Ernest Sosa Encountering Chinese Philosophy: A Cross-Cultural Approach to Virtue Epistemology

Cover
Halftitle page
Series page
Title page
Copyright page
Contents
Notes on Contributors
1 Ernest Sosa Encounters Chinese Philosophy An Introduction
	1 Introduction
	2 Sosa’s virtue epistemology at a glance
	3 Sosa’s first encounter with Chinese philosophy
	4 The divide between responsibilism and reliabilismin virtue epistemology
	5 Other issues of Sosa’s virtue epistemology
	6 Conclusion
2 Xunzi, Zhuangzi, and Virtue Epistemology
	1 Introduction
	2 Perspective
	3 Xunzi
	4 Zhuangzi
	5 Comparisons with Sosa
	6 Conclusion
3 Epistemic Competence and Agency in Sosa and Xúnzı
	1 Introduction
	2 Sosa on epistemic competence and agency
	3 Xúnzı
	4 Reflections for further inquiry
4 In Favor of a Comprehensive Virtue Epistemology?
	1 Introduction
	2 Sosa’s emphasis on intellectual virtues
	3 Xunzi’s emphasis on character virtues
	4 Intellectual virtues (faculties) versus character virtues (character traits)?
	5 In favor of a comprehensive virtue epistemology? Focusing on the question of how to communicate and justify knowledge
	6 In favor of both: specific and comprehensive virtue theories of knowledge?
	Appendix
5 Detachment A Trait-Reliabilist Virtue in Linji’s Chan Buddhism
	1 Introduction
	2 Debate about two kinds of epistemic virtues
	3 Detachment as a reliabilist virtue in Buddhist epistemology
	4 Detachment as a cultivated character trait in the Linjilu
	5 Conclusion: detachment as a trait-reliabilist virtue
6 Apt Performance as Unity of Knowledgeand Action A Comparative Study on Ernest Sosa’s Virtue Epistemology and Wang Yangming’s Meta-ethics
	1 Introduction
	2 The AAA structure and Wang’s meta-ethics
	3 The unity of knowledge and action
	4 On intellectual virtues
	5 Closing remarks
7 The Hearer’s Conditions for Accepting Testimony
	1 Sosa’s account of testimony
	2 Xunzi’s remarks on testimony
	3 Accepting testimony
	4 Believing p without accepting testimony to p
	5 Two senses of uptake
	6 Perception and instrument
8 Sosa’s Reflective Knowledge and Xunzi’s Knowledge of the Dao
	1 Sosa on animal and reflective knowledge
	2 Xunzi’s unification of nature and heaven via the dao
	3 Xunzi’s nomic-transcendentalism, knowledge of change and knowledge of the dao
	4 The result of a comparison: a new generalized definition of reflective knowledge
9 Epistemic Virtues, the Gettier Problem, and the Rectification of Names
	1 Introduction
	2 Sosa’s theory reformulated on a high level
	3 Gettier’s cases revisited in the light of “the rectification of names”
	4 “The rectification of names” in the light of six principles of composing Chinese characters
	5 Conclusion
10 Sosa’s Reliabilist Reading of Davidson and Zhuangzi’s Way Out of the Ontological Predicament
	1 Introduction
	2 Sosa’s reliabilist reading of Davidson and the ontological predicament
	3 Sosa’s middle way between foundationalism and coherentism
	4 Is the skepticism of “brains in a vat” self-refuting?
	5 How to ask the skepticism of “brains in a vat” to get lost?
	6 Zhuangzi’s proposal
	7 Concluding remarks
11 Resurrecting Daoist Virtuosity Epistemology
	1 Introduction
	2 The nature of knowledge
	3 The contrasts
	4 Conclusion: a truce
12 A Third Platonic Problem for Sosa? Or How Wang Yangming Can Know Better than Full Well?
	1 Introduction
	2 A third Platonic problem for Sosa
	3 Normative knowledge
	4 Wang Yangming: how to know better than Full Well
	5 Conclusion
13 Responses
	1 Introduction
	2 Part I
Index