Being in time : dynamical models of phenomenal experience

Being in Time
 Editorial page
 Title page
 LCC data
 Table of contents
 Introduction
 Conclusion
 Time after time
 1. Introduction: Ubiquitous time
 2. A middle way: Dynamical systems
 3. Brainspace
 4. Temporality now!
 5. Countdown to implementation
 6. Crossing the explanatory gap
 Acknowledgements
 References
 Neuronal reflections and subjective awareness
 1. Introduction- the optimistic outlook
 2. The creative nature of visual perception
 3. A colossal library
 4. Building templates- hierarchically
 5. A combinatorial explosion
 6. The ambiguity inherent in isolated responses. 7. Neuronal reflections8. Experimental consequences
 9. What is so unique about the cerebral cortex?
 10. Is consciousness a local or global phenomenon?
 11. Is visual awareness dependent on higher levels of the cortical hierarchy?
 References
 From probabilities to percepts
 1. Introduction
 2. The ubiquity of sensory ambiguity and its absence from sensory consciousness
 3. An orthogonal order of estimates and the 'precedence of the gaze'
 4. Design features of a global best estimate buffer
 4.1 The neural numerology of sensory experience. 4.2 Our panoramic, nested, ego-centric, three-dimensional visual world4.3 "Just in time" for the next gaze movement: brief career of the global best estimate
 5. Cortex, colliculus and "the other thalamus"
 6. Conclusion
 References
 Being in time
 1. A few more constraints on theories of phenomenal experience
 1.1 Autonomy
 1.2 Timeliness
 1.3 Computational tractability
 2. Implications of the autonomy of experience
 3. Time is of the essence
 4. Waiting for Godot
 4.1 The attractor hypothesis
 4.2 The way ahead
 5. Computational tools for distributed dynamic coordination
 6. Summary. AcknowledgmentsReferences
 The (lack of) mental life of some machines
 1. Introduction --
special laws:
 2. One bit at a time
 3. How detailed is detailed enough?
 4. Not all machines are born equal
 5. Conclusion
 Acknowledgements
 References
 Restless minds, wandering brains
 1. Introduction
 1.1 Escaping robustness
 2. Perceptual switching
 3. An EEG-study of perceptual mind wandering
 4. The dynamics of mind-wandering
 5. What happens to the laminar intervals when observers do engage in a task?
 6. Conclusion
 Acknowledgement
 References
 Fuzzy consciousness
 1. Introduction. 2. Cylinder sets3. The pushing and pulling of consciousness
 4. Discussion
 References
 Two dynamical themes in Husserl
 1. Background
 2. Horizon theory/constitution
 3. Transcendental-eidetic phenomenology
 4. Conclusion
 References
 Desiderata for a mereotopological theory of consciousness
 1. Introduction: Unity, holism, and temporal continuity
 2. Mereotopology as a new tool for the study of consciousness
 2. A critical application: Does an experience have temporal parts?
 3. "Self-embedding": Sketch of a positive proposal
 4. Conclusion
 References
 The brain and its states.