Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science (Contemporary Debates in Philosophy)

Preface (Robert J. Stainton)......Page 2
PART I: JUST HOW MODULAR IS THE MIND?......Page 4
1. The Case for Massively Modular Models of Mind (Peter Carruthers)......Page 5
2. Is the Mind Really Modular? (Jesse J. Prinz)......Page 24
3. Is the Human Mind Massively Modular? (Richard Samuels)......Page 39
PART II: HOW MUCH OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE IS INNATE?......Page 59
4. Irrational Nativist Exuberance (Barbara C. Scholz and Geoffrey K. Pullum)......Page 60
5. The Case for Linguistic Nativism (Robert J. Matthews)......Page 82
6. On the Innateness of Language (James McGilvray)......Page 98
PART III: HAS COGNITIVE SCIENCE SHOWN HUMAN BEINGS ARE COGNITIVELY BOUNDED, OR IRRATIONAL?......Page 114
7. Bounded and Rational (Gerd Gigerenzer)......Page 115
8. Bounded Rationality and the Enlightenment Picture of Cognitive Virtue (David Matheson)......Page 134
PART IV: ARE RULES AND REPRESENTATIONS NECESSARY TO EXPLAIN SYSTEMATICITY?......Page 145
9. Cognition Needs Syntax but not Rules (Terence Horgan and John Tienson)......Page 146
10. Phenomena and Mechanisms: Putting the Symbolic, Connectionist, and Dynamical Systems Debate in Broader Perspective (Adele Abrahamsen and William Bechtel)......Page 158
PART V: CAN CONSCIOUSNESS AND QUALIA BE REDUCED?......Page 185
11. Consciousness and Qualia Can be Reduced (William G. Lycan)......Page 186
12. Consciousness and Qualia Cannot be Reduced (Brie Gertler)......Page 199
PART VI: DOES COGNITIVE SCIENCE NEED EXTERNAL CONTENT AT ALL?......Page 214
13. Locating Meaning in the Mind (Where it Belongs) (Ray Jackendoff)......Page 215
14. The Intentional Inexistence of Language - But Not Cars (Georges Rey)......Page 233
PART VII: IS THE AIM OF PERCEPTION TO PROVIDE ACCURATE REPRESENTATIONS?......Page 252
15. Is the Aim of Perception to Provide Accurate Representations? (Kirk Ludwig)......Page 253
16. Is the Aim of Perception to Provide Accurate Representations? A Case for the \"No\" Side (Christopher Viger)......Page 269
PART VIII: CAN MENTAL STATES, KNOWLEDGE IN PARTICULAR, BE DIVIDED INTO A NARROW COMPONENT AND A BROAD COMPONENT?......Page 283
17. Can Cognition be Factorized Into Internal and External Components? (Timothy Williamson)......Page 284
18. The Internal and External Components of Cognition (Ralph Wedgwood)......Page 300
Index......Page 319