An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language

Cover......Page 1
Half-title......Page 3
Title......Page 5
Copyright......Page 6
Contents......Page 7
Acknowledgements......Page 11
Introduction......Page 13
1.2 What Locke says......Page 17
1.3 Meaning and signification......Page 21
1.4 Problems about communication......Page 22
1.5 Words and sentences......Page 26
1.6 Locke’s less disputed assumptions......Page 30
Further reading......Page 32
2.1 Introduction......Page 33
2.2 Psychologism and the Context Principle......Page 34
2.3 Frege and logic......Page 38
2.4 Frege’s mature system (i): reference......Page 40
2.5 Frege’s mature system (ii): Sense......Page 44
2.6 Two further uses of the notion of Sense......Page 48
2.7 Questions about Sense......Page 52
2.8 Sense and the Basic Worry......Page 59
Further reading......Page 60
3.1 Introduction......Page 61
3.2 The problems......Page 62
3.3 Russell’s solution in outline......Page 65
3.4 Russell’s solution in detail......Page 67
3.5 Strawson on definite descriptions......Page 73
3.6 Donnellan on referential and attributive uses of descriptions......Page 75
3.7 Russellian defences......Page 78
3.8 Russell beyond descriptions......Page 82
Further reading......Page 85
4.1 Introduction......Page 86
4.2 Kripke’s target......Page 88
4.3 Kripke’s objections (i): simple considerations......Page 90
4.4 Kripke’s objections (ii): epistemic and modal considerations......Page 92
4.5 Defences of the description theory......Page 97
4.6 Sense and direct reference......Page 102
4.7 Conclusion......Page 104
Further reading......Page 105
5.1 Introduction......Page 106
5.2 A Lockean view of natural-kind terms: the individualist version......Page 108
5.3 A Lockean view without individualism......Page 114
5.4 How can there be Kripke–Putnam natural-kind terms?......Page 117
5.5 How can natural-kind terms be rigid designators?......Page 120
Further reading......Page 123
6.1 Introduction......Page 125
6.2 Quine’s three grades of modal involvement......Page 126
6.3 Referential opacity and Leibniz’s law......Page 130
6.4 Referential opacity and the three grades......Page 133
6.5 Quine’s logical problem with de re modality......Page 138
6.6 Quine’s metaphysical worries about de re modality......Page 142
Further reading......Page 145
7.1 Introduction......Page 146
7.2 Quine’s problem......Page 147
7.3 Quine’s proposed solution......Page 150
7.4 Perry and the essential indexical......Page 157
7.5 The problems for Quine’s solution......Page 159
Further reading......Page 162
8.1 Introduction......Page 164
8.2 Kripke, names, necessity, and propositional attitudes......Page 165
8.3 Kripke’s Pierre......Page 167
8.4 Referential solutions to the puzzle......Page 170
8.5 A Fregean response......Page 175
8.6 Davidson’s proposal......Page 178
8.7 Can Davidson’s proposal solve Kripke’s puzzle?......Page 181
Further reading......Page 184
9.1 Introduction......Page 185
9.2 Meanings as entities......Page 187
9.3 Tarski’s ‘definition’ of truth......Page 191
9.4 Davidson’s use of Tarski......Page 195
9.5 The obvious objections to Davidson’s proposal......Page 199
9.6 Truth and the possibility of general semantics......Page 201
9.7 One final worry......Page 203
Further reading......Page 204
10.1 Introduction......Page 206
10.2 Quine and radical translation......Page 207
10.3 Davidson and radical interpretation......Page 210
10.4 Statements of meaning and propositional attitudes......Page 214
10.5 Theories of meaning and speakers’ knowledge......Page 217
10.6 How fundamental is radical interpretation?......Page 222
Further reading......Page 225
11.1 Introduction......Page 226
11.2 ‘Two dogmas of empiricism’......Page 227
11.3 Indeterminacy and inscrutability......Page 231
11.4 Resisting Quine on indeterminacy: some simple ways......Page 240
Further reading......Page 242
12.1 Introduction......Page 243
12.2 Performative utterances......Page 244
12.3 Towards a general theory of speech acts......Page 246
12.4 Truth and performatives......Page 251
12.5 Issues for a theory of speech acts......Page 254
Further reading......Page 258
13.1 Introduction......Page 260
13.2 Grice’s overall strategy......Page 261
13.3 Sympathetic objections to Grice’s account of speaker-meaning......Page 265
13.4 Sympathetic objections to Grice’s account of expression-meaning......Page 270
13.5 An unsympathetic objection to Grice’s account of expression-meaning......Page 273
13.6 An unsympathetic objection to Grice’s account of speaker-meaning......Page 276
13.7 After Grice......Page 280
Further reading......Page 281
14.1 Introduction......Page 283
14.2 The sceptical challenge......Page 284
14.3 The ‘sceptical solution’......Page 289
14.4 A community-based response......Page 295
14.5 Can dispositionalism be defended?......Page 296
14.6 Anti-reductionism and radical interpretation......Page 299
Further reading......Page 302
15.1 Introduction......Page 304
15.2 The Augustinian picture......Page 305
15.3 The Anti-Metaphysical interpretation......Page 307
15.4 The Quasi-Kantian interpretation......Page 311
15.5 Worries about these Wittgensteinian views......Page 320
Glossary......Page 324
Works cited......Page 328
Index......Page 335