Cyber Mercenaries: The State, Hackers, and Power

Cover
......Page 1
Half-title page......Page 3
Title page......Page 5
Copyright page......Page 6
Contents......Page 7
List of
Figures......Page 10
Preface......Page 11
Acknowledgments......Page 18
List of
Abbreviations......Page 21
Part
I Of Brokers and Proxies
......Page 23
1
Cyber Proxies: An Introduction......Page 25
Proxies and Cyber Power......Page 28
What Cyber Proxies Are (Theoretically) Capable Of......Page 30
What Cyber Proxies Are Likely to Be Used For......Page 36
The Pool of Potential Cyber Proxies......Page 38
Proxy Relationships and Selected Cases......Page 42
Proxies and the Attribution Problem......Page 44
A Few Words on Methodology......Page 47
Conclusion:
Cyber Proxies and the Bigger Picture......Page 48
2
Proxies: An Instrument of Power Since Ancient Times......Page 51
A Framework for Thinking About Proxies......Page 53
Why Proxy Relationships Exist......Page 57
Three Main Types of Proxy Relationships: Delegation, Orchestration, and Sanctioning......Page 64
Conclusion: It’s the Relationship That Matters......Page 70
3
Cyber Power: Geopolitics and Human Rights......Page 72
The Bigger Picture: Sovereignty and Information......Page 74
The US Government’s Perspective......Page 77
The Russian Government’s Perspective......Page 80
The Chinese Government’s Perspective......Page 83
The Iranian Government’s Perspective......Page 86
Conclusion: Cybersecurity Is in the Eye of the Beholder......Page 88
Part
II Cyber Proxies Up Close
......Page 91
4
Cyber Proxies on a Tight Leash: The United States......Page 93
Private Cybersecurity Contractors......Page 95
Delegation Under the Spotlight: US Cyber Command and Cybersecurity Contractors......Page 98
Private Cybersecurity Contractors and Internal Security......Page 100
Conclusion: Predictable Proliferation of Capabilities......Page 101
5
Cyber Proxies on a Loose Leash: Iran and Syria......Page 103
Orchestration under the Spotlight: The US Indictment of Iranian Hackers......Page 106
Orchestration
in Wartime: The Syrian Electronic Army......Page 111
Conclusion:
Unexpected Escalation and Limited Options for Response......Page 114
6
Cyber Proxies on the Loose: The Former Soviet Union......Page 116
Sanctioning in Peacetime: The 2007 DDoS Attack on Estonia......Page 119
Sanctioning in Wartime: The Conflict in Ukraine (2014–Today)
......Page 120
Blitz
Orchestration: The War Against Georgia in 2008......Page 123
Sanctioning and Mobilizing: The March 2017 US Indictment of Russian Hackers......Page 125
Conclusion: Sanctioning and Statehood......Page 127
7
Change Over Time: China’s Evolving Relationships with Cyber Proxies......Page 129
The Rise of Hacktivists in China and the Government’s Passive Support (1994–2003)......Page 130
The Creation of Militia Units and the Move Towards Orchestration (2003–13)......Page 134
Tightening Control and Aspirational Delegation (2013–Today)......Page 137
Conclusion: From Broker State to (Aspirational) Monopolist......Page 139
Part
III Implications
......Page 143
8
The Theory: State Responsibility and Cyber Proxies......Page 145
A Framework for Cyber Proxy Relationships Based on International Law......Page 147
Due
Diligence......Page 152
Third Countries and Extraterritoriality......Page 154
Conclusion: International Cooperation Under Pressure......Page 156
9
The Practice: Shaping Cyber Proxy Relationships......Page 160
Keeping One’s Own House in Order: Determining Inherently Governmental Functions......Page 164
Keeping One’s Own House in Order: Determining the Role of the Private Sector......Page 166
Keeping One’s Own House in Order: Nationalism and Hacktivism......Page 168
Conclusion: Nudging and Managing Instead of Dictating and Prohibiting......Page 171
10
Conclusion: Cyber Proxies, the Future, and Suggestions for Further Research......Page 173
Future
Research......Page 180
Notes
......Page 186
Index......Page 257