Aquinas as Representationalist: The Ontology of the Species Intelligibilis

Table of Contents
Acknowledgements        IV
Abstract        VIII
Introduction         IX
Chapter I: The Traditional View: Aquinas’ Direct Realism       1
1.1 Aquinas’ Account of Cognition: The Problem of Representation   2
1.2 The Traditional View of Representation      15
1.2.1 Opinions of Non Experts on Aquinas     20
1.2.2 Opinions of Experts on Aquinas but not on Epistemology  22
Etienne Gilson        23
Owens         27
1.2.3 Opinions of Experts on Aquinas’ Epistemology   32
D. W. Hamlyn        33
Norman Kretzmann       34
John Haldane        35
Anthony Kenny       38
Lawrence Dewan       41
John Peifer        48
Chapter II: Supporters of a different view      58
2.1 Unintended Supporters of a Representational View    60
Joseph Moreau        61
François Xavier Putallaz      63
Bernard Lonergan       70
2.2 Implicit Supporters of a Representational View     79
Edmund Joseph Ryan       79
M. C. D’Arcy        82
Marcia Colish        83
Eleonore Stump       85
2.3 Explicit Supporters of a Representational View     87
Pierre Rousselot       88
Robert Pasnau        94
Claude Panaccio       104
Paul Hoffman       108
Martin Tweedale       114
Peter King       116
Chapter III: Representation and Nature        121
3.1 What is a Representation?       122
 3.1.1 Modern Notion of Representation    123
 3.1.2 Concepts and Ideas      125
 3.1.3 Intentionality       129
 3.1.4 ‘Object,’ ‘Objective,’ and ‘Object of Knowledge’  136
 3.1.5 Medieval Notion of Representation    139
 3.1.6 Realist Representationalism     142
3.2 Likeness and Formal Identity      148
 3.2.1 Representation as Likeness in Aquinas    148
 3.2.2 Is the Causal Form Different from the Essence?  158
3.2.2.1 Aristotle’s Conception of Form   
  and its Relation to Essence    159
  3.2.2.2 Form and Essence in Aquinas    165
3.3 Abstraction and Cognition of Essence     176
 3.3.1 Abstraction from Material Composites    177
 3.3.2 Essence as Intelligible Structure    184
 3.3.3 Representational Union of Knower and Known  197
Chapter IV: Some Objections         207
4.1 Is Direct Realism Different from Realist Representationalism?  208
4.2 Cognition is a Causal Act, not a Representational One   210
4.3 What is Cognized is Always a Representation    212
4.4 An Object in a Mirror is not a Mental Representation   215
4.5 Aquinas’ Rejection of Representationalism    216
 Conclusions        218
 Bibliography        227