Ernest Nagel: Philosophy of Science and the Fight for Clarity

Contents
Contributors
1 Introduction: Ernest Nagel and the Making of Philosophy of Science a Profession
	1.1 Ernest Nagel: Life and Work of an Immigrant
	1.2 The Making of Analytic and Scientific Philosophy
	1.3 The Essays in This Volume
	References
Part I Nagel in the History of Philosophy
2 Ernest Nagel: A Biography
	2.1 Ernest Nagel: A Biography
	References
3 Nagel’s Philosophical Development
	3.1 Introduction
	3.2 Nagel’s Naturalism
	3.3 The Logic of Inquiry
	3.4 Philosophical Influences (1): John Dewey
	3.5 Philosophical Influences (2): Morris R. Cohen
	3.6 Nagel’s First Encounters with Logical Positivism
	3.7 Prague
	3.8 Cambridge
	3.9 Impressions and Appraisals
	3.10 Naturalism Reconsidered
	References
4 The Emergence of Scientific Explanation as a Problem for Philosophy of Science: Aristotle, Nagel, and Hempel
	4.1 Introduction
	4.2 Ernest Nagel, Aristotle, and New York’s Philosophy
	4.3 The Logic of Explanation: Hempel’s New Puzzle
	4.4 The Emergence of the Debate on Scientific Explanation
	4.5 Conclusion
	References
5 From Cautious Enthusiasm to Profound Disenchantment: Ernest Nagel and Carnapian Logical Empiricism
	5.1 Introduction
	5.2 The Encounter of Logical Empiricism and American Pragmatism: A Potpourri of Narratives
	5.3 Cautious Enthusiasm
	5.4 Alienation and Disenchantment
	5.5 A Role for the History of Science in the Philosophy of Science
	5.6 Philosophy of Science—Who is the Audience?
	5.7 Concluding Remarks
	References
Part II The Method(s) of the Sciences
6 Nagel on Idealization in Science
	6.1 Introduction
	6.2 Nagel on Types of Idealization and Their Place in His Reconstruction of Scientific Theories
		6.2.1 Abstraction
		6.2.2 Falsehood
		6.2.3 Inapplicability
		6.2.4 Analogy
	6.3 Nagel’s Explication of a Theory
	6.4 Idealization in Theoretical Laws
	6.5 Idealization in Empirical Laws
	6.6 Familiarity, Analogy, and the Use of Scientific Models
		6.6.1 Theory Construction
		6.6.2 Theory Development and Experimental Laws
		6.6.3 Acceptance
	6.7 Idealization Within the Bigger Picture
	6.8 ‘As if’ Constructions and Fictionalism
	6.9 Conclusion
	References
7 Putting the Cart Before the Horse: Ernest Nagel and the Uncertainty Principle
	7.1 Introduction
	7.2 Nagel’s Criticism of Heisenberg
	7.3 Two Uncertainty Principles
	7.4 Universally Valid Uncertainty Relation
	7.5 Nagel’s Criticism Revisited
	7.6 Conclusion
	Appendices
	References
8 Ernest Nagel on Determinism as a Guiding Principle and Its Compatibility with Quantum Mechanics
	8.1 Introduction
	8.2 The Supposed Violation of Determinism in Quantum Mechanics
	8.3 Determinism as a Guiding Principle
	8.4 Determinism as Relative to State Descriptions
	8.5 Determinism in Quantum Mechanics
	8.6 Determinism in the Social Sciences
	8.7 Conclusion
	References
Part III Issues in General Philosophy of Science
9 On Nagel’s Truth-Frequency Theory of Probability
	9.1 The Meaning of Probability
	9.2 Nagel’s Criticism of Other Interpretations of Probability
	9.3 The Truth-Frequency Interpretation
	9.4 Concluding Remarks
	References
10 On Ernest Nagel on Teleology in Biology
	10.1 Introduction
	10.2 An Overview of Questions Concerning Teleology in Biology
	10.3 Nagel’s View of Teleology in Biology: Articulation and Defense
		10.3.1 Questions of Legitimacy and Uniqueness
		10.3.2 Eliminativism
		10.3.3 Teleological Terms as Anthropomorphic Vestiges
	10.4 A Clarification of the Biological Function Debate
		10.4.1 The Descriptive Dimension
		10.4.2 The Prescriptive Dimension
		10.4.3 Some Concrete Examples
	10.5 On the Persistence of Teleology in Biology: From Nagel to Kant
	10.6 Conclusion
	References
Part IV The Social Sciences and the Social Role of Philosophy
11 Nagel on the Methodology of the Social Sciences
	11.1 Introduction
	11.2 Problems of a Clear-Cut Demarcation
	11.3 The ‘Immaturity’ of the Social Sciences
	11.4 Two Case Studies
		11.4.1 The Case of Methodological Individualism
		11.4.2 The Case of the Value-Oriented Bias of Social Inquiry
	11.5 Concluding Remarks
	References
12 Philosophy of Science as First Philosophy: The Liberal Polemics of Ernest Nagel
	12.1 Introduction
	12.2 Nagel and the Retreat to the Icy Slopes
	12.3 The Tasks of the Philosopher of Science
	12.4 Contextual Naturalism and Pluralism
	12.5 Objections and Conclusion
	References
Part V Previously Unpublished Papers
13 Interview with Ernest Nagel by Remmel Nunn
	13.1 Editorial Introduction
	13.2 The Interview
	References
14 Ernest Nagel’s “The Philosophy of Science” Lecture at the Delaware Seminar
	14.1 Editorial Introduction
	14.2 Ernest Nagel: The Philosophy of Science
	14.3 Discussion
	References