Climate Liberalism: Perspectives on Liberty, Property and Pollution

Acknowledgments
Contents
Notes on Contributors
List of Figures
List of Tables
Introduction
	Conventional Environmental Protection
	Classical-Liberal Environmental Protection
	The Problem of Pollution
	The Climate Challenge
	Climate Liberalism
	Conclusion
	Notes
Pollution and Natural Rights
	Introduction
	Natural Rights Theory
	Pollution and Natural Rights
	The Efficiency Objection
	The Liberty Objection
	Conventionality
	The Efficiency Objection, Redux
	Conclusion
	Notes
Do Libertarians Have Anything Useful to Contribute to Climate Change Policy?
	Introduction
	The Varieties of Libertarian Environmental and Climate Policies
		Libertarian Dissensus
		Libertarian Climate Policies
			Pure Property-Based Environmental and Climate Policies
			Property-Based Plus Limited Government Action
	Special Problems of Climate Change for Free Market Environmentalism
		Problems for Common-Law Property-Based Solutions
		Problems for “Market-Based” Regulatory Instruments
	Implications and Conclusion
	Notes
Climate Change Adaptation Through the Prism of Individual Rights
	Introduction
	Property Owners’ Takings Claims Based on Adaptation Regulation
		Takings Doctrine in Brief
		Inequality, Causation, and Property Owners’ Takings Claims
	Governments Suing Energy Companies for Adaptation Costs in Public Nuisance
	The Notice/Causation Nexus
	Conclusion
	Notes
Common Law Tort as a Transitional Regulatory Regime: A New Perspective on Climate Change Litigation
	Introduction
	Tort Law in the Administrative State: A Dynamic, Information-Forcing, Experimentation Model of Common Law Tort as a Transitional Regulatory Regime
	Climate Change Litigation: Laying a Foundation for Experimentation with Adaptation Measures
	Conclusion: Common Law Tort as Part of the Future of Environmental Law?
	Notes
Libertarianism, Pollution, and the Limits of Court Adjudication
	Enforcing Rights
	Navigating Indeterminacy
	Limited Protections
		Path Dependency
		Uncertainty
		Predictably Limited Protection
	Institutional Competencies
	Recasting the Judiciary
	Focusing on Rights
	Conclusion
	Notes
Complexities of Climate Governance in Multidimensional Property Regimes
	Introduction
	Climate Change Indicators
		Weather Modification
		Wildfire
	Siloed Approaches in Interconnected Systems
		Unregulated Polluters
		Pollution’s Connection to Land
		A Theory of Landscape-Level Governance
		Stakeholder Collaborations
		Negative-Value Resources
	Wildfire, A Case Study
		Restoring Fire to the Natural Landscape
	Conclusion
	Notes
Climate Change and Class Actions
	What Is a Class Action?
	The Classical Liberal Case for Class Actions
	Better Incentives
	More Independence
	Notes
Nature and the Firm
	The Firm
	The Firm and the Environment
	Where Are the Environmental Firms?
	The Airshed authority—A Thought Experiment
	Firms and Federalism
	Conclusion
	Notes
Permission, Prohibition, and Dynamism
	Economic Dynamism
	Political Dynamism and the Open Society
	Dynamism as a Social Value
	Prohibitions and Permissions
	Permissions, Innovation, and the Environment
	Conclusion
	Notes
Market Solutions to Large Number Environmental Problem-Induced Changes in Risk Distributions
	Introduction
	Challenges Presented by Changes in Risk Distributions
	The Role of Alternative Risk Transfer Mechanisms
		The Traditional Insurance Baseline
		The Role of Alternative Risk Transfer
			Captive Insurance
			Catastrophe Bonds
			Weather Derivatives
			Using ART Methods
	Harnessing ARTMs to Incentivize Adaptation
		The Entrepreneur’s Role
		Policy Options
	Notes
A Classical Liberal Case for Target-Consistent Carbon Pricing
	Property Rights and Their Limits1
	The Role of Government
	Friedrich Hayek’s Contributions11
	Pricing, Science, and the Future16
	The Case for Target-Consistent Pricing
	Conclusions
	Notes
Climate Change, Political Economy, and the Problem of Comparative Institutions Analysis
	Introduction
	Comparative Institutions Analysis in Political Economy
	Climate Change Governance and Comparative Institutions Analysis
		Institutional Options for Climate Change Governance
	The Problem of Comparative Evaluation
		Modelling to the Rescue?
		History to the Rescue?
		Like Cases to the Rescue?
	Conclusion
	Notes
The Social Cost of Carbon, Humility, and Overlapping Consensus on Climate Policy
	Introduction and Overview
	The Social Cost of Carbon
		The Social Cost of a Pollutant: The Basic Idea
		The Social Cost of Carbon (SCC), and Estimates of the SCC
		The SCC-Based Approach to Climate Policy
	A Modest Carbon Tax Derived from SCC Estimates as an Alternative to a Pigouvian Tax
	Overlapping Consensus, Ecumenical Climate Policy, and the SCC-Based Approach
		Ecumenical Climate Policy: How the SCC-Based Approach is Neutral Between Different Reasonable Normative Frameworks
		Overlapping Consensus on Climate Policy: How the SCC-Based Approach Can Help Identify a Policy That Is Justifiable to All
	Summary of Distinctions Relevant to Evaluating the SCC-Based Approach and Policy Recommendations
	Additional Worries About the SCC-Based Approach
		Worry: Too Much Mitigation, Because of Overly Pessimistic Assumptions About Technology and Adaptation
		Worry: Too Much Mitigation, Given Political Infeasibility and Counterproductive Blowback of Recommended Mitigation
		Worry: Too Much Mitigation, Because Domestic SCC Is Only a Fraction of Global SCC
		Worry: Too Little Mitigation, Because Worst-Case Scenarios Are Ignored and/or There Is Too Much Pure Time Preference (i.e., Impacts More Than a Century from Now Are Given Little Importance)
		Worry: Too Little Mitigation, Because Many Harms Are Not Accounted for, Especially Harm to the Poor, Oppressed, and Most Vulnerable
		Worry: Carbon Taxation Is the Wrong Mechanism for Emissions Reductions
	Notes
Index