Democracy, Governance, and Growth (Economics, Cognition, and Society)

Front Cover\r......Page 1
Title Page\r......Page 4
Copyright......Page 5
Foreword......Page 6
Contents......Page 10
Acknowledgments......Page 12
1. Introduction......Page 14
2. Modeling Institutions......Page 17
3. Measuring Institutions......Page 24
Measuring the Quality of Governance......Page 25
Measuring Trust......Page 29
Recent Developments in Measuring Governance and Institutions......Page 32
Notes......Page 34
References......Page 35
PART 1  Governance and Growth......Page 38
Notes......Page 39
1. Introduction......Page 42
2. The Boundaries of Wealth and Poverty......Page 44
3. The Access to Productive Knowledge......Page 47
4. Overpopulation and Diminishing Returns to Labor......Page 48
5. The Surprising Results of Large Migrations......Page 49
6. Surprising Evidence on Density of Population......Page 51
7. Diminishing Returns to Capital......Page 53
8. Distinguishing Private-Good and Public-Good Human Capital......Page 55
9. Migration as an Experiment......Page 57
10. The Overwhelming Importance of Institutions and Economic Policies......Page 60
11. The Old Growt h Theory, the New Growth Theory, and the Facts......Page 61
12. Picking Up the Big Bills......Page 62
Notes......Page 64
Refe ren ces......Page 67
3. Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Te sts Using Alternative Institutional Measures......Page 69
Ambiguities of Political Violence and the Gastil Indices......Page 70
The Institutional Data......Page 72
Comparing Institutional Va riables, Violence, and the Gastil Indices......Page 74
The Growth Equation......Page 76
Empirical Results-Growth......Page 78
Empirical Results-Investment......Page 82
Conclusion......Page 86
Notes......Page 87
References......Page 89
1. Introduction......Page 91
2. Why Does Government Enforcement of Contracts Matter?......Page 92
3. Testing the Theory: Contract-Intensive Money......Page 94
Iran......Page 96
Chile......Page 97
Grenada......Page 99
Indonesia......Page 101
5. CIM and Complementary Measures of the Quality of Governance......Page 103
6. Governance and the Size of Finance and Other Contract-Dependent Sectors......Page 105
7. CIM and the Level of Income and Wealth......Page 106
8. CIM, Investment, and Growth......Page 108
9. Is CIM a Measure of the Contracting Environment or Financial Sector Development?......Page 113
10. Alternative Explanations fo r the CIM Findings......Page 115
11. Conclusions......Page 116
Appendix: Variable Definitions and Sources......Page 118
Notes......Page 120
Refe ren ces......Page 121
PART 2\r Endogenizing Institutions......Page 124
Notes......Page 127
5. Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development......Page 128
The First Blessing of the Invisible Hand......Page 130
The Grasping Hand......Page 133
The Reach of Dictatorships and Democracies Compared......Page 135
\"Long Live the King\"......Page 137
Democracy, Individual Rights, and Economic Development......Page 139
The Improbable Transition......Page 141
The Different Sources of Progress in Autocracies and Democracies......Page 145
Notes......Page 146
Refe ren ces......Page 147
1. Introduction......Page 149
2. Empirical Tractability......Page 153
Defining Regime Ty pes......Page 159
Measurement of Regime Duration......Page 161
Property Rights Measures......Page 163
Control Variables......Page 165
4. Property and Contract Rights in Different Types of Regimes......Page 167
5. Property Rights and Regime Duration......Page 171
6. Endogeneity of Regime Duration......Page 179
7. Heterogeneity of Autocrats......Page 181
9. Conclusions......Page 184
Appendix: The Gurr-Banks Annual Scheme......Page 186
Notes......Page 188
References......Page 192
7. Does Inequality Harm Growth Only in Democracies? A Replication and Extension......Page 194
Notes......Page 201
References......Page 202
1. Introduction......Page 204
2. Microevidence: The World Values Survey......Page 206
3. Microevidence: An Enterprise Survey in Georgia......Page 211
Measurement and Data......Page 215
Results......Page 219
Robustness of Results......Page 222
5. Interpretation of Findings and Concluding Remarks......Page 228
Notes......Page 231
References......Page 234
PART 3 \rSocial Capital and Development......Page 238
1. Introduction......Page 240
2. The Evolution of Rule Obedience......Page 242
Model of Rule Obedience......Page 244
3. Attitudes and Behavior......Page 248
4. Organizational Loyalty and Effectiveness......Page 249
5. A Model of Organizational Effectiveness......Page 251
The Employee\'s Effort Decision......Page 253
The Firm\'s Decisions......Page 256
Implications of the Model and of Other Considerations......Page 259
6. Concluding Observations......Page 260
Notes......Page 261
References......Page 263
1. Introduction......Page 265
2. How Can Trust Affect Economic Performance?......Page 266
3. Measuring Trust and Civic Norms......Page 268
4. Trust, Civic Cooperation, and Economic Performance......Page 271
5. Associational Activity and Economic Performance......Page 282
6. Additional Links from Trust to Growth......Page 285
7. Determinants of Trust and Civic Cooperation......Page 287
8. Conclusion and Policy Implications......Page 292
Appendix......Page 293
Notes......Page 294
References......Page 298
PART 4 \rConclusion......Page 302
11. Is \"Wising Up\" Enough? Special Interests and Institutional Reform......Page 304
References......Page 309
Contributors......Page 312
Author Index......Page 314
Subject Index......Page 318
Back Cover\r......Page 322