Causal Powers: Theory of Natural Necessity

FIRST PAGE......Page 1
TITLE PAGE......Page 3
COPYRIGHT......Page 4
CONTENTS......Page 5
PREFACE......Page 7
I. The Plot......Page 9
II. Conceptual and Natural Necessity......Page 16
III. The Place of Necessity in Explanation and the Non-necessity of Worlds......Page 22
IV. The Scientific Use of the Distinction between Real and Nominal Essence......Page 24
V. The Modes of Necessity......Page 27
VI. The True History of \'Copper\'......Page 29
References......Page 33
I. Why a Regularity Theorist would find Logicism a natural philosophical method......Page 35
II. Logicism Examined: the case of Causality and Lawlikeness......Page 36
III. Why a Regularity Theorist should find a Source of Support in Epistemic Atomism......Page 48
IV. The Alleged Psychological Basis for Epistemic Atomism Examined......Page 49
References......Page 50
I. An Examination of the Most Central Humean Contention: the In-Principle (or No-contradiction) Argument......Page 52
II. The Experience of the Action of Causal Power......Page 57
References......Page 76
I. Inductive Inference......Page 78
II. The Occasions for New Worlds......Page 81
III. The Location of the Fallacy of Strong Scepticism......Page 84
References......Page 88
I. Two Paradigms of Action......Page 90
II. Analysis of Power Ascriptions, 1......Page 92
III. Analysis of Power Ascriptions, 2......Page 94
IV. The Criteria of Truth and Falsity for Power Ascriptions......Page 99
V. Powers and the Numerical Identity of their Possessors......Page 102
VI. The Identity Criterion for Powers......Page 104
VII. The Logical Form of Power Ascriptions......Page 105
VIII. Tendencies......Page 106
References......Page 108
I. Natures as Essences: The Logical Concept of a Nature......Page 109
II. Natures as Constitutions: The Empirical Concept of a Nature......Page 111
III. Natures and the Explanation of Change......Page 113
IV. Natures, Identity and Continuity......Page 117
IV. Natures, Identity and Continuity......Page 120
References......Page 124
I. The Paradoxes that flow from the Assumption of the Independence of Empirical Predicates......Page 126
II. The Content of Adequate Theories......Page 132
III. How Adequate Theories escape the Paradoxes......Page 136
IV. Natural Necessity......Page 138
V. The Irreducibility of Natural Necessity......Page 140
VI. Our View distinguished from that of Idealism......Page 143
References......Page 146
I. A Summary of our Theory and Possible Criticisms of it......Page 148
II. In Defence of our Argument that the Possibility of a Change in the Course of Nature does not affect the Necessity of the Relation between the Nature of a Thing and its Powers......Page 151
III. The Rebuttal of the Doctrine that whatever is \'a posteriori\' cannot be Necessary......Page 153
IV. Variations in a Thing\'s Nature are not Inconsistent with Natural Necessity in its Actions......Page 158
V. Examination of the Charge that the Concept of the Nature of a Thing Presupposes the Legitimacy of Inductive Generalisation......Page 159
VI. The Proper Place of Contingency......Page 160
VII. Refutation of the Argument for an Ultimate Humean Contingency......Page 162
VIII. Rebuttal of the Argument that even if Necessary Causal Connections exist they could never be Known......Page 164
References......Page 167
I. Some Requirements for an Individual to be an Ultimate Entity......Page 169
II. The Empirical Concept best meeting the Requirements for Ultimacy......Page 172
III. Problems in the Generalisation of Field Concepts as a new Metaphysics......Page 183
IV. Metaphysical Difficulties with the Concept of a Universal and Fundamental Field......Page 187
References......Page 191
E......Page 195
I......Page 196
N......Page 197
W......Page 198
Y......Page 199