Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science

Cover......Page 1
Title Page......Page 5
Contents......Page 7
Notes on Contributors......Page 9
Preface......Page 13
0.1 Philosophical Methods......Page 17
0.2 Philosophical Problems......Page 18
0.2.1 Ethical issues in science......Page 19
0.2.2 Epistemological issues in science......Page 20
0.2.3 Metaphysical issues in science......Page 22
0.3 The Sciences......Page 24
0.3.1 Mathematics......Page 25
0.3.2 Physics......Page 26
0.3.3 Biology......Page 28
0.3.4 Psychology......Page 30
0.3.5 The social sciences......Page 31
Further reading......Page 33
Bibliography......Page 35
Do Thought Experiments Transcend Empiricism?......Page 37
1.1 Galileo’s Rationalism......Page 39
1.2 Some Examples......Page 41
1.3 Different Uses of Thought Experiments......Page 45
1.4 A priori Knowledge of Nature......Page 46
1.5 Mathematical Intuitions and Laws of Nature......Page 47
1.6 Norton’s Arguments and Empiricism......Page 50
1.7 The Moral of the Story......Page 56
Bibliography......Page 57
2.1 Introduction......Page 60
2.2 Thought Experiment – Anti Thought Experiment Pairs......Page 61
2.2.1 Is the world spatially finite?......Page 62
2.2.2 What is the geometry of space for a rotating observer?......Page 63
2.2.3 What is the lift of an infinite rotor at rest?......Page 64
2.3 Thought Experiments are Arguments......Page 65
2.4 The Reliability Thesis......Page 68
2.5 Alternative Accounts of Thought Experiments......Page 71
2.5.1 Platonism......Page 72
2.5.2 Constructivism......Page 74
2.5.3 Visualization and simulation......Page 75
2.5.4 Mental models......Page 76
2.5.5 Experimentalism......Page 78
2.5.6 Other views......Page 79
2.6 Conclusion......Page 80
Bibliography......Page 81
Does Probability Capture the Logic of Scientific Confirmation or Justification?......Page 83
3.1 Introduction......Page 85
3.2 Explication of Justified Degree of Belief......Page 86
3.3 Explication of Confirmation......Page 87
3.4 Verified Consequences......Page 88
3.5 Probabilities for Two Properties......Page 89
3.6 Reasoning by Analogy......Page 91
3.7 Universal Generalizations......Page 92
3.8 Nicod’s Condition......Page 93
3.9 The Ravens Paradox......Page 94
3.10 Projectability......Page 95
3.11 Conclusion......Page 96
3.12.1 Propositions......Page 97
3.12.2 Proof of Theorem 1......Page 98
3.12.5 Proof of Theorem 5......Page 99
3.12.6 Propositions used in the proof of Theorems 6–8......Page 100
3.12.9 Proof of Theorem 8......Page 102
3.12.10 Propositions used in the proof of Theorem 9......Page 103
3.12.12 Proof of Theorem 10......Page 105
3.12.16 Proof of Theorem 14......Page 106
3.12.17 Proof of Theorem 15......Page 107
Bibliography......Page 108
Further reading......Page 109
4.1 Introduction......Page 110
4.2 Inductive Performance and Complexity......Page 113
4.3 Explanations of Practice......Page 116
4.4 Ockham’s Razor and Efficiency......Page 118
4.5 Statistical Retractions......Page 123
4.6 Curves and Causes......Page 126
4.7 Confirmation Revisited......Page 128
Bibliography......Page 129
Further reading......Page 130
Can a Theory's Predictive Success Warrant Belief in the Unobservable Entities it Postulates?......Page 131
5.1 The Burden of Argument......Page 133
5.2 Underdetermination......Page 135
5.3 Superseded Science......Page 138
5.4 Selective Confirmation......Page 140
5.5 An Argument from Novelty......Page 142
5.6 Consequences and Clarifications......Page 144
5.7 The Importance of Novelty......Page 145
5.8 Observation and Theory......Page 146
Bibliography......Page 148
6.1 Introduction......Page 149
6.2 Anti-Realist Explanations for the Success of Science......Page 150
6.3 Two Realist Arguments from the Success of Science......Page 156
6.4 Truth and Truthlikeness as Explanations for the Success of Science......Page 159
6.5 The Circularity of the Argument from the Success of Science......Page 162
Further reading......Page 164
Are there Laws in the Social Sciences?......Page 165
7.1 The Significance of the Question......Page 167
7.2 What is a Law?......Page 169
7.3 Distinguishing some Questions......Page 172
7.5 Why Social Laws must be Hedged......Page 175
7.6 The Case against Hedged Laws......Page 178
7.7 Why Social Science need not Posit Laws......Page 181
Bibliography......Page 182
Further reading......Page 183
8.1 Initial Issues......Page 184
8.2 What is a Law?......Page 186
8.3 Problems and Prospects for Generalizable Causal Knowledge......Page 191
8.4 Objections......Page 195
Acknowledgments......Page 199
Further reading......Page 200
Are Causes Physically Connected to their Effects?......Page 203
9.1 Introduction......Page 205
9.2 Arguments from Intuition......Page 206
9.3 The Counterfactual Theory of Quasi-Causation......Page 208
9.4 Epistemic Blur and Practical Equivalence......Page 210
Bibliography......Page 211
Further reading......Page 212
10.1 Negative Causation......Page 213
10.2 Physical Connection......Page 219
10.3 Meaning and Method......Page 221
10.4 Dowe’s Arguments......Page 225
10.5 Misconnections and Differences......Page 230
Bibliography......Page 231
Further reading......Page 232
Is there a Puzzle about the Low-Entropy Past?......Page 233
11.1 The Most Underrated Discovery in the History of Physics?......Page 235
11.2 PTB in the Age of Steam......Page 236
11.3.1 The two-asymmetry approach......Page 238
11.3.2 The one-asymmetry approach......Page 239
11.4 Did it all Happen by Accident?......Page 240
11.5 The Monkey Wrench......Page 242
11.6 Initial Smoothness......Page 243
11.7 Should Cosmologists be Trying to Explain Initial Smoothness?......Page 245
11.8 What’s Special about Initial Conditions?......Page 246
11.9 The Just Good Luck Objection......Page 248
11.10 The Only One Universe Objection......Page 249
11.10.3 Even unique things get explained......Page 250
11.11.1 The appeal to inflation......Page 251
11.11.2 The anthropic strategy......Page 252
11.11.3 Penrose’s Weyl hypothesis......Page 253
Bibliography......Page 254
Further reading......Page 255
12.1 A Story......Page 256
12.2 Thermodynamics and Probability......Page 257
12.3 What We Really Want Explained......Page 259
12.4 Brute Facts and Explanation......Page 262
12.5 The Past Hypothesis as Law......Page 265
12.6.1 Dynamical explanations......Page 266
12.6.2 New nondynamical law?......Page 268
12.6.3 Eliminating the initial probability distribution......Page 269
Bibliography......Page 270
Further reading......Page 271
Do Genes Encode Information about Phenotypic Traits?......Page 273
13.1 Introduction......Page 275
13.2 The Theory of Communication......Page 278
13.3 Semiotic Information......Page 282
13.4 Traits and Molecular Biology......Page 287
Bibliography......Page 288
Further reading......Page 289
14.1 Introduction......Page 291
14.2 More on the Two Senses of Information......Page 293
14.3 What Genes Do and How They Do It......Page 295
14.4 The Real but Restricted Role of “Genetic Coding”......Page 297
14.5 Two Objections and Replies......Page 300
14.6 Conclusion......Page 303
Bibliography......Page 304
Is the Mind a System of Modules Shaped by Natural Selection?......Page 307
15.1 Introduction: Evolutionary Psychology and Modularity......Page 309
15.1.1 What are modules?......Page 310
15.1.2 Belief/desire psychology and learning......Page 312
15.1.3 Practical reasoning......Page 313
15.1.4 Acquiring desires......Page 315
15.2.1 The argument from biology......Page 316
15.2.2 Could general learning evolve?......Page 317
15.2.3 The argument from computational psychology......Page 318
15.3 Evidence that the Mind is Modular......Page 319
15.3.2 Pathological evidence......Page 320
15.3.3 Experimental evidence......Page 321
15.4 Adaptation versus Learned Modularization......Page 322
15.5 A Problem for Modularity: The Unconstrained Character of Thought......Page 323
15.6 Conclusion......Page 324
Bibliography......Page 325
16.1 Did the Mind Evolve by Natural Selection?......Page 328
16.2.1 Reading structure from function......Page 330
16.2.2 The one-to-one assumption......Page 332
16.2.3 The role of learning and development......Page 334
16.2.4 Non-Darwinian traits......Page 335
16.3 The Mind as a System of Modules......Page 336
16.3.1 Combinatorial explosion and the “frame problem”......Page 337
16.3.2 The argument from the poverty of the stimulus......Page 338
16.4 In Search of Mental Modules......Page 339
16.4.1 Modularity and neural specificity......Page 340
16.4.2 Modularity and dissociability......Page 341
16.4.3 Modules and encapsulation......Page 343
16.4.4 Modules and independent evolvability......Page 345
Bibliography......Page 347
Further reading......Page 350
B......Page 351
C......Page 352
D......Page 353
E......Page 354
F......Page 355
I......Page 356
L......Page 357
M......Page 358
N......Page 359
P......Page 360
R......Page 361
S......Page 362
U......Page 363
Z......Page 364