Aristotle: Semantics and Ontology, Volume 1: General Introduction. The Works on Logic

ARISTOTLE: SEMANTICS AND ONTOLOGY, Volume 1: General introduction. The works on logic......Page 4
Preface......Page 6
1.1 Aristotle the philosopher and his interpreters......Page 20
1.11 The development theory and its aftermath......Page 22
1.12 The general purport of the present study......Page 26
1.13 The Greeks in search for λόγος out off χάος......Page 31
1.21 The structural limits of language......Page 33
1.22 Deep structure analysis in Aristotle......Page 35
1.3 Meaning and representation......Page 39
1.4 Charles Kahn's view of copulative 'be' as central for the uses οf εἶναι......Page 43
1.5 The common doctrine of 'be' rephrased in light of Aristotelian semantics......Page 49
1.51 No copulative 'be' in Aristotle's protocol language......Page 50
1.52 A preliminary survey of Aristotle's notion of 'be'......Page 52
1.53 An appendix on various uses of ὑπάρχειν......Page 56
1.6 Εἶναι and its cognates in Aristotle's philosophical investigations......Page 62
1.61 Tὸ ὄv and τὰ ὄντα......Page 63
1.62 The various uses of οὐσία......Page 66
1.63 A preliminary assessment of these uses......Page 71
1.64 The 'connotative' or 'intensional' use of 'be'......Page 72
1.71 Four Main Rules of Aristotelian semantics......Page 79
1.72 Ambivalence vs. ambiguity......Page 88
1.73 Modern parallels to the Main Rules......Page 91
2.11 'Predication ' in Aristotle. The τὶ κατὰ τινός device......Page 94
2.12 The monadic analysis of Aristotelian statement proposed by Matthen......Page 99
2.13 The semantic paradigm of assertions with 'is' as an assertoric operator......Page 102
2.14 Aristotle's protocol language of the statement-making utterance......Page 105
2.15 The copula-less exegesis evidenced......Page 106
2.16 The import of the distinction between 'assertible'and 'assertion'......Page 112
2.17 Allan Bäck's 'aspect theory' of predication......Page 115
2.18 The notion οf ὑποκεῖσθαι in Aristotle......Page 118
2.2 Naming vs. asserting. Onomastic vs. apophantic level......Page 119
2.21 Φάναι and φάσις. Κατάφασις and ἀπόφασις. Ἀντίφασις......Page 120
2.22 Λόγος and πρᾶγμα......Page 123
2.23 Aristotle's use οf πρᾶγμα assessed in a broader context......Page 130
2.24 Διάνοια and πρᾶγμα......Page 133
2.3 Συμπλοκή and σύνθεσις. The role of διαίρεσις......Page 134
2.31 What precisely does συμπλοκή bear on?......Page 135
2.32 Σύνθεσις and διαίρεσις......Page 139
(a) συντιθέναι......Page 140
(b) σύνθεσις......Page 141
2.33 Résumé......Page 146
2.34 Ἀλήθεια and ψεῦδος, and cognate notions......Page 147
2.35 The functions οf ὄνομα and ῥῆμα in the assertible (λόγος)......Page 150
2.41 The Aristotelian categories are classes of names, not sentence predicates......Page 152
2.42 Categorization......Page 154
2.51 The agonistic spirit of Greek culture......Page 155
2.52 Ἀπόδειξις: Epistemonic proof......Page 158
2.53 Ἐπαγωγή in Aristotle: A heuristic strategy......Page 159
2.54 The syllogism based on induction vs. induction as such......Page 163
2.55 Persuasion only found in the ἐπακτικός λόγος......Page 167
2.56 On the 'universalpoint' aimed at by Aristotelian induction......Page 172
2.57 Example (παράδειγμα)......Page 175
2.61 Categorization at work in APr. II 21......Page 178
2.62 Again, the proper nature of the 'universal point'......Page 185
2.7 Categorization and the use of the qua-locution as its main device......Page 186
2.71 Particulars as the ultimate objects of epistemonic proof......Page 187
2.72 Focalization and categorization, and the acquisition of the 'middle'......Page 189
2.73 The qua-locution as the proper device for Aristotle s strategy of argument......Page 191
2.74 APr. 137-38 and the role of the qua-locution......Page 194
2.75 The modest role of prioristic syllogistics in Aristotelian argument......Page 198
2.76 Indexing by qua-locution as the device for categorizing commensurately......Page 204
3.1 Introduction......Page 209
3.21 Words as representing thoughts......Page 211
3.22 Combined and uncombined thoughts and utterances......Page 212
3.23 The impact of combination on statemental truth and falsehood......Page 214
3.24 On time-connotation and timelessness......Page 218
3.25 The semantics of naming. Ὄνομα defined......Page 223
3.26 The semantics of verbal or nominal attribution. Ῥῆμα defined......Page 226
3.27 Ῥῆμα opposed to ὄνομα......Page 231
3.28 Is ῥῆμα 'verb'?......Page 233
3.3 The "curious medley" found, in the chapter's final part (16b19-25)......Page 234
3.31 Some philological problems concerning 16b22-25......Page 238
3.32 On the diverse ways of interpreting 16b22-25......Page 240
3.33 On Boethius's main source, Ammonius......Page 243
3.34 Ammonius's debatable appeal to Alexander......Page 248
3.35 Some notes on the origin of the copula construal 'S is P'......Page 254
3.36 Thomas Aquinas going his own way......Page 257
3.37 Consuming now the 'indigestible' portion......Page 261
3.41 The semantics of λόγος (both 'assertible' and 'assertion')......Page 267
3.42 On affirmation, negation, and contradiction......Page 269
3.51 The different 'states of affairs' (πράγματα)......Page 274
3.52 On universal and partial quantification......Page 276
3.53 On contrary and contradictory opposition......Page 279
3.54 Does Aristotle's concept of 'contradiction' differ from ours?......Page 281
3.55 On single affirmation and negation......Page 285
3.6 The problems surrounding expressions concerning future events......Page 287
3.61 Some introductory remarks......Page 288
3.62 Status quaestionis......Page 292
3.63 The so-called determinist's or fatalistic argument......Page 295
3.64 The 'either-true-or-false-of-necessity' issue correctly understood......Page 302
3.65 On the notion of necessity......Page 305
3.66 Taking the dichotomy 'assertible' vs. 'assertion' seriously......Page 307
3.67 Summary of the argument of 19a7-b4......Page 312
3.68 Boethius's exegesis of Aristotle's solution......Page 314
3.69 Two final remarks on the 'assertion vs. assertible' device......Page 320
3.7 Simple statements and their mutual relations......Page 321
3.71 'Simple statement' defined......Page 322
3.72 On primitive affirmation and negation......Page 324
3.73 On 'Is' acting as a 'third element'......Page 325
3.74 The key-role of the disjunction made between onoma and rhema at 19b21-22......Page 329
3.75 Focussing on either the rhema part or the onoma part......Page 333
3.76 On contrary vs. contradictory opposition......Page 339
3.77 The so-called 'Proclus's canon'......Page 345
3.78 On changing the word-order......Page 347
3.81 The notion of 'making up one thing'......Page 351
3.82 On assigning two conjoint designations......Page 354
3.83 Summary of chapter 11......Page 359
3.84 On using modal expressions......Page 360
3.85 The semantic function οf πρόσθεσις......Page 364
3.86 On negating modal expressions. Continuation......Page 365
3.87 Contradiction, contrariety, and contrary beliefs......Page 366
3.88 On true and false belief......Page 367
3.89 From belief to spoken expressions......Page 369
3.9 Conclusion......Page 370
3.91 The main outcome of De interpretatione highlighted......Page 371
3.92 The treatise's doctrinal and strategic position......Page 373
4.11 Late Antiquity and Middle Ages......Page 377
4.12 Kant and the aftermath......Page 380
4.13 Contemporary views......Page 383
4.14 The categories as classes of names. Categorization......Page 387
4.2 On naming. Names and the things named (Cat., chs. 1-3)......Page 392
4.21 Homonymy. Synonymy and Paronymy......Page 393
4.22 The semantic diagram......Page 394
4.23 The notion of ὑποκεῖσθαι (ὑποκείμενον)......Page 396
4.24 The purport of the semantic diagram......Page 397
4.25 The transitivity rule. Metalepsis......Page 399
4.31 Things brought up 'without any combination' (κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκήν)......Page 403
4.32 Κατηγορία, κατηγορεῖν, and categorization......Page 405
4.4 On the protagonist of the list, οὐσία......Page 407
4.41 Primary and secondary οὐσία. Sequels of this way of naming......Page 408
4.42 Sequels to naming concerning 'things present in a substrate'......Page 409
4.43 The ontic status οf δεύτεραι ὐσίαι. Ousia further assessed......Page 411
4.44 The characteristics of οὐσίαι and their specific differences......Page 412
4.45 On the this-ness and definiteness of ousia......Page 415
4.46 On certain other characteristics of οὐσίαι......Page 418
4.47 An additional question about λόγος and δὀξα......Page 420
4.48 What does Aristotle mean by οὐσία ?......Page 422
4.5 Quantitative being......Page 423
4.6 The category πρός τι as primarily modifying naming......Page 427
4.61 The nature and practical impact of relational naming......Page 428
4.62 Of what nature are the correlates mentioned at 6b2-3 ?......Page 429
4.63 Knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) and perception (αἴσθησις)......Page 430
4.64 State (ἕξις), disposition (διάθεσις), and 'posture' (θέσις)......Page 433
(a) Ἕξις......Page 434
(b) Διαθέσις......Page 436
(c) Θέσις......Page 440
4.65 Why should the correlates 'reciprocate'?......Page 442
4.66 On reciprocation as to implication of 'being given'......Page 446
4.67 The requirement of simultaneity by nature......Page 448
4.68 Relational being as discussed elsewhere. Aristotle vs. Plato......Page 452
4.69 Why should the first definition of πρός τι things be revised?......Page 457
4.71 Four kinds of qualitative being......Page 461
4.72 On paronymy......Page 464
4.73 Some characteristics of qualitative being......Page 467
4.8 The remaining six modes of categorial being. The Postpraedicamenta......Page 468
4.82 On things opposed in virtue of a relational mode of being......Page 469
4.83 On things contrarily opposed......Page 470
4.84 On things piivatively opposed......Page 472
4.85 On things opposed as assertion and denial......Page 474
4.86 Priority, posteriority, and simultaneity......Page 479
4.87 On logico-semantic (non-)priority and the implication of 'being given'......Page 480
4.88 On being simultaneous......Page 483
4.89 Change as observed in four kinds of categorial being......Page 484
4.9 On the different kinds of 'having'......Page 485
5.1 Preliminary matters (Top. I, chs. 1-4)......Page 491
5.21 The so-called 'predicables' introduced in Top. I, 5-6 and 8......Page 495
5.22 How the categories and the 'four items' are integrated......Page 503
5.23 The notions τί ἐστι and οὐσία......Page 508
5.24 The origin of the misleading label 'predicable'......Page 510
5.25 Some notes on the title Πέντε φωναί......Page 515
5.31 Dialectical propositions, problems, and theses. Kinds of argument......Page 517
5.32 How to become well supplied with reasonings......Page 519
5.33 How to deal with multiplicity of meaning......Page 521
5.34 How to notice dissimilarities and resemblances......Page 523
5.35 On the usefulness of the three devices......Page 524
5.41 The division of problem propositions......Page 525
5.42 A semantic difficulty concern ing coincidental modes of being......Page 526
5.43 Two more errors bearing on the semantics of naming......Page 528
5.44 Some important semantic issues in the discussions of 'accident'......Page 529
5.51 Further implementations of the transitivity rule......Page 537
5.52 Various additional rules for identifying genus and differentia......Page 540
5.53 The assignment of propria......Page 541
5.6 The correct statement of a thing's definiens (Top. VI-VII, chs. 1-3)......Page 544
5.7 The practice of dialectics (Top. VIII)......Page 548
5.72 How to answer questions (Top. VIII, chs. 4-10)......Page 549
5.73 On bad dialectical practice and hoxu to react (Top. VIII, 11)......Page 551
5.74 On clarity vs. fallaciousness of arguments (Top. VIII, 12)......Page 553
5.75 On begging the question (Top. VIII, 13)......Page 554
5.76 Various hints on training and practice in dialectical arguments (Top.VIII, 14)......Page 555
5.8 The Sophistic Refutations......Page 556
5.81 Introductory remarks (SE, chs. 1-2)......Page 557
5.82 The fallacies depending on linguistic features......Page 559
5.83 The fallacies unconnected with language......Page 561
5.84 Various notes on the nature of refutation and its different types......Page 566
5.85 No genuine distinction between expressions and things expressed......Page 567
5.9 On the respondent's job. How to rebut fallacious attacks......Page 569
5.91 Some general remarks on how to react to fallacious attacks......Page 570
5.92 The special rebuttals to the fallacies depending on language......Page 573
5.93 The special rebuttals to the seven remaining fallacies......Page 575
5.94 The rebuttals in connection with babbling and. solecism......Page 577
5.95 On the evaluation of fallacious arguments......Page 578
5.96 Conclusion......Page 579
6.1 The Prior Analytics. Preliminary remarks......Page 581
6.11 Premiss. Term. Syllogism......Page 582
6.12 The nature of the Aristotelian syllogism. Disputational necessity......Page 587
6.21 How to frame conclusive premisses......Page 591
6.22 The proofs ἐξ ὑποθέσεως. The role of correct categorization......Page 595
6.23 Some general remarks on the device called 'exposition ' (ἔκθεσις)......Page 599
6.24 Ecthesis as the extrication of the proper syllogistic terms......Page 600
6.25 The proof by ecthesis concerning imperfect syllogisms......Page 610
6.26 Some other instructions for correctly framing syllogisms......Page 611
6.27 On correctly refuting your opponent's thesis......Page 612
6.3 The Posterior Analytics......Page 613
6.31 The need, for pre-existent cognition......Page 614
6.32 Genuine knoiuledge and epistemonic proof......Page 619
6.33 On the notions θέσις, ἀξίωμα, ὕπόθεσις, and ὁρισμός......Page 623
6.34 How to frame necessary premisses. The three requirements......Page 627
6.35 On the notions 'necessary' and 'commensurate'......Page 637
6.36 The starting-points (ἀρχαί)......Page 647
6.37 Knowledge of the 'fact that' and knowledge of the 'why'......Page 655
6.38 No genuine knowledge without sense-perception......Page 656
6.39 An infinite chain of premisses rejected. The nature of categorization......Page 657
6.41 Universal proof is superior to one concerning an individual case......Page 664
6.42 On the diverse disciplines......Page 666
6.43 Sense-perception does not afford genuine knowledge......Page 667
6.44 Opinion as opposed to genuine knowledge......Page 669
6.51 The four steps making up epistemonic proof......Page 672
6.52 The 'mediating state' or 'middle' ('medium demonstrationis')......Page 678
6.53 Substrate, attribute, and the role of definition......Page 682
6.54 The vital distinction between δεικνύναι and ἀποδεικνύναι......Page 690
6.55 What 'to define' comes down to......Page 697
6.56 On definition, essence and existence......Page 705
6.57 The different ways of 'defining' things......Page 709
6.58 Did Aristotle redeem his promise of more precision?......Page 719
6.59 Recipes for the discovery of definitions......Page 723
6.61 On two different types of 'because': cause and effect......Page 733
6.7 The καθ' ὅλου requirement re-assessed......Page 738
6.71 Once more, καθ' ὅλου vs. καθόλου......Page 739
6.72 On the epistemonic procedure properly accomplished......Page 740
6.73 The commensurate universal. Intension vs. extension......Page 743
6.8 How do we apprehend the 'starting-points' (ἀρχαί) ?......Page 745
6.82 The nature of the ἀρχαί in II 19......Page 752
6.83 The ἀρχαί elsewhere in the Posterior Analytics......Page 755
6.84 No vacillation between primitive theorems and primitive terms......Page 757
6.85 Νοῦς and ἕξις......Page 759
6.86 Is II 19 'Janus-faced', vacillating between empiricism and rationalism ?......Page 763
6.87 Particulars as the proper objects of epistemonic proof......Page 765
6.9 Conclusion......Page 767
Back Matter......Page 769