Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy

Half-title......Page 2
Title......Page 4
Copyright......Page 5
Dedication......Page 6
Contents......Page 8
Preface......Page 12
1 Paths of Political Development......Page 18
1. Britain......Page 19
2. Argentina......Page 22
3. Singapore......Page 25
4. South Africa......Page 27
5. The Agenda......Page 31
2 Our Argument......Page 32
1. Democracy versus Nondemocracy......Page 33
2. Building Blocks of Our Approach......Page 36
3. Toward Our Basic Story......Page 39
4. Our Theory of Democratization......Page 40
5. Democratic Consolidation......Page 47
6.2.1 Democratization......Page 48
6.3.1 Democratization......Page 49
6.4.1 Democratization......Page 50
6.4.2 Consolidation......Page 51
6.5.1 Democratization......Page 52
6.5.2 Consolidation......Page 54
6.6.1 Democratization......Page 55
6.7.1 Democratization......Page 57
7. Political Identities and the Nature of Conflict......Page 59
8. Democracy in a Picture......Page 60
9. Overview of the Book......Page 63
1. Measuring Democracy......Page 65
2. Patterns of Democracy......Page 68
3. Democracy, Inequality, and Redistribution......Page 75
5. Social Unrest and Democratization......Page 82
5.1 Democratizations in Nineteenth-Century Europe......Page 84
5.2 Why in the Nineteenth Century?......Page 85
5.3 The Latin American Experience......Page 88
6. The Literature......Page 92
7. Our Contribution......Page 97
1. Introduction......Page 106
2. Aggregating Individual Preferences......Page 108
3.1 Single-Peaked Preferences......Page 109
3.2 The Median Voter Theorem......Page 111
3.3 Downsian Party Competition and Policy Convergence......Page 112
4.1 TheMedian VoterModel of Redistributive Politics......Page 116
4.2 A Two-Group Model of Redistributive Politics......Page 121
4.3 Targeted Transfers......Page 124
4.4 Alternative Political Identities......Page 126
5. Democracy and Political Equality......Page 130
6. Conclusion......Page 134
1. Introduction......Page 135
2.2 The Revolution Constraint......Page 137
2.3 Collective-Action Problems in Revolution......Page 140
2.4 Evidence on the Collective-Action Problem......Page 143
3. Modeling Preferences and Constraints in Nondemocracies......Page 145
4.1 Basic Issues......Page 150
4.2 The Diffculty of Committing Not to Use Political Power......Page 153
4.2.1 The Peasants Revolt of 1381......Page 154
4.2.2 The Comunero Rebellion in New Grenada (Colombia)......Page 155
4.2.3 The 1905 Russian Revolution......Page 157
4.3 Modeling Commitment Problems in Nondemocracy......Page 159
5. A Simple Game of Promises......Page 161
6. A Dynamic Model......Page 168
7. Incentive-Compatible Promises......Page 178
8. Conclusion......Page 188
2. The Role of Political Institutions......Page 190
3. Preferences over Political Institutions......Page 193
4.1 Institutions versus Policies......Page 194
4.3 Political Power......Page 196
5. A StaticModel of Democratization......Page 198
6. Democratization or Repression?......Page 203
6.1 Comparative Statics......Page 206
7. A Dynamic Model of Democratization......Page 210
8. Subgame Perfect Equilibria......Page 218
9. Alternative Political Identities......Page 220
11. Power of the Elites in Democracy......Page 224
12. Ideological Preferences over Regimes......Page 228
13. Democratization in a Picture......Page 231
14. Equilibrium Revolutions......Page 232
15. Conclusion......Page 235
1. Introduction......Page 238
2. Incentives for Coups......Page 241
3. A Static Model of Coups......Page 242
4. A Dynamic Model of the Creation and Consolidation of Democracy......Page 248
6. Targeted Transfers......Page 263
7. Power in Democracy and Coups......Page 264
8. Consolidation in a Picture......Page 266
9. Defensive Coups......Page 268
10. Conclusion......Page 270
1. Introduction......Page 272
2. The Three-Class Model......Page 276
3. Emergence of Partial Democracy......Page 279
4.1 Intra-Elite Conflict and Transition to Full Democracy......Page 284
4.2 The Threat of Revolution and Transition to Full Democracy......Page 287
5. Repression: The Middle Class as a Buffer......Page 290
6. Repression: Softliners versus Hardliners......Page 295
7. The Role of the Middle Class in Consolidating Democracy......Page 300
8. Conclusion......Page 302
1. Introduction......Page 304
2. Economic Structure and Income Distribution......Page 307
3. Political Conflict......Page 309
4. Capital, Land, and the Transition to Democracy......Page 310
5. Costs of Coup on Capital and Land......Page 313
6. Capital, Land, and the Burden of Democracy......Page 317
7. Conflict between Landowners and Industrialists......Page 324
8. Industrialists, Landowners, and Democracy in Practice......Page 329
9. Economic Institutions......Page 330
10. Human Capital......Page 333
11. Conjectures about Political Development......Page 334
12. Conclusion......Page 336
1. Introduction......Page 338
2. AModel of an Open Economy......Page 342
2.1 Factor Prices and Incomes in an Open Economy......Page 345
3. Political Conflict – Democratic Consolidation......Page 348
4. Political Conflict – Transition to Democracy......Page 351
4.1 Implications of Land Abundance......Page 354
5.1 Capital-in and Democracy......Page 355
5.2 Capital-out......Page 357
6. Increased Political Integration......Page 360
7. Alternative Assumptions about the Nature of International Trade......Page 361
8. Conclusion......Page 364
1.1 Britain......Page 366
1.2 Argentina......Page 369
1.3 Singapore......Page 370
1.4 South Africa......Page 371
2. Extensions and Areas for Future Research......Page 372
3. The Future of Democracy......Page 375
2.1 Probabilistic Voting and Existence of Equilibrium......Page 378
2.2 Probabilistic Voting and Swing Voters......Page 380
3. Lobbying......Page 384
4.1 Electoral Competition with Partisan Parties......Page 390
4.2 Electoral Competition with Partisan Parties and Probabilistic Voting......Page 393
4.3 Commitment and Convergence......Page 395
Bibliography......Page 398
Index......Page 418