entry
			(c)  Types of barrier to entry
			(d)  Structural barriers
			(p. 95) (e)  Strategic barriers relating to the behaviours of incumbent undertakings
	D.  Other Useful Economic Concepts—Competition Law, Law of Costs
		(p. 97) (1)  Marginal cost
		(p. 98) (2)  Average costs
			(a)  Average total costs
			(b)  Difficulties
			(c)  Subdivision—fixed and variable average costs
				(i)  Fixed costs
				(ii)  Variable costs
		(3)  Average avoidable costs
		(4)  Other cost concepts
			(a)  Average incremental costs
			(b)  Stranded costs
	Footnotes:
3 The Law and Economics of Anticompetitive Coordination
	Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar, Nicolas Petit
	From: EU Competition Law and Economics
	Damien Geradin, Dr Anne Layne-Farrar, Nicolas Petit
(p. 105) 3  The Law and Economics of Anticompetitive Coordination
I.  Article 101(1) TFEU—The Prohibition Rule
	A.  The Legal Component of Article 101(1) TFEU—A Concurrence of Wills between Several Independent Undertakings
		(1)  Plurality of independent undertakings
			(a)  ‘Intra-group’ agreements
	Illustration: Viho v Commission
		(b)  Agency agreements
		(c)  Employment contracts
		(2)  Concurrence of wills
			(p. 112) (a)  Agreements
				(i)  A broad concept
				(ii)  Limits of the concept
				(iii)  Private coercion
				(iv)  Public coercion
				(p. 116) (v)  Unilateral actions
			(p. 118) (b)  Decisions by associations of undertakings
			(c)  Concerted practice
		(3)  Final comments
	(p. 123) B.  The Economic Component of Article 101(1) TFEU—A Restriction of Competition
		(1)  The concept of competition
		(p. 125) (2)  Substantive content of the concept of a ‘restriction of competition’
			(a)  What a restriction of competition is not (or is no longer)
				(i)  A situation of contractual imbalance
				(ii)  A restriction on the parties’ freedom to act on the market
			(b)  What a restriction of competition is
				(i)  An ‘economic’ concept
				(ii)  The ‘integrationist’ approach towards a restriction of competition
		(3)  Presumed restrictions of competition vs Proven restrictions of competition—the object and effect dichotomy
			(a)  Presumed restrictions: the concept of restriction by ‘object’
			(b)  Restrictions of competition to be proved: the concept of restriction by ‘effect’
				(i)  Basic principles for assessing agreements under Article 101(1) TFEU
				(ii)  Appreciable effects
				(iii)  Cumulative effects
		(4)  The ancillary restraints doctrine
	C.  The Jurisdictional Component of Article 101(1) TFEU—A Restriction ‘Within the Internal Market’ Which ‘Affects Trade between Member States’
		(p. 145) (1)  Horizontal jurisdictional issues
		(2)  Vertical jurisdictional issues
			(a)  The ‘effect on trade’ concept—purpose
			(b)  The ‘effect on trade’ concept—interpretation
				(i)  Screening—quantitative presumptions
				(ii)  Individual assessment—qualitative analysis
				(iii)  The agreement involves an economic activity
				(iv)  The agreement has the ability to affect trade
				(v)  The agreement ‘may have an influence’ on trade between Member States
					Decrease, increase, or diversion of trade
				(p. 156) Direct or indirect influence on trade
				(vi)  The agreement ‘appreciably’ affects trade between Member States
			(c)  Shortcuts for the appraisal of the effect on trade
				(i)  Transnational agreements
				(ii)  National, regional, and local agreements
II.  Article 101(2) TFEU—The Rule of Nullity
	A.  The Principle
	B.  The Practice
(p. 162) III.  Article 101(3) TFEU—The Exception Rule
	A.  Overview of the Exception Rule
	B.  The Application of the Four Conditions of Article 101(3) TFEU
		(1)  The welfare improvement condition
			(a)  Economic improvements
				(i)  Type of possible efficiency gains
				(ii)  Conditions for the admissibility of efficiency gains
			(b)  Non-economic improvements
		(p. 169) (2)  The passing-on condition
		(3)  The indispensability condition
		(4)  The non-elimination of competition condition
	Footnotes:
4 Abuse of Dominance
	Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar, Nicolas Petit
	From: EU Competition Law and Economics
	Damien Geradin, Dr Anne Layne-Farrar, Nicolas Petit
(p. 175) 4  Abuse of Dominance
I.  Introduction
II.  Determining Dominance
	A.  Market Definition
		(p. 178) (1)  The components of a relevant market
			(a)  The product market
				(i)  Demand-side substitution
				(ii)  Supply-side substitution
				(iii)  Potential competition
			(b)  The geographic market
		(2)  Methods for defining a relevant market
	B.  Dominance
		(1)  Introduction
		(2)  The definition of dominance stemming from case law
		(3)  The definition and assessment of ‘substantial market power’
		(4)  Factors to be taken into account to determine the presence of dominance
			(a)  Market position of the undertaking under investigation and its competitors
			(p. 190) (b)  Expansion or entry
			(c)  Countervailing buyer power
		(5)  Collective dominance
			(p. 194) (a)  Collective dominance and oligopolistic anticompetitive coordination
				(i)  The Commission’s initial attempts to craft a doctrine of oligopolistic dominance
				(ii)  The Courts’ acceptance of the doctrine of collective dominance under Article 102 TFEU
				(iii)  Clarifications in the field of merger control
				(p. 198) (iv)  Exportability of the EU Merger Regulation case law to Article 102 TFEU?
				(v)  The enduring low-enforcement practice of the Commission
				(vi)  The uncertain contours of the notion of abuse of a collective dominant position
			(b)  Other settings in which collective dominant positions can be identified
				(i)  Collective dominance as the cumulative effect of individual dominant positions on distinct markets
			(p. 202) (c)  Collective dominance short of the single economic entity doctrine
			(d)  Collective dominance and legislative/regulatory measures
			(e)  The test for collective dominance in oligopolistic settings
				(i)  The existence of a collective entity
				(ii)  Assessment of dominance
III.  The Notion of Abuse
	A.  Exclusionary Abuses
		(1)  The concept of exclusionary abuse
			(p. 207) (a)  The case law of the EU Courts and the decisional practice of the Commission
			(p. 208) (b)  From a form-based approach to effects-based approach to exclusionary abuses
				(i)  The form-based approach pursued by the EU Courts and the Commission
				(ii)  The modernization of Article 102 and the 2005 Discussion Paper
				(iii)  The 2008 Guidance Paper
		(2)  The various forms of exclusionary abuses
			(a)  Exclusive dealing
				(i)  Exclusive purchasing
			(p. 214) (b)  Conditional rebates
				(i)  The concept of conditional rebates
			(p. 215) (ii)  Effects of conditional rebates
				(iii)  Decisional practice of the Commission and case law of the EU Courts preceding the adoption of the Guidance Paper
				(iv)  The Guidance Paper
				(v)  Case law of the EU Courts and decisional practice of the Commission after adoption of the Guidance Paper
			(p. 231) (c)  Tying
				(i)  The concept of tying
				(ii)  Effects of tying
				(iii)  Decisional practice of the Commission and case law of the EU Courts
				(iv)  The Guidance Paper
			(d)  Predation
				(i)  The concept of predation
				(ii)  Effects of predation
				(iii)  Decisional practice of the Commission and case law of the EU Courts
			(e)  Refusal to supply and margin squeeze
				(i)  The concepts of refusal to supply and margin squeeze
				(ii)  Effects of refusal to supply and margin squeeze
				(iii)  Decisional practice of the Commission and case law of the EU Courts
				(iv)  The Guidance Paper
	B.  Exploitative Abuses
		(1)  Excessive prices
			(a)  Introduction
			(b)  Standards set by the European Courts’ case law and Member State courts for assessing excessive price
			(c)  Practical difficulties of controlling excessive prices
				(i)  Finding an adequate cost measure and defining an appropriate profit margin
				(ii)  Identifying the appropriate benchmarks
				(iii)  Designing an adequate remedy
			(d)  Decisional practice of DG Competition
			(e)  Limits to the application of Article 102(a) TFEU
				(f)  Comparison with US law
			(g)  Summary on excessive pricing
		(2)  Unfair contractual terms and conditions
			(a)  Abuse of buyer power
			(b)  Abuse through the imposition of ‘other unfair trading conditions’
	(p. 293) C.  Price Discrimination
		(1)  Introduction
		(p. 294) (2)  Definition, conditions, and different forms of price discrimination
			(a)  Definition of and conditions for price discrimination
			(b)  Different forms of price discrimination
			(c)  Welfare effects of price discrimination
		(3)  The scope of Article 102(c) TFEU
		(4)  Analytical framework for examining price discrimination measures
			(a)  Price discrimination in primary line injury settings
				(i)  Main forms of primary line price discrimination measures examined under Article 102(c)
				(ii)  Why have the Commission and the EU Courts mistakenly relied on Article 102(c) to address primary line cases?
			(b)  Price discrimination in secondary line injury settings
				(p. 308) (i)  Main forms of secondary line price discrimination measures examined under Article 102(c)
				(ii)  Secondary line injury price discrimination by non-vertically integrated operators
				(iii)  Secondary line injury price discrimination by vertically integrated operators
				(iv)  The choice of Article 102(c) as the legal basis for the secondary line injury cases
			(c)  Geographic price discrimination and measures facilitating this form of discrimination
				(i)  Case law of the EC Courts and Commission decisions on geographic price discrimination
				(ii)  Is Article 102(c) the appropriate legal basis for geographic price discrimination and facilitating measures?
		(5)  Conclusion
	Footnotes:
5 Enforcement, Institutions, and Procedure
	Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar, Nicolas Petit
	From: EU Competition Law and Economics
	Damien Geradin, Dr Anne Layne-Farrar, Nicolas Petit
(p. 321) 5  Enforcement, Institutions, and Procedure
I.  Introduction
(p. 323) II.  The Institutional Framework
	A.  The Commission
		(1)  Missions
		(2)  Organization
	B.  The National Competition Authorities
		(1)  The powers and duties of NCAs under EU competition law
			(a)  Main institutional models
	(p. 329) C.  Interplay of the Commission and NCAs within the ECN
		(1)  Vertical issues
			(a)  Priority competence of the Commission
			(p. 330) (b)  Duty of loyal cooperation
			(c)  Cooperation mechanisms
			(p. 331) (d)  Monitoring instruments
		(2)  Horizontal issues
		(p. 335) (3)  The European Competition Network
	D.  The National Courts
		(1)  The role of national courts in the EU competition system
		(2)  Vertical and horizontal coordination with national courts
			(a)  Vertical relationships between the Commission and national courts
				(i)  Duty to avoid passing judgments contrary to Commission decisions
				(ii)  Duty on the Member States to forward written judgments to the Commission
				(iii)  The amicus curiae procedure
				(iv)  Duty on the Commission to transmit information to national courts
			(b)  Horizontal relationships amongst national courts
III.  The Procedural Framework
	A.  The Detection of Infringements
		(1)  Market monitoring
		(2)  Information received through other institutional channels
		(3)  Information received from complainants
		(4)  Information received from consumers
		(p. 346) (5)  Information received through specific legal instruments
			(a)  Sector inquiries
			(b)  Leniency
	B.  The Investigation of Alleged Infringements
		(1)  Requests for information
		(2)  Inspections
			(p. 351) (a)  Inspections of firms’ premises
			(b)  Inspection of other premises
		(3)  Power to take statements
	C.  The Evaluation of Infringements
		(1)  Preliminary remarks
		(2)  The Statement of Objections
		(3)  Access to file
		(4)  Right to be heard
		(5)  Final stages
	D.  The Decision
		(p. 358) (1)  Decisions finding and terminating an infringement
		(p. 360) (2)  Decisions making commitments binding
		(3)  Decisions withdrawing the benefit of a block exemption Regulation
		(4)  Decisions ordering interim measures
		(5)  Settlement decisions
	E.  Final Remarks
IV.  The Judicial Framework
	A.  Acts Subject to Annulment Proceedings
		(1)  The theory
		(2)  The practice
	B.  Persons that can Start Annulment Proceedings
		(1)  Decisions addressed to other individuals
		(2)  Acts of a general nature
	C.  Modalities of Annulment Proceedings
		(1)  Formal conditions
		(2)  Substantive conditions
			(a)  Grounds of external legality
			(p. 378) (b)  Grounds of internal legality
	D.  Parallel and Subsequent Actions to Annulment Proceedings
		(1)  Actions seeking to obtain a revision of the fine
		(2)  Actions seeking compensation from the EU institutions
	E.  Scope and Intensity of Judicial Review in Annulment Proceedings
		(p. 381) (1)  The scope of judicial review—Restricted vs Unlimited jurisdiction
			Table 5.1  Main differences between annulment proceedings (restricted review) and appeal (full jurisdiction)
		(p. 382) (2)  The intensity of judicial review—Standard (full) vs Marginal (restrained) review
			(a)  The theory
			(b)  The practice
				(p. 384) (i)  Review of the law
				(ii)  Review of the facts
				(p. 386) (iii)  Review of ‘complex economic matters’
	Footnotes:
6 Cartels And Other Horizontal Hardcore Restrictions
	Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar, Nicolas Petit
	From: EU Competition Law and Economics
	Damien Geradin, Dr Anne Layne-Farrar, Nicolas Petit
(p. 391) 6  Cartels And Other Horizontal Hardcore Restrictions
I.  The EU Anti-Cartel Policy
(p. 396) II.  Substantive Cartel Law
	A.  Substantive Scope of Application—What Agreements Constitute Hardcore Cartels?
		(1)  Concept of a hardcore cartel
		(p. 398) (2)  Types of hardcore cartels
			(a)  Cartels related to price fixing or other trading conditions
				(i)  Price-fixing cartels
				(ii)  Cartels over trading conditions
			(b)  Cartels limiting production, markets, technical development, or investments
				(i)  Limitation or control of production
				(ii)  Limitation or control of ‘markets’
				(iii)  Limitation or control of technical development
				(iv)  Limitation or control of investment—the principle
				(v)  Limitation or control of investment—the specific case of crisis cartels
			(c)  Agreements entailing the sharing of markets or of sources of supply
			(d)  Agreements applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions and entailing joint boycott
				(i)  Agreement applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions
				(ii)  Collective boycott strategies
	B.  Personal Scope of Application—What Undertakings are Liable for Hardcore Cartels?
		(1)  The ‘parental liability’ doctrine
		(2)  Conduct of employees
		(3)  Undertakings succeeding other undertakings as purchasing entities
		(4)  Third parties not present in the market but active within the cartel
	C.  Temporal Scope of Application—Are There Time Limits for Pursuing a Hardcore Cartel?
III.  Institutional Aspects of Cartel Law
	A.  Deterring Hardcore Cartels
		(1)  Punishing hardcore cartels
			(a)  Administrative fines
				(i)  Method of calculation
				(p. 414) (ii)  Determining the basic amount
				(iii)  Adjustment of amount of fine
			(p. 416) (b)  Alternative penalties?
		(2)  Detecting hardcore cartels
			(a)  Ex officio detection by the Commission
			(b)  Indirect detection by the firms themselves
				(i)  The EU leniency programme
	(p. 421) B.  Litigation Relating to Cartels and Hardcore Restrictions
	Footnotes:
7 Horizontal Cooperation Agreements
	Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar, Nicolas Petit
	From: EU Competition Law and Economics
	Damien Geradin, Dr Anne Layne-Farrar, Nicolas Petit
(p. 423) 7  Horizontal Cooperation Agreements
I.  Introduction
II.  The Law Applicable to Horizontal Cooperation Agreements
	A.  Origin of Applicable Texts
	B.  Scope of Application of the EU Framework
III.  Principles of Competition Analysis Applicable to Horizontal Cooperation Agreements
	A.  Basic Principles of Competition Analysis of Horizontal Cooperation Agreements
		(p. 428) (1)  Is the agreement in question restrictive of competition within the meaning of Article 101(1)?
		(2)  Can a restrictive agreement benefit from exemption in Article 101(3)?
	(p. 429) B.  Specific Principles for Competition Analysis (By Type of Cooperation)
		(1)  Exchanges of information
			(a)  Definition and scope
			(b)  Assessment under Article 101(1) TFEU
				(i)  Main competition concerns
				(ii)  Restriction of competition by object
				(iii)  Restrictive effects on competition
				(iv)  Restrictive effects on competition–market characteristics
				(p. 433) (v)  Restrictive effects on competition—characteristics of the information exchanged
			(c)  Assessment under Article 101(3) TFEU
		(3)  Research and development agreements
			(a)  Introduction
			(p. 437) (b)  Assessment under Article 101(1)
				(i)  Main competition concerns
				(ii)  Relevant markets
				(iii)  Restrictions of competition by object
				(iv)  Restrictive effects on competition
			(c)  Assessment under Article 101(3)
		(p. 440) (4)  Production and specialization agreements
			(a)  Introduction
			(b)  Assessment under Article 101(1)
				(i)  Main competition concerns
				(ii)  Relevant markets
				(iii)  Restrictions of competition by object
				(iv)  Restrictive effects on competition
				(v)  Assessment under Article 101(3)
		(5)  Purchasing agreements
			(a)  Introduction
			(b)  Assessment under Article 101(1)
				(i)  Relevant markets
				(ii)  Main competition concerns
				(iii)  Restrictions of competition by object
				(iv)  Restrictive effects on competition
				(v)  Analysis under Article 101(3)
		(6)  Commercialization agreements
			(a)  Introduction
			(b)  Assessment under Article 101(1)
				(i)  Relevant markets
				(ii)  Main competition concerns
				(iii)  Restrictions of competition by object
			(p. 451) (iv)  Restrictive effects on competition
				(vi)  Assessment under Article 101(3)
		(7)  Standardization agreements
			(a)  Introduction
			(b)  Analysis under Article 101(1)
				(i)  Relevant markets
				(ii)  Main competition concerns
				(iii)  Restrictions by object
			(p. 457) (iv)  Restrictive effects—agreements normally not restrictive of competition
				(v)  Restrictive effects—additional guidance on FRAND requirements
				(vi)  Restrictive effects—effects-based assessment for standardization agreements
			(c)  Assessment under Article 101(3)
	C.  Conclusions
	Footnotes:
8 The Law And Economics Of Vertical Restraints
	Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar, Nicolas Petit
	From: EU Competition Law and Economics
	Damien Geradin, Dr Anne Layne-Farrar, Nicolas Petit
(p. 463) 8  The Law And Economics Of Vertical Restraints
I.  Introduction
II.  Types of Vertical Restraint
	A.  The Issue
	B.  The Exclusive Contractual Relationship Group
		(1)  Notion of exclusive contractual relationships
		(2)  Theories of competitive harm
		(3)  Objective justifications and pro-competitive effects
	C.  The Resale Price Maintenance Group
		(1)  Notion of resale price maintenance
		(2)  Theories of competitive harm
		(3)  Objective justifications and pro-competitive effects
	(p. 470) D.  The Limited Distribution Group
		(1)  Notion of limited distribution
		(2)  Theories of competitive harm
		(3)  Objective justifications and pro-competitive effects
	E.  The Market-Sharing Group
		(1)  Notion of market sharing
		(2)  Theories of competitive harm
		(3)  Objective justifications and pro-competitive effects
	F.  The Buyer Power Group
		(1)  Notion of buyer power
		(2)  Theories of competitive harm
		(p. 475) (3)  Objective justifications and pro-competitive effects
III.  A Step-by-Step Method for the Self-Assessment of Vertical Restrictions
	A.  Screening of Vertical Restraints
		(1)  The presumption of incompatibility
			(a)  Preliminary remarks
			(b)  Resale price maintenance
			(c)  Territorial resale prohibitions
				(i)  Principle
				(ii)  Exceptions
			(d)  Restrictions on active and passive sales in selective distribution networks
			(e)  Restrictions of cross-deliveries in selective distribution networks
			(f)  Restrictions on component suppliers to sell to end-users, repairers, and independent service providers
		(p. 481) (2)  The presumptions of compatibility
			(a)  Agreements of minor importance
				(i)  The appreciability rule
				(ii)  The practice
			(b)  Agreements between small and medium-sized enterprises
			(c)  Block exemption mechanism
				(p. 483) (i)  The double market-share thresholds
				(p. 486) (ii)  Conditions
				(iii)  Withdrawal of the block exemption
	B.  Full-Blown Competition Analysis of Vertical Restraints
		(1)  Preliminary remarks
		(p. 488) (2)  Method
			(a)  Selection of the theories of harm
			(b)  Assessment of the theories of harm
			(p. 490) (c)  Efficiencies and objective justifications
(p. 491) IV.  Online Distribution
	A.  The Context
	B.  The New Framework for Online Distribution
		(1)  Selective distribution and online commerce
		(2)  Active and passive sales
			(a)  Internet sales are passive
			(b)  In exceptional circumstances, internet sales may be considered active
(p. 495) V.  Conclusions
	Footnotes:
9 Merger Control
	Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar, Nicolas Petit
	From: EU Competition Law and Economics
	Damien Geradin, Dr Anne Layne-Farrar, Nicolas Petit
(p. 497) 9  Merger Control
I.  Introduction
	A.  History of the Development of an EU Merger Control Regime
	(p. 499) B.  The Concept of Concentration in EU Competition Law
		(1)  Definition
		(2)  Different types of concentrations
II.  Regulation 139/2004
	(p. 501) A.  Should the Concentration be Notified?
		(1)  The concept of ‘concentration’
		(2)  The ‘Community dimension’
			(p. 502) (a)  Identification of the undertakings concerned
			(b)  Calculation of the turnover to determine whether the thresholds are reached
		(3)  Implications resulting from the fact that a concentration has a ‘Community dimension’
			(a)  Compulsory ex ante notification and suspension rule
			(b)  Lack of jurisdiction of the Member States
	(p. 506) B.  Is the Concentration Compatible with the Common Market?
		(1)  The double test included in Regulation 139/2004
		(p. 507) (2)  Assessment of horizontal mergers
			(a)  The screening of horizontal mergers—market shares and HHI
			(b)  The in-depth analysis
				(i)  Non-coordinated effects
				(ii)  Coordinated effects
		(3)  The analysis of non-horizontal mergers
			(a)  Filtering non-horizontal mergers
			(b)  The admissibility of vertical mergers
			(c)  The admissibility of conglomerate mergers
		(4)  The assessment of the parties’ justifications
			(a)  The ‘failing firm’ doctrine
			(b)  The ‘efficiency defence’?
				(i)  Nature of the issue
				(ii)  Efficiency gains in economic theory
				(iii)  Principles applicable to the consideration of efficiency gains
		(5)  The analysis of the compatibility of ancillary restraints
		(6)  The compatibility analysis of full-function joint ventures
			(a)  What is a joint venture?
			(b)  The concept of ‘full function’ and the applicability of the EMCR
				(i)  The content of full function
				(ii)  The material condition
				(iii)  The time condition—lasting quality/stability
				(iv)  Substantial rules applicable to full-function joint ventures
			(c)  Comparative assessment of the legal regimes of Article 101 TFEU and the EMCR
III.  The Institutional and Procedural Implementation of Merger Control
	A.  The Informal Pre-Notification Procedure
	(p. 529) B.  The Formal Notification Procedure
		(1)  Form CO
		(2)  Calendar of the procedure
			(a)  General remarks
			(p. 530) (b)  Phase I
			(c)  Phase II
			(d)  Remedies
				(i)  Nature of the issue
				(ii)  ‘Structural’ and ‘behavioural’ remedies
	C.  Merger Litigation
		(p. 535) (1)  Annulment proceedings
			(a)  Marginal review
			(b)  Effective judicial review
	D.  Conclusions—Myths and Reality of Merger Control
		(1)  The myth(s)
		(2)  The reality
	Footnotes:
(p. 541) Index Of Names
Index Of Names
	From: EU Competition Law and Economics
	Damien Geradin, Dr Anne Layne-Farrar, Nicolas Petit
(p. 543) General Index
General Index
	From: EU Competition Law and Economics
	Damien Geradin, Dr Anne Layne-Farrar, Nicolas Petit