Deliberative democracy and the institutions of judicial review

Part I. Introduction: 1. An old chestnut is actually two
 2. Pathologies of ad hoc triangulation
 3. Functions and institutions
 Part II. Majoritarian Democracy and Minoritarian Constitutionalism: 4. Judicial review as substantially legitimate protection of minority rights
 5. Judicial review as procedurally legitimate protection of democracy
 6. Moving beyond aggregative majoritarianism and minoritarian constitutionalism
 Part III. From Majoritarian to Deliberative Theories of Constitutional Democracy: 7. Deliberative democracy: four axes of analysis
 8. Constitutionalism: four central elements
 9. Constitutional democracy?
 Part IV. Deliberative Democracy and Substantive Constitutionalism: 10. Keepers of the substantive flame of American exceptionalism
 11. Guardians of the moral law in the forum of principle
 12. Are substantialist defenses of judicial review self-defeating?
 Part V. Disagreement and the Constitution of Democracy: 13. Democratic precommitment to judicial review: Freeman
 14. Deliberative majoritarianism and the paternalism of judicial review: Waldron
 15. Upshot: we need a theory of democratic constitutionalism
 Part VI. The Seducements of Juristic Discourse as Democratic Deliberation: 16. A division of labor between juristic deliberation and populist aggregation?
 17. Actual juristic discourse in the United States system of constitutional adjudication
 18. Legal principles and moral-political reasoning
 Part VII. Constitutionalism as the Procedural Structuring of Deliberative Democracy: 19. A provisional summary: criteria for an adequate theory of constitutional review
 20. Guardians of the conditions of procedural legitimacy: Habermas
 Part VIII. The Institutions of Constitutional Review I: Design Problems and Judicial Review: 21. The problems of designing institutions of constitutional review
 22. Independent constitutional courts in a concentrated review system
 Part IX.  The Institutions of Constitutional Review II: Horizontal Dispersal and Vertical Empowerment: 23. Self-review panels in the legislature and regulatory agencies
 24.  Mechanisms for inter-branch debate and decisional dispersal
 25. Easing formal amendability requirements
 26. Establishing civic constitutional fora.