China's Use of Military Force in Foreign Affairs: The Dragon Strikes

Cover
Half Title
Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication
Contents
List of illustrations
List of abbreviations
Acknowledgements
1 Introduction
	Aim of the book
	The puzzle of China’s use of military force
	Core argument and central findings
	Current state of research and debate and relevancy of this contribution
	Designing research
	Plan of the book
	Notes
	Bibliography
2 Why nations go to war
	Realist explanations for war
		The individual level: Classical Realism
		The system level: Neorealism
		The second image: rationality and warfare
	Requirements for an explanation of China’s use of force
	A Cultural Theory of International Relations
		Spirit
		Appetite
		Reason
		Fear
		Ideal-types, real worlds, and the formation of foreign policy
	Operationalization
		Defining empirical tests
			Expectations: spirit
			Expectations: fear
			Expectations: Fearon’s rationalist explanation
		‘Measuring’ motives: methodological challenges
			Analyzing discourses or documents
			Process tracing and congruence tests
			Turning weaknesses into strengths: an integrated methodological approach
		The structure of the case-study analyses
	Notes
	Bibliography
3 China’s Korean War, 1950–1953
	Outline of the chapter
	Setting the scene
		China enters the socialist society
		Kim Il-sung’s military ambitions between Beijing and Moscow
		Interim conclusion: honor and obligations
	On the course to intervention
		China’s early commitment
		NEBDA – assembling an intervention force
		The tide changes: constructing an intervention with Chinese characteristics
			The just cause: waiting for the enemy to cross the 38th parallel
			The right to intervene: Kim’s personal request
	The decision: an intervention by invitation
		Bringing the leadership into line: the “national security interest”
		The decision stands firm
	China’s Korean War: assessing the risks
		The state of combat-readiness of China’s ground forces
		Air power: Soviet air cover for the CPV
		Implications for operative planning
		Interim conclusion: assessing the risks of China’s Korean war
	The CPV in Korea: fighting for China’s glory
		Phase I: the five Chinese offensives
			The prevalence of military considerations
			The predominance of political objectives
		Phase II: cease-fire negotiations
			The POW issue – a matter of principle and pride
			China’s last battle in the Korean War
		The success of the Panmunjom negotiations: in search of explanations
			Military developments
			Domestic considerations
			Stalin’s death
		Interim conclusion: Mao’s Korean War
	Conclusion: China’s intervention in the Korean War
	Notes
	Bibliography
4 The Sino-Indian War of 1962
	Outline of the chapter
	The making of a conflict
		Phase I: a special relationship
			First clouds over the Sino-Indian honeymoon
			The eastern sector: the controversy over the ‘illegal’ McMahon Line
			The western sector: India’s last-minute claim
		Phase II: friendship in crisis
			The Tibetan revolt and the breakdown of Sino-Indian friendship
			The militarization of the border
			Negotiations: Zhou Enlai in New Delhi
		Phase III: frustration – India’s forward policy
			The forward policy: India’s calculus and intentions
			China’s response: armed coexistence
			Armed coexistence meets forward policy in the Himalayas
		Interim conclusion: from cleavage to conflict
	Offended: Beijing’s decision for war with India
		China’s operative consideration
		India’s lost opportunity for a final course correction
	Assessing the risks of China’s lesson
		Fighting in the Himalayas: challenges and capabilities in high-altitude combat
		Key capabilities for combat at high altitude
		The combatants’ military portfolios for high-altitude combat
		Interim conclusion: assessing the risks of China’s Himalayan campaign
	Fighting a war to negotiate the peace: the PLA in the Himalayas
		China’s initial offensive
		Three weeks of quiet on the Himalayan front
		The humiliation of India’s armed forces
		China’s unilateral cease-fire and withdrawal
		The outcome: a “most unfortunate war”
	Conclusion: warfare between friends
	Notes
	Bibliography
5 The Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969
	Outline of the chapter
	Who started the fight?
		Bloodshed at Zhenbao: the Chinese aggression
		An escalation by accident?
		The second clash: March 15, 1969
	Patterns of Sino-Soviet crisis management
	The formation of the conflict
		The border issue: a mirror for Sino-Soviet relations
	Phase I: no use of force at all (1959–66)
		The Sino-Soviet split: from crop to harvest
			The Khrushchev years
			Border consultations
			Brezhnev: Cold War in the socialist world
		Phase II: fight if necessary, but avoid shooting (1966–8)
			China’s Cultural Revolution
			Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia: the Brezhnev Doctrine
		Phase III: proactive use of military force (1969)
			Setting the trap
			Alternative explanation: regaining control over the Cultural Revolution
		Interim conclusion: classifying triggers and conditions
	Assessing the risks: a well-calculated Chinese ‘lesson’?
		Risk assessment I: the tactical level
			Limited provocation: China’s risk control
			The choice for Zhenbao: a tactical perspective
		Risk assessment II: the strategic level
			Force posture
			Logistical infrastructure
			Assessing vulnerabilities: who had more to lose?
			Mao’s calculus on Soviet restraint
		Interim conclusion: assessing the risks of challenging a superpower
	Striking the balance for China’s border clashes
	Conclusion: fighting to make a point
	Notes
	Bibliography
6 China’s Vietnam War, 1979
	Outline of the chapter
	The formation of the conflict
		Phase I: Brotherly comradeship
		China’s crucial assistance in the First and Second Indochina Wars
		The growing Soviet factor in Sino-Vietnamese relations
		Phase II: Drifting apart
		The predominance of the Soviet factor in Vietnam
		China’s strategic realignment: The United States and Cambodia
		Phase III: Ingratitude with Vietnamese characteristics
			Territorial disputes
			The expulsion of the Hoa-Chinese from Vietnam
			Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia
			The common denominator: the Soviet Union
		Interim conclusion: from comradeship to enmity
	The decision: China takes revenge
	China’s Vietnam War: assessing the risks
		The state of combat-readiness of China’s armed forces in 1979
			The impact of Lin Biao’s military reforms
			Deficits in leadership
			Low morale across the rank and file
			Obsolete weaponry
		The PLA en route to Vietnam: the leadership’s assessment
		The threat to the north: the Soviet factor in Beijing’s risk calculation
		Interim conclusion: gambling with high stakes
	Revenge with Chinese characteristics: China’s lesson in the field
		The initial offensive: China’s tanks against Vietnamese punji stakes
		The battle for Lang Son and China’s withdrawal
		Striking the balance for China’s Vietnam War
	Conclusion: warfare between comrades
	Notes
	Bibliography
7 Conclusion
	Empirical findings
	Theoretical reflection
	Back to the future: today’s Middle Kingdom, conflicts, and status
		Chinese–Japanese rivalry in the East China Sea
		The South China Sea: a Chinese sphere of influence?
		The United States and China: the gathering storm?
	Notes
	Bibliography
Index