Capital Markets and Financial Intermediation

Cover......Page 1
Frontmatter......Page 2
Contents......Page 10
List of figures......Page 14
List of tables......Page 16
Preface......Page 18
List of conference participants......Page 19
1 - Introduction......Page 22
1 Theoretical issues......Page 23
2 Policy issues......Page 28
3 Conclusions......Page 31
1 Introduction......Page 33
2 What do banks do?......Page 35
3 Efficient governance structure of firms......Page 38
4 Interpreting the firm as a bank......Page 47
5 Banking regulation......Page 49
6 Private remedies......Page 52
7 Concluding remarks......Page 54
Discussion......Page 57
1 Introduction......Page 67
2 The model......Page 69
3 Borrowers' desired f1-contingent contracts......Page 71
4 Assignment of control when f1, is not verifiable and there are no competing future lenders......Page 74
5 Competing future lenders, refinancing and liquidation decisions......Page 76
6 Multiple initial lenders and debt priority......Page 79
7 Bank (private) lenders and public bondholders......Page 82
8 Lender competition and dilution......Page 85
9 Conclusion......Page 86
Discussion......Page 89
1 Introduction......Page 102
2 Traditional analyses......Page 111
3 The checking role of the stock market......Page 113
4 Banks versus stock markets......Page 122
5 The stock market and government ownership......Page 124
6 Concluding remarks......Page 125
Discussion......Page 129
1 Introduction......Page 138
2 The model......Page 142
3 Equilibrium......Page 145
4 Equilibrium with positive lending......Page 148
5 Stability of financial collapse......Page 151
6 The impossibility of profitable deviations......Page 154
7 Discussion......Page 155
Appendix A: Definition of equilibrium......Page 158
Appendix B: Proofs of Propositions 2--5......Page 160
Discussion......Page 169
1 Introduction......Page 177
2 Theoretical perspective......Page 179
3 Financial development and economic activity......Page 187
4 Financial intermediation and economic growth......Page 193
5 Implications for the reconstruction of Europe......Page 203
6 Summary and conclusions......Page 208
Discussion......Page 211
1 Introduction......Page 218
2 The history of Hungarian bankruptcy......Page 220
3 The design of bankruptcy laws and decisions to liquidate......Page 225
4 Creditor passivity: an implementation problem......Page 228
5 Towards a link between financial institutions and bankruptcy......Page 239
Discussion......Page 246
1 Introduction......Page 251
2 Identifying the problem......Page 252
3 Implications of credit market failures......Page 258
4 Tackling the problem......Page 260
5 Reforming credit relations in Central and Eastern Europe......Page 266
6 Monetary policy after credit reform......Page 273
Discussion......Page 276
1 Introduction......Page 283
2 The formal analysis......Page 284
3 The changing environment of banking: the US experience and its implications for Western Europe......Page 292
Appendix......Page 298
Discussion......Page 307
1 Introduction......Page 313
2 The model......Page 316
3 The analysis......Page 320
4 Policy implications......Page 335
5 Conclusion......Page 338
Discussion......Page 340
1 Introduction......Page 349
2 A simple model of lending......Page 352
3 Comparative statics of more competition......Page 357
4 Welfare results......Page 358
5 Other issues......Page 360
6 Concluding remarks......Page 362
Discussion......Page 365
Index......Page 370