Environmental Dilemmas and Policy Design

Cover......Page 1
Half-title......Page 3
Series-title......Page 5
Title......Page 7
Copyright......Page 8
Contents......Page 9
Figures......Page 12
Tables......Page 13
Preface......Page 15
Part I Background......Page 17
1.1 Can something be done?......Page 19
1.2 Environmental dilemmas and the logic of collective action......Page 21
1.3 Surveying environmental dilemmas from the actor’s perspective: rational choice......Page 26
1.4 How motives speak to preferences......Page 30
1.5 Non-equivalent dilemmas and reported behaviour......Page 33
1.6 Policies of self-regulation in the Netherlands......Page 34
1.7 Moral commitment in environmental dilemmas: conditional or unconditional?......Page 36
1.8 Determinants of cooperation in environmental dilemmas and policy design......Page 40
2.1 Introduction......Page 44
2.2 Dutch environmental policy and the idea of self-regulation......Page 45
2.3 The social instruments......Page 51
2.4 An environmental ethos and the social dilemma......Page 56
2.5 Self-regulation: compliance-oriented or virtue-based?......Page 58
3.1 The subjectivity of the actor in rational choice theory......Page 63
3.2 Problems of collective action......Page 65
3.3 Social dilemmas......Page 71
3.4 The actor’s perspective......Page 75
Part II The survey......Page 81
4.1 Three potential social dilemmas......Page 83
4.2 Measuring preference orderings......Page 87
4.3 Three different environmental problems......Page 94
4.4 Avoiding response effects......Page 98
5.1 Conditions of rational choice......Page 100
5.2 The dominance rule of rational choice......Page 103
5.3 Choice of strategy......Page 107
5.4 The robustness of the dominance rule......Page 111
5.5 Conclusion......Page 114
6.1 A model of reasoned choice......Page 117
6.2 The motives of Valuation and Willingness......Page 119
Holiday Destination......Page 120
6.3 The test of consistent preferences......Page 124
6.4 Consistent preferences in the three cases......Page 132
6.5 Does motive-preference consistency matter?......Page 134
6.6 Conclusion......Page 137
7.1 Hard and easy cases of the dilemma......Page 140
7.2 The model of the hardest case......Page 141
7.3 The scalability of the cases......Page 147
7.4 The non-equivalence of social dilemmas......Page 149
8.1 Determinants of behaviour......Page 152
8.2 The sociocultural model......Page 154
8.3 An alternative model......Page 158
8.4 From motives to behaviour......Page 162
Part III Conclusions: theory and policy......Page 165
9.1 Introduction to part III......Page 167
9.2 Acceptance and agreement......Page 169
Self-regulation by government......Page 171
Legal regulation......Page 172
9.4 Conclusion......Page 176
10.1 Introduction......Page 177
10.2 The two stages of the environmental ethos......Page 178
10.3 Knaves, pawns or knights?......Page 183
10.4 The ethical interpretation of motives and preferences......Page 185
10.5 The agreement response......Page 190
10.6 Acceptance and agreement: overview......Page 192
11.1 Ranking preference orderings......Page 194
11.2 The meta-ranking approach......Page 195
11.3 Enlightened self-interest and moral commitment......Page 199
11.4 Consistent preferences in the meta-ranking......Page 203
11.5 An environmental meta-ranking......Page 209
12.1 The puzzle of unconditional cooperation......Page 213
12.2 The reciprocity thesis......Page 214
12.3 Cost of cooperation and conditionalities in environmental dilemmas......Page 221
13.1 The context of environmental dilemmas......Page 226
13.2 Consistent ethical cooperation......Page 227
13.3 Background features of hard and easy cases......Page 229
13.4 Mapping problems and the salience of the environmental ethos......Page 232
13.5 Individual cost and collective gain......Page 235
13.6 Comparing motives in the polar cases......Page 241
13.7 The dimension of private significance......Page 243
13.8 Self-regulation policy: symbolic or real?......Page 244
13.9 A non-moralistic approach to environmental responsibility......Page 246
13.10 Self-regulation in proportion to facilitation......Page 249
References......Page 251
Index......Page 255