Constructivism in Ethics

Cover
Constructivism in Ethics
Title
Copyright
Contents
Contributors
Preface
Introduction
	1 Constructivism and Kantian arguments
	2 Constructivism, realism, and cognitivism
	3 Constructivism, moral norms, and normative practices
CHAPTER One Moral skepticism, constructivism, and the value of humanity
	1 Korsgaard on moral realism and moral skepticism
	2 Korsgaard on the Formula of Humanity
	3 Kant on the Formula of Humanity
		3.1 Paragraph 1: 427.19–428.2
		3.2 Paragraph 2: 428.3–6
		3.3 Paragraph 3: 428.7–33
		3.4 Paragraph 4: 428.34–429.14
	4 Concluding remarks
CHAPTER Two How not to be an ethical constructivist: A critique of Korsgaard’s neo-Kantian constitutivism
	1 Introduction: realism, constructivism, and neo-Kantian constitutivism
	2 Instrumental normativity: an illustration and assessment of the self-constitution model
	3 Extending the model: self-constitution and moral normativity
	4 Conclusion: the failure of the extension of the model
CHAPTER Three Kant’s constructivism
	1 Moral realism and constructivism
	2 Kant’s account of value
		2.1 Kant on inner value
		2.2 No specification to the contrary
		2.3 Kant’s arguments against value realism
	3 The content of the moral law
		3.1 Moral realism and the moral law
		3.2 Constructivism and the moral law
		3.3 Constitutivism and the moral law
	4 Obligation: the bindingness of the moral law
	5 Normative ethics
	6 Conclusion
CHAPTER Four Meta-ethics and its discontents: A case study of Korsgaard
	1 Introduction
	2 Meta-ethics and normative ethics
	3 Non-cognitivism
		3.1 The non-cognitivist interpretation of “the normativity of instrumental reason”
		3.2 Korsgaard’s official rejection of non-cognitivism
		3.3 Constitution, inescapability, and necessity
	4 Conclusion
CHAPTER Five Is constructivism an alternative to moral realism?
	1 Some issues worth worrying about
	2 Kinds of meta-ethical constructivism
	3 The characterization of meta-ethical constructivism
	4 Meta-ethical constructivism and realism
	5 Meta-ethical constructivism and moral naturalism
	6 Non-constructivist sister theories
	7 Prospects for blockbuster arguments
	8 Conclusion
CHAPTER Six Constructivism and practical knowledge
	1 Two accounts of the moral capacity
	2 A constructivist alternative?
	3 Objectivity
	4 The moral capacity as the capacity for practical knowledge
	5 Constructivism and practical knowledge
	6 Concluding observation
CHAPTER Seven Constructivism about practical knowledge
	1 Christine Korsgaard’s arguments against “applied knowledge”
	2 Practical knowledge vs. speculative knowledge
	3 Resetting the debate: Kantian constructivism about practical knowledge
	4 Practical reflection as self-legislation
	5 Knowing oneself as a practical subject: the emotional experience of respect
	6 Respect and the efficacy of practical reason
	7 The objection of subjectivism
CHAPTER Eight Constructivism and particularism
	1 Lessons from the Tortoise: received view
	2 Lessons from the Tortoise: constructivism
	3 Lessons from the Tortoise: multiple tasks for norms
	4 Kant and the Tortoise’s lesson
	5 Lessons from the Tortoise: moving beyond principles
	6 Lessons from the Tortoise: from constructivism to particularism
	7 The way forward
CHAPTER Nine Constructive complaints
	1 Introduction
	2 Rawls’ constructivism
	3 Scanlon’s contractualism
	4 Practices and complaints
CHAPTER Ten Revising moral norms: Pragmatism and the problem of perspicuous description
	1 Revising moral norms
	2 From indeterminacy to radical contingency
	3 Contingency, contextualism, and branching
	4 Concluding remarks: minimalism, revisited
References
Index