Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics

Cover
Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics
Copyright
Contents
Note to Readers
Contributors
Acknowledgements
1: Introduction: A Guided Tour of Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics
	Introduction
	1. ‘Conceptual Engineering’ and ‘Conceptual Ethics’
		Conceptual Engineering
		Conceptual Ethics
	2. A Bottom-Up Characterization of Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics
	3. Central Challenges
		Cluster 1
		Cluster 2
		Cluster 3
		Cluster 4
		Cluster 5
		Cluster 6
	4. Interaction between Specific Cases of Conceptual Engineering and General Theorizing
	5. Role and Scope of Conceptual Engineering in Philosophy: Descriptive
	6. Role and Scope of Conceptual Engineering in Philosophy: Normative
		1. All of All of Philosophy
		2. All of Some
		3. Some of All of Philosophy
		4. Some of Some of Philosophy
		5. Nothing
	7. Conceptual Engineering beyond Philosophy
	Conclusion
	Acknowledgments
	References
Abstracts of Chapters
	1 Introduction
	2 Revisionary Analysis without Meaning Change (Or, Could Women Be Analytically Oppressed?)
	3 Minimal Substantivity
	4 Reactive Concepts
	5 Strategic Conceptual Engineering for Epistemic and Social Aims
	6 Never Say ‘Never Say “Never’’’?
	7 Conceptual Engineering
	8 Preliminary Scouting Reports from the Outer Limits of Conceptual Engineering
	9 Descriptive vs. Ameliorative Projects: The Role of Normative Considerations
	10 Variance Theses in Ontology and Metaethics
	11 Neutralism and Conceptual Engineering
	12 Going On, Not in the Same Way
	13 The Theory–Theory Approach to Ethics
	14 Conceptual Ethics and the Methodology of Normative Inquiry
	15 Conceptual Evaluation: Epistemic
	16 Analyzing Concepts and Allocating Referents
	17 The A-project and the B-project
	18 Talk and Thought
	19 Philosophy as the Study of Defective Concepts
	20 Linguistic Intervention and Transformative Communicative Disruptions
	21 A Pragmatic Method for Normative Conceptual Work
2: Revisionary Analysis without Meaning Change (Or, Could Women Be Analytically Oppressed?)
	1. Changing the Subject
		1.1. The Argument Argument
		1.2. Two Responses
	2. Concepts
	3. Analyticity
		3.1. Implicit Definition and Adoption Grasp
		3.2. From Implicit Definition to Metasemantic Analyticity
	4. Timing
	5. Successful Analysis
		5.1. Agreeing that a Dispute is Verbal, and Other Complications
	6. Conclusion
	Acknowledgements
	References
3: Minimal Substantivity
	1. Introduction
	2. The Minimum Requirement for Substantivity
	3. Rescuing the Ontological Significance of Metalinguistic Disputes
		3.1. First-Order Issues and Ontological Commitments
		3.2. Resisting Two Attempts at Downplaying the Proposal
	4. Rescuing the Epistemic Significance of Metalinguistic Disputes
	5. Dispelling a Threat of Excessive Proliferation
	6. Conclusion: Minimal Anti-Deflationism
	Acknowledgements
	References
4: Reactive Concepts: Engineering the Concept CONCEPT
	1. Introduction
	2. The R-concept Hypothesis
		2.1. Concepts, R-concepts, Beliefs, and Desires
		2.2. Comparison with Standard Accounts of Concepts
		2.3. R-concepts versus Belief Desire Psychology with Irrationality or a Divided Mind
	3. General Explanatory Benefits of R-concepts Including Ones for Conceptual Ethics
		3.1. Three Unified Benefits: Hate Speech, Crypto-evaluative Terms, Phenomenal Concepts
			3.1.1 Hate speech
			3.1.2 Phenomenal concepts
			3.1.3 Crypto-evaluative concepts
			3.1.4 Tacit bias
		3.2 Conceptual Difference Where There Is No Disagreement About Fact
		3.3. R-concepts and Words: How to Engineer R-concepts
	4. Two Objections to the Theory of R-concepts
		4.1. Failing to Possess the Concept and Failing to Understand the Concept
		4.2. Reactive Representations and Besires
	5. Conclusion
	References
5: Strategic Conceptual Engineering for Epistemic and Social Aims
	Lessons from Scientific Concepts
	Engineering Concepts in the Context of Biosocial Phenomena: Gender and Race
	Gender and the Inclusion of Trans Persons
	Strategic Conceptual Engineering
	Conclusion
	Acknowledgements
	References
6: Never Say ‘Never Say “Never’’’?
	Acknowledgements
	References
7: Conceptual Engineering: The Master Argument
	I. Background and Explanation of Central Terms
	II. The Master Argument
	III. Replies to Seven Objections
		Objection (1): Why Think that if a Word, W, Has a Meaning M, Then There Are Many Similar Meanings W Could Have?
		Objection (2): In What Sense Can One Meaning Be Better Than Another?
		Objection (3): Why Not Think the Meanings Words Have Are the Best They Can Be (or Need to Be)?
		Objection (4): If We Change the Meaning of an Expression, Won’t That Result in Massive Verbal Disputes and a Change of Topic?
		Objection (5): Aren’t Meaning Assignments Normatively Neutral, as Long as Each Thing Worth Meaning is Meant by Some Word or Other?
			1. Sometimes we care about lexical effects
			2. The original lexical item as marker of topic continuity
			3. The anchoring role of the original lexical item
			4. The role of lexical items in social ontology
		Objection (6): Why Think the Importance of the Revisionist Project Undermines the Importance of the Descriptive Project? Why Think There’s a Tension between the Two Approaches? Aren’t They Complementary?
		Objection (7): If We Are to Engage in Conceptual Engineering, Don’t We Have to Assume that Meaning Assignments Are Within Our Control? If They Are Out of Our Control, How Can We Meaningfully Engage in Conceptual Engineering?
	Conclusion
	Acknowledgements
	References
8: Preliminary Scouting Reports from the Outer Limits of Conceptual Engineering
	1. How to Argue about the Planets
	2. Big Theory, Little Theory
	3. Conceptual Maximalism and Global Versus Ideal Language Theorizing
	4. Conceptual Engineering, Conceptual Ethics, and Xenolinguistics
	5. Problematic Languages and Limiting Damage and Exposure
	6. Answering the Boundary Question
		First Semantic Attempt: Possible Worlds
		Second Semantic Attempt: Truth Conditions
		Third Semantic Attempt: Inferential Roles, Syntax, and Carnapian Tolerance
	7. Answering the Boundary Question with Metasemantics
		First Metasemantic Attempt: Facts and Other Metaphysics Heavy-Weights
		Second Metasemantic Attempt: Concepts as Thinkables
		Third Metasemantic Attempt: Moves in a Language Game
	8. Primitivism and the Star Gambit
	References
9: Descriptive vs. Ameliorative Projects: The Role of Normative Considerations
	1. Descriptive and Ameliorative Projects
	2. The Descriptive Project Revisited
	3. Objectivity and Joint-Carvingness
	4. Reference, Explanatory Power, and Normative Considerations
	5. Conclusion
	Acknowledgements
	References
10: Variance Theses in Ontology and Metaethics
	1. Ontology
	2. Variance
	3. Thin Normative Concepts
	4. General Lessons
	Acknowledgements
	References
11: Neutralism and Conceptual Engineering
	1. Paradox and Conceptual Engineering with Concepts
	2. Paradox and Conceptual Engineering without Concepts
	3. Happy-Face Treatments
	4. Unhappy-Face Treatments
	5. What’s the News?
	6. The Test-Bed of Philosophical Theory
	7. The Standard Account of Paradox
	8. A Flaw
	9. The Standard Account Tweaked
	10. Treating Paradox: The Standard Account
	11. Treating Paradox: A Third Desideratum
	12. Inconsistent Concepts
	13. Concepts and Conceptual Principles
	14. Why are Certain Paradoxes so Contagious and/or Intractable?
	15. Can the Conceptual Engineer Embrace Happy-Face Treatments?
	16. Happy-Face Conceptual Engineering
	17. The Indeterminate Concept View: The Non-Specific Version
	18. The Indeterminate Concept View: The Gappy Version
	19. The Excess Baggage Objection
	20. The Overkill Objection
	21. The Symmetry Argument
	22. The Indeterminate Concept View: The Classical Version
	23. Unhappy-Face Conceptual Engineering via the Indeterminate Concept View
	24. Absolute versus Relative Intractability
	25. Paradoxes as Stress-Tests
	26. The Master Argument
	27. The Imperialism Objection
	28. The Indiscriminable Concept View
	29. Unhappy-Face Conceptual Engineering via The Indiscriminable Concept View
	30. The Imperialism Objection Again
	31. Which Form of Conceptual Engineering Wins Out?
	32. A Happy-Face Treatment?
	33. Happy-Face Treatments Represent a Limit Case
	34. Unhappy-Face Treatments are also a Limit Case
	35. Intermediate Treatments
	36. Fully Neutral Treatments: A First Pass
	37. Sameness Skepticism
	38. Sameness Skepticism Regimented
	39. A Neutralist Treatment of Sameness Skepticism
	40. Back to the Engineering Metaphor
	41. The Primary Goal of Treating Paradox
	42. The Secondary Goal of Treating Paradox
	43. Don’t Conflate the Primary and Secondary Goals
	44. Three Axes of Neutralism
	45. Neutralism and Intractability
	46. Neutralism and Minimal Adequacy
	47. Neutralist Conceptual Engineering with Concepts
	48. Meaning Engineering
	49. Inconsistent Meanings (Intensions)
	50. Inconsistent Words
	51. Neutralist Meaning Engineering
	52. Type I Neutralist Meaning Engineering
	53. Type II Neutralist Meaning Engineering
	54. Concluding Remarks
	Acknowledgements
	References
12: Going On, Not in the Same Way
	1. Introduction
	2. Historical and Political Context
	3. Concepts?
	4. “Conceptual Analysis”
	5. Representational Traditions: ‘Water’ as an Example
	6. Conceptual Amelioration
	7. Conclusion
	Acknowledgements
	References
13: The Theory–Theory Approach to Ethics
	1. Methodological Preamble
	2. Background Presumptions
	3. The Metaphysics of Ethical Properties
	4. Hunting for the Ethical after Moore
	5. Making a Start on What It Takes to be the Best Properties for Ethical Terms to Pick Out
	6. The Problem of Finding Purpose in Traditional Debates in Ethics
	7. Analytical Functionalism
	8. The Effects of Using Ethical Words
	9. How Ethical Terms Can Get to Make Things Go Better: A Bit More Detail
	10. How to Respond to the Disagreement
	Acknowledgments
	References
14: Conceptual Ethics and the Methodology of Normative Inquiry
	Introduction
	1. Folk vs. Theoretical Concepts
	2. Concept/Word Pairing
	3. Authority-Revealing vs. Extension-Revealing Concepts
	4. Evaluating the Norms and Concepts used in the Methodology of Normative Inquiry
	5. Conclusions
	Acknowledgements
	References
15: Conceptual Evaluation: Epistemic
	1 Preliminaries
		1.1 ‘Makes’
		1.2 ‘Concepts’
		1.3 ‘Good, Epistemically’
	2 The Simple Hypothesis
	3 Against the Simple Hypothesis
		3.1 Initial Skepticism
		3.2 Variety of Explanatory Purposes
		3.3 Trouble with Uniformity
		3.4 Concept and Property
	4 Where to Next?
	Acknowledgements
	References
16: Analyzing Concepts and Allocating Referents
	1. The Place of Analysis in Philosophy
		Two Inadequate Accounts of Analysis
		An Alternative Account of Analysis
	2. Interpretation, Analytical and Allocative
		After Analysis
		The Constraint and License Models
		Two Grounds for License
	3. In Favor of the License Model of Analysis and Allocation
		The Basic Case
		The License Model and the Canberra Plan
		The License Model and Natural Properties
		Criteria of Allocation
	4. Genealogy: Melding Analytical and Allocative Interpretation
	5. A Case Study: The Concept of Freedom
	Acknowledgements
	References
17: The A-project and the B-project
	1
	2
	3
	4
	References
18: Talk and Thought
	1. Introduction
	2. The Background: Internalism and Externalism
	3. Linguistic Meaning
	4. Concepts
	5. Theoretical Frameworks and Contested Meanings
	6. Conceptual Engineering
	7. Truth and Normativity
	8. Conclusion
	References
19: Philosophy as the Study of Defective Concepts
	1. The Radical Therapeutic Program
	2. Conceptual Engineering
	3. Metrological Naturalism
	4. Elements of Conceptual Engineering
	5. Tools for Conceptual Engineering
	6. Constraints on Conceptual Engineering
	7. Non-Scientific Exports
	8. Defective Concepts in Conceptual Engineering
	9. Is Philosophy about Concepts?
	10. Conclusion
	Acknowledgements
	References
20: Linguistic Intervention and Transformative Communicative Disruptions
	Introduction
	1. Meaning Change, Linguistic Intervention, and Linguistic Transgression
		Linguistic Interventions
		Amelioration and Facilitating Meaning Change by Use
		Linguistic Disruption
		Linguistic Transgression and the Linguistic Reformer’s Dilemma
	2. On the Pervasiveness of Linguistic Interventions
		(i) Neologisms, Protologisms, and Semantic Introductions
		(ii) Reappropriation of Slurs or Insults
		(iii) Transgressive Uses of Normative or Definitional Generics
		(iv) Interpretive Uncharity and Semantic Elimination
		(v) Blocking or Flouting (Semantic) Presuppositions
	3. Challenges for the Ameliorator I—Transition Periods and the Inevitability of Miscommunication
	4. Challenges for the Ameliorator II—From Miscommunication to Lying, Misleading, and Bullshitting
	5. Effective Linguistic Interventions—Transformative Communicative Disruptions
	6. Justifying Linguistic Interventions—the Long Game and Diachronic Communicative Intentions
	Conclusion
	References
21: A Pragmatic Method for Normative Conceptual Work
	1. The Metaphysical Approach and the Pragmatic Approach
	2. A Defense of Function
	3. A Pragmatic Method for Normative Conceptual Work
		3.1. Reverse Engineering
		3.2. Identifying the Function to Be Served
		3.3. Engineering to Serve the Function
	4. A Defense of the Pragmatic Approach
		4.1. Preserving Core Intuitions about Structure
		4.2. Respecting Non-Arbitrariness
		4.3. Leaving Room for Critique
	5. Conclusion
	Acknowledgments
	References
Index