Could there have been Nothing?: Against Metaphysical Nihilism

Cover......Page 1
Contents......Page 8
List of Diagrams......Page 10
Preface......Page 11
1 Could There Have Been Nothing?......Page 14
1.1 Could there have been nothing? – One question, three answers......Page 16
1.2 Possible worlds......Page 17
1.3 Could things have been different?......Page 18
1.4 Nihilism, anti-nihilism and philosophical explanations......Page 19
1.5 The structure of the discussion......Page 20
1.6 The nature of metaphysics and the role of intuition......Page 22
1.7 A note on some technical terms......Page 23
2 Metaphysical Nihilism and the Subtraction Argument......Page 24
2.1 Premise (A1)......Page 25
2.1.1 Unit sets......Page 27
2.1.2 Parts of concrete objects......Page 29
2.2 Rodriguez-Pereyra’s subtraction argument*......Page 30
2.3 Premise (A2)......Page 35
2.4 Premise (A3) and the other subtraction premises......Page 37
3.1 Metaphysical nihilism, the subtraction argument and worlds......Page 39
3.2 Three views of worlds and objects......Page 40
3.3 What about sets?......Page 51
3.4 Another way out?......Page 57
3.5 The problem with memberlessness......Page 60
3.6 Modal fictionalism......Page 64
3.7 Conclusion......Page 67
4.1 What is nihilism?......Page 70
4.2 Criteria of concreteness......Page 72
4.3 The sense-perception account......Page 74
4.4 The causal account......Page 76
4.5 The spatio-temporal account......Page 78
4.6 The Identity of indiscernibles......Page 84
4.7 Natural boundaries......Page 88
4.8 Other accounts of concreteness......Page 94
4.9 The temporal criterion of concreteness and possible world theories......Page 95
4.10 The motivation for nihilism......Page 96
5 Concreta, Dependence and Anti-Nihilism......Page 99
5.2 Premise (A1)......Page 100
5.3 Premise (A2) and Anti-nihilism 1......Page 101
5.3.1 The modal ontological arguments......Page 105
5.4 Premise (A3) and Anti-nihilism 2......Page 107
5.4.1 Do abstract objects exist in every possible world?......Page 109
5.4.2 Ersatzism and anti-ersatzism......Page 111
5.4.3 The challenge from absolute nihilism......Page 112
5.4.4 Do abstract objects depend on concrete objects?......Page 113
5.4.5 Universals and the empty set......Page 119
5.4.6 Dependence......Page 124
5.5 One more challenge to nihilism......Page 126
5.6 Conclusion......Page 128
6.1 Subtractability......Page 130
6.2 The subtraction premise......Page 132
6.3 General strategies for defending metaphysical nihilism......Page 136
6.4 The downward induction argument for metaphysical nihilism......Page 138
6.5 Downward induction in the subtraction argument......Page 142
6.6 Objections and replies......Page 145
6.7 Conclusion......Page 148
7 The Trouble with Metaphysical Nihilism......Page 150
Notes......Page 156
Bibliography......Page 174
Index......Page 182