Concepts in Thought, Action, and Emotion: New Essays

Cover
Half Title
Series Page
Title Page
Copyright Page
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments
List of Contributors
Chapter 1: Introduction*: Concepts in Thought, Action, and Emotion
	Notes
	References
Part I: Concepts and Experience*
	References
	Chapter 2: Concepts and Experience: A Non-Representationalist Perspective
		2.1 What Abilities Can Do for the Philosophy of Mind
		2.2 Conceptions of Concepts
		2.3 Concepts, Abilities, and Rules
		2.4 Experience and Perception
		2.5 Experience and Conceptual Thought
		2.6 The Myth of the Given: Qualia
		2.7 The Myth of Spontaneity
		Note
		References
	Chapter 3: Conceptualism and the Notion of a Concept
		3.1 Introduction
		3.2 Concepts and the Representation of Generality
		3.3 Children’s Sorting Behavior and Primitive Normativity
		Notes
		References
	Chapter 4: Concepts, Belief, and Perception1
		4.1 Concepts
		4.2 Belief
			4.2.1 Occurrent and Dispositional Belief
			4.2.2 Implicit and Explicit Beliefs
			4.2.3 Belief and Dispositions
			4.2.4 Belief and the Space of Reasons
		4.3 Perception
		Notes
		References
	Chapter 5: The Explanatory Merits of Reasons-First Epistemology
		5.1 Introduction
		5.2 The Epistemic Significance of Perception and Epistemic Justification
		5.3 PIK on the Epistemic Significance of Perception and on Epistemic Justification
		5.4 PINK on the Epistemic Significance of Perception and on Epistemic Justification
		5.5 Reasons-First on the Epistemic Significance of Perception and on Epistemic Justification
		5.6 Results
		Notes
		References
Part II: Concepts and Language*
	References
	Chapter 6: Conceptual Thought Without Language? The Case from Animal Cognition
		6.1 The Argument from Animal Cognition
		6.2 Defending the Explanatory Premise
			6.2.1 The First Challenge: Instrumentalism
			6.2.2 The Second Challenge: Indeterminacy
			6.2.3 Third Challenge: Higher-Order Thoughts
		6.3 Thought Involving Concepts
		Note
		References
	Chapter 7: Concepts, Normativity, and Self-Knowledge: On Ginsborg’s Notion of Primitive Normativity
		7.1 Concepts and Normativity
		7.2 The Kripkean Dilemma
		7.3 Primitive Normativity
		7.4 Normativity without Justification?
		7.5 Normativity Without Error?
		7.6 Conclusion
		Notes
		References
	Chapter 8: A Role for Language in Concept Formation
		8.1 Introduction
		8.2 Disclosing Concept Formation and Its Epistemic Importance
		8.3 An Argument Against the Possibility of Disclosing Concept Formation
		8.4 Sellars on the Meaning of Theoretical Terms
		8.5 From Sellarsian Interpretation to Disclosing Concept Formation
		8.6 The Necessity of Language Use in Sellarsian Interpretation
		8.7 Conclusion
		Notes
		References
	Chapter 9: Practical Understanding, Concepts, and Language*
		9.1 Understanding
		9.3 Affordances, Concepts, and Propositions
		Notes
		References
Part III: Concepts and Know-How*
	References
	Chapter 10: Concepts and Action: Know-How and Beyond
		10.1 Introduction
		10.2 The Question of Know-How
		10.3 Ryle on Know-How and Normative Guidance
		10.4 Responsible Control
		10.5 Know-how, Concepts, and Propositions
		10.6 Acting without Know-How
		10.7 Conclusion
		Notes
		References
	Chapter 11: Knowledge-How and Its Exercises
		11.1 Knowledge-How and Ability
		11.2 Knowledge-How
		11.3 Intellectualism and Anti-Intellectualism
		11.4 Knowledge-How in Action, Thought, and Sensation
		Notes
		References
	Chapter 12: Practical Understanding: Skill as Grasp of Method
		12.1 The Reality and Distinctness of Practical Understanding
			12.1.1 reality
			12.1.2 distinctness
		12.2 The Demand for Explanation
		12.3 The Significance of Method
		12.4 The Role of Conceptual Mastery
			12.4.1 intellectualism
			12.4.2 conceptualism
			12.4.3 e-value
		12.5 The Charge of Over-Intellectualization
		12.6 Conclusion
		Notes
		References
	Chapter 13: Primary Know-How: Understanding Through Practical Concepts
		13.1 Introduction
		13.2 Phenomena of Apparently Concept-Free Action
		13.3 Controversies about Concepts in Action
		13.4 Practical Concepts
		13.5 From Practical to Linguistic Concepts and Back
		13.6 The Self in Habitual and Skillful Action
		13.7 Conclusion
		Note
		References
Part IV: Concepts and Emotion*
	References
	Chapter 14: Emotions Inside Out: The Nonconceptual Content of Emotions1
		14.1 Introduction
		14.2 The Fregean Framework
		14.3 The Arguments for Emotional Nonconceptualism
			14.3.1 Fineness of Grain
			14.3.2 Concept Acquisition
			14.3.3 Analogue, Unit-Free Content
			14.3.4 Non-Human Animal and Infant Cognition
			14.3.5 Recalcitrance
			14.3.6 Representing the Impossible
		14.4 Objections to Emotional Nonconceptualism
		14.5 Conclusion
		Notes
		References
	Chapter 15: A Challenge to Perceptual Theories of Emotion
		15.1 Introduction
		15.2 Tappolet on Emotions and Perceptions
		15.3 Emotionality and the Self
		15.4 Affective Intentionality: World-Directedness and Self-Involvement
		15.5 The Evaluative Background
		15.6 Self-Involvement, Not Self-Interestedness
		15.7 Recalcitrant Emotions and the Perception Analogy
		15.8 The Case for Conceptuality
		Notes
		References
	Chapter 16: Emotions and the Conceptual Space of Human Life*
		16.1 Philosophy of Emotions: A Sketch
		16.2 Concepts and Experience
		16.3 Are Emotions Conceptual Phenomena?
		Notes
		References
Index