Comparative Constitutional Design

Cover......Page 1
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN......Page 2
Title......Page 4
Copyright......Page 5
Contents......Page 6
Figures......Page 8
Tables......Page 9
Contributors......Page 10
Acknowledgments......Page 12
1: Introduction......Page 14
ANTECEDENTS......Page 15
THE STATE OF KNOWLEDGE......Page 17
OVERVIEW OF THE VOLUME......Page 18
REFERENCES......Page 23
PART I: Design Processes......Page 26
INTRODUCTION......Page 28
ENHANCING IMPARTIALITY......Page 31
ENHANCING RATIONAL BELIEF FORMATION......Page 33
REDUCING THE IMPACT OF INTEREST......Page 35
REDUCING THE IMPACT OF PASSION......Page 38
CONCLUSION......Page 41
REFERENCES......Page 42
INTRODUCTION......Page 44
LITERATURE ON CASES......Page 45
CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN: MODES, ACTORS, AND CONSTRAINTS......Page 47
CONNECTING PROCESS AND OUTCOME:
MICRO-FOUNDATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS......Page 55
HYPOTHESES AND EVIDENCE LINKING PROCESSES TO OUTCOMES......Page 56
Institutional Self-Dealing......Page 57
International Actors......Page 61
Public Participation and Oversight......Page 63
CONCLUSION......Page 71
LITERATURE CITED......Page 72
PART II: How Do We Get to Constitutional Design? Constraints and Conditions......Page 80
INTRODUCTION......Page 82
COUNTERMAJORITARIAN CONSTITUTIONS AND SUCCESSFUL DEMOCRATIZATION......Page 84
THE MODEL......Page 88
Payoffs......Page 89
Model 2......Page 90
Payoffs......Page 92
Analysis......Page 93
IMPLICATIONS......Page 97
APPLYING THE APPROACH: CHILE, 1973–PRESENT......Page 100
Mutual Restraint: Governance under the 1980 Constitution......Page 103
CONCLUSIONS......Page 107
REFERENCES......Page 111
INTRODUCTION......Page 114
PARLIAMENTARY RESPONSIBILITY......Page 115
KINGS AGAINST PARLIAMENTS......Page 118
CONSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES......Page 121
Never Lost......Page 125
Rotation......Page 127
Suppress, Dynasty Deposed or Monarchy Abolished......Page 130
Yield, Survive......Page 140
Suppress, Survive......Page 145
REFERENCES......Page 147
FROM THE QING TO NEW CHINA TO NEW NEW CHINA: QING, REPUBLICAN AND SOCIALIST CONSTITUTIONS, AND BEYOND......Page 151
THE 1982 CONSTITUTION AND ITS AMENDMENTS: FROM A CENTRALLY PLANNED ECONOMY TO A SOCIALIST MARKET ECONOMY, FROM A REVOLUTIONARY PARTY TO A GOVERNING PARTY......Page 157
Horizontal Power Issues......Page 162
Vertical Power Issues......Page 164
Constitutional Litigation and the Protection of Individual Rights......Page 165
CHINA’S LIVING CONSTITUTION: SOCIALIST CONSTITUTIONALISM
WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS......Page 168
THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CHINA......Page 172
REFERENCES......Page 175
7: The Political Economy of Constitutionalism in a Non-Secularist World......Page 177
CO-OPTATION......Page 178
JURISDICTIONAL ADVANTAGES......Page 183
THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW......Page 187
CONSTITUTIONAL DELEGITIMATION OF RADICAL
RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATION......Page 194
POLITICAL CONTROL OF THE JUDICIARY......Page 196
CONCLUSION......Page 201
REFERENCES......Page 202
PART III: Issues in Institutional Design......Page 206
8: Constitutional Amendment Rules: The Denominator Problem......Page 208
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT, DIFFICULTY AND SCALE:
THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS......Page 209
THE DATA ON AMENDMENT RATES AND DENOMINATORS......Page 212
Sliding-Scale Voting Rules......Page 221
Lower Supermajority Rules......Page 222
Comparative Dangers (or Disadvantages)......Page 225
CONCLUSION......Page 227
REFERENCES......Page 228
INTRODUCTION......Page 232
Preratification......Page 235
Postratification......Page 236
The General Welfare Clause......Page 238
The Commerce Clause......Page 239
Externalities......Page 245
Internalization Principle......Page 246
Federal Coase Theorem......Page 248
ANALYTICAL CATEGORIES OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 8......Page 253
Analysis of Section 8......Page 254
Collective-action Federalism and Constitutional Disagreement......Page 259
EXPLAINING (OR IMPROVING) CONTEMPORARY UNDERSTANDINGS......Page 261
The Commerce Clause......Page 262
Dormant Commerce Clause......Page 267
The Purposes for Which Congress May Tax and Spend......Page 268
Regulation under Clause 1?......Page 269
EVALUATING CONGRESSIONAL JUDGMENTS ABOUT
COLLECTIVE-ACTION PROBLEMS......Page 274
CONCLUSION......Page 276
REFERENCES......Page 277
10: Personal Laws and Equality: The Case of India......Page 279
HISTORY......Page 280
PERSONAL LAWS AS ACCOMMODATION......Page 289
PERSONAL LAWS AS ESTABLISHMENT......Page 290
ACCOMMODATION AND ESTABLISHMENT: AN APPARENT TENSION
AND A PROPOSED RESOLUTION......Page 297
NEGOTIATION: LATIFI V. UNION OF INDIA......Page 301
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS......Page 305
REFERENCES......Page 306
INTRODUCTION......Page 307
THE ITALIAN MODEL......Page 313
LATIN AMERICAN CIRCUMSTANCES......Page 322
CONCLUSION......Page 326
REFERENCES......Page 328
12: Tyrannophobia......Page 330
CONCEPTS AND DISTINCTIONS......Page 331
The Founding......Page 335
Post-Founding American History......Page 338
Hypotheses......Page 341
Does Tyrannophobia Prevent Dictatorship?......Page 342
Alternative Explanations for the Absence of Dictatorship......Page 343
Demographics......Page 345
Institutional Design......Page 346
DICTATORSHIP AND TYRANNOPHOBIA IN AMERICA......Page 347
Bounded Rationality......Page 348
Tyrannophobia and the Risk of Dictatorship......Page 350
Alternative Explanations......Page 353
The Costs and Benefits of Tyrannophobia......Page 356
CONCLUSION......Page 358
REFERENCES......Page 359
13: Do Executive Term Limits Cause Constitutional Crises?......Page 363
EXECUTIVE TERM LIMITS: ORIGINS AND RATIONALE......Page 364
EXECUTIVE TERM LIMITS: THEIR TYPES AND INCIDENCE......Page 368
Understay, Punctual Exit, and Overstay......Page 372
Determinants of Overstay......Page 378
Consequences of Overstay......Page 381
CONCLUSION......Page 386
APPENDIX......Page 388
REFERENCES......Page 390
Index......Page 394