Delegation and Agency in International Organizations (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)

Contents......Page 7
Figures......Page 9
Tables......Page 10
Notes on contributors......Page 12
Preface......Page 17
1 Delegation under anarchy: states, international organizations, and principal-agent theory......Page 21
DEFINING DELEGATION......Page 25
Node 1. Unilateralism......Page 28
Node 3. Delegation to IOs......Page 29
WHY DELEGATE?......Page 30
Specialization......Page 31
Policy externalities......Page 33
Collective decision-making......Page 34
Dispute resolution......Page 35
Credibility......Page 36
“Lock-in” (creating policy bias)......Page 37
Preference heterogeneity......Page 38
Institutional rules, power, and delegation......Page 39
STRUCTURES OF DELEGATION......Page 41
Agency problems......Page 42
The nature of the agent......Page 43
Mechanisms of control......Page 44
Rules versus discretion......Page 45
Screening and selection procedures......Page 46
Institutional checks and balances......Page 47
Sanctions......Page 48
Agents as actors......Page 49
Variation in principal characteristics......Page 51
Preferences of the principals......Page 52
Variation in agent characteristics......Page 53
Agent tasks or functions......Page 54
Agent strategies and permeability......Page 55
INTRODUCTION......Page 59
COMPLEX PRINCIPALS......Page 62
US SOCIAL FOREIGN AID POLICY: SINGLE OR MULTIPLE PRINCIPAL?......Page 64
Conceiving the United States as a single principal......Page 65
Multiple principals within the US government......Page 68
MODELING MDBS AS COLLECTIVE PRINCIPALS......Page 72
Number of actors......Page 74
Derivation of individual member states\' preferences......Page 75
Modeling a collective principal......Page 76
Data and dependent variables......Page 77
Independent variables......Page 78
Methods and results......Page 83
CONCLUSION......Page 92
INTRODUCTION......Page 95
ORGANIZATION OF THE IMF......Page 98
APPROACH AND ARGUMENT......Page 100
Private actors and the IMF......Page 101
Congress and the IMF......Page 103
IMF policy-makers and IMF policy......Page 104
DATA AND ANALYSIS: CONGRESSIONAL ROLL CALL VOTING ON IMF QUOTA INCREASES......Page 105
Discussion......Page 112
IMF LENDING PATTERNS......Page 114
Data and analysis: IMF outcomes......Page 116
CONCLUSION......Page 120
Appendix: data and sources......Page 121
INTRODUCTION......Page 125
THE PUZZLE? THE COSTS OF MULTILATERAL AID FOR DONOR COUNTRIES......Page 129
THE BENEFITS OF MULTILATERAL AID FOR DONOR COUNTRIES......Page 132
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS......Page 140
CONCLUSIONS......Page 156
5 Distribution, information, and delegation to international organizations: the case of IMF conditionality......Page 158
DISTRIBUTIONAL CONFLICT AND PRIVATE INFORMATION AS SOURCES OF AUTONOMY......Page 159
Distributional concerns......Page 160
Informational concerns......Page 163
IMF structure......Page 165
The first years......Page 167
Evolution of mechanisms......Page 173
PRECONDITIONS AND TREATMENT OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION......Page 177
CONCLUSION......Page 181
6 Delegation and discretion in the European Union......Page 183
PRINCIPAL-AGENT ANALYSIS: DELEGATING FUNCTIONS, LIMITING DISCRETION......Page 185
DELEGATION TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION: THE EMPIRICAL RECORD......Page 193
Delegation of functions to the Commission in the treaties......Page 194
Agenda setting......Page 195
Implementation and regulation......Page 196
The range of member-state control mechanisms......Page 197
Cross-sectoral variation in Commission discretion......Page 199
Delegation and discretion in secondary legislation......Page 203
Analysis......Page 205
THE ANOMALOUS ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT......Page 208
Why did they do it?......Page 209
Multiple principals?......Page 210
CONCLUSIONS: COMPETING HYPOTHESES AND COMPARATIVE STUDIES......Page 211
7 How agents matter......Page 217
WHEN DO STRATEGIES MATTER? AGENCY COSTS AND POOL SIZE AS SCOPE CONDITIONS......Page 221
HOW AGENT STRATEGIES INFLUENCE DELEGATION AND AUTONOMY......Page 223
Agents interpret and reinterpret rules......Page 224
Agents increase their permeability to third parties......Page 226
Agents buffer principal monitoring using dualism and ceremonialism......Page 228
HUMAN RIGHTS AGENTS......Page 230
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION......Page 243
INTRODUCTION......Page 247
THE SCREENING FUNCTION OF IOs......Page 250
Information on intentions and policy consequences......Page 252
THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND IRAQ, 1990–1991......Page 255
Screening US intentions......Page 256
Overcoming public opposition......Page 261
INSTITUTIONAL VARIATION AND FORUM SHOPPING......Page 265
CONCLUSION......Page 271
9 Dutiful agents, rogue actors, or both? Staffing, voting rules, and slack in the WHO and WTO......Page 273
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SLACK......Page 276
CASES......Page 280
The World Health Organization......Page 281
The World Trade Organization......Page 289
CONCLUSION......Page 297
INTRODUCTION......Page 299
Existing literature on the IMF’s agency slack......Page 301
Gauging agency slack......Page 303
The principal......Page 305
The agent......Page 306
Predictions of the principal-agent model......Page 307
Delegation of conditionality......Page 309
First Conditionality Guidelines......Page 311
Second Conditionality Guidelines and conformity assessment......Page 313
Third Conditionality Guidelines......Page 317
Additional evidence of principal preferences......Page 318
EXPLAINING VARIATIONS IN CONTROL AND CONFORMITY: THE STRENGTHS OF THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT APPROACH......Page 321
WHAT EXPLAINS VARIATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY? THE WEAKNESSES OF THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT FRAMEWORK......Page 324
CONCLUSION......Page 327
11 Delegation to international courts and the limits of re-contracting political power......Page 330
( RE-)CONTRACTING POWER AND STATE INFLUENCE OVER ICS......Page 334
Screening and appointment processes as tools of principal control......Page 335
Control of the budget as a tool of principal control......Page 339
Clear rules as a tool of principal control......Page 340
Sanctions through rewriting the delegation contract as a tool of principal control......Page 342
Why are principal re-contracting tools so weak?......Page 344
WHAT DOES SHAPE WHETHER INTERNATIONAL COURTS ARE MORE OR LESS INDEPENDENT?......Page 349
HOW STATES LIVE WITH INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COURTS: MOVING BEYOND PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY......Page 352
12 The logic of delegation to international organizations......Page 359
DELEGATION, AGENTS, AND AUTONOMY......Page 360
WHEN DOES DELEGATION SUCCEED?......Page 362
Common features of delegation relationships......Page 365
A model of delegation......Page 367
The conditions for persuasion......Page 370
Conditions for successful delegation......Page 372
DELEGATION AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS......Page 376
CONCLUSION......Page 385
References......Page 387
Index......Page 412