Emerging Powers in the International Economic Order: Cooperation, Competition and Transformation

Cover
Half-title page
Series page
Title page
Copyright page
Contents
List of
Tables
Preface
Table of Treaties and Conventions
Table of Cases
WTO Cases
List of
Abbreviations
1 Introduction
	I Making the System Work for the South: Embedded Neoliberalism
		A Developing Countries Use the WTO to Gain Access to Markets in the North and South
		B Developing Countries Use Trade Remedies and Other Flexibilities to Protect Domestic Industries
		C In Practice, the Dispute Process Enables Developing Countries to Temporarily Adopt Policies That Contravene the Rules
		D Developing Countries Have Successfully Blocked Extension of the Rules
	II Is the Truce About to Be Broken?
		A Trade Policy Changes in the Face of Resurgent Chinese State Capitalism
		B Investment Law Is Unsettled
		C Restricted by IEL, the Social Safety Net Fails to Offset Shocks
	III A New Equilibrium?
		A A New Political Economy of Development?
		B Alternative Global Governance Paradigms?
2 Cooperation Narratives and Theoretical Divergences
	I A Discourse of South–South Cooperation: Investment for Development, Respect for Sovereignty
	II Theoretical Debates on the Relationship between Development and Trade
		A Brazil: A Grand Debate over Trade in a Time of Economic and Political Crisis17
		B China: State Planning Wins against Liberalism Overtures
		C India: Developmentalism Priorities, Liberal Aspirations
		D Africa: Forging its Own Trade and Development Experimentation at Last?
	III Conclusion
3 Developing Countries’ Love–Hate Relationship with Neoliberalism
	I A Partial Rejection of the WTO Trade Ordering
		A Increased Institutional Participation
			1 Expansion of the Green Room Process, Emergence of Developing Country Coalitions
			2 Alignments and Competition in WTO Dispute Settlement
		B Using Flexibilities within Existing Rules
		C Strategic Breaches
		D Blocking the Adoption of New Rules
	II International Investment Protection: Adhesion at a Cost
		A Studies Question the Effect of BITs on FDI Flows
		B Investor–State Dispute Resolution: Too Much of a Good Thing?
		C More than Was Bargained for: Concerns about Regulatory Autonomy
			1 The Rise of the Regulatory State versus the Expansion of Indirect Expropriation Claims
			2 Conflicts between Social Policies, Human Rights and Investment Protection
		D Attempts to Use Flexibilities in the Investment Regime
			1 Non-preclusion Measures
			2 Leveraging Multiple Fora
	III Conclusion
4 Seeking a New Balance of Rights and Obligations in International Investment Law
	I Redefining Investment and Investor
		A Circumscribing the Scope of Investments Qualifying for Protection
			1 India
			2 China
			3 SADC Model BIT
			4 Brazil CIFAs
			5 South Africa
		B Defining Foreign Investors
			1 India
			2 SADC Model BIT
			3 Brazil CIFAs
			4 South Africa
		C Common Trends
	II Defining and Constraining Investor Protections
		A Standard of Treatment
			1 India
			2 China
			3 SADC
			4 Brazil
			5 South Africa
		B Expropriation and Compensation
			1 India
			2 China
			3 SADC
			4 Brazil
			5 South Africa
		C Extending or Creating Carve-Outs and Exceptions
			1 India
			2 China
			3 SADC
			4 Brazil CIFAs
			5 South Africa
		D Investor and Home State Obligations
			1 India
			2 SADC
			3 Brazil CIFAs
	III Preserving Domestic Judicial Power and Reforming Investor–State Arbitration
		A Limiting Access to Arbitration by Investors
			1 India Model BIT
			2 China
			3 Central America
		B Moving Away from the Pro-Investor Bias in Arbitration
			1 India
			2 SADC
			3 UNASUR
		C Diplomatic Recourses and Domestic Remedies179
			1 Domestic Remedies: the Examples of South Africa and Indonesia
			2 Return to Diplomatic Protection? The Case of Brazil
			3 Limitations of State-Centric Dispute Resolution
	IV Conclusion: Lessons from Emerging Economies
5 Emerging Economies, Developmental Strategies and Trade Standards: the Search for Alternative Space
	Introduction
	I Globalization and the Potential for Export-Led Growth
	II Developing Country Strategies
	III CPTPP-Type Provisions in Contrast to State Developmentalism
		A Regime-Altering Provisions
			1 Industrial Policy Restrictions
			2 SOEs
			3 Competition
		B Problem-Creating Rules
			1 Intellectual Property
			2 Digital Economy
		C Conclusion: What Cost for State Developmentalism?
	IV Forum Shifting: Emerging Powers’ Drive to Create Regional Economic Integration Spaces
		A Toward a China-Led Asian Integration? ASEAN, RCEP, BRI
		B Prospects for Regional Integration in Latin America
			1 The Pacific Alliance
			2 Mercosur
		C (Re)-Building an African Integration?
	V Conclusion
6 Emerging Economies and the Future of the Global Trade and Investment Regime
	I Emerging Powers Pushing the Boundaries of IEL
	II The Crisis of the World Order and the Fate of Embedded Liberalism
		A The End of U.S. Hegemony
		B Autarky as an Alternative to Hegemonic International Economic Governance
		C Anarchy as an Alternative to Hegemonic International Economic Governance
	III Pluralism as the New Normal
		A “Regional” Pluralism
			1 Normative Nature
			2 Institutional Features
		B Topical Pluralism
		C Economic Interdependence in a Plural World Order
	IV Emerging Economies, Pluralism and the Future of International Economic Law
		A Abandon the Idea of Separate International and Domestic Spheres for Regulation
		B Eliminate the Presumption That Trade Trumps Non-Trade Concerns
		C Looking Ahead
Bibliography
Index