An Introduction to Metaphysics

Cover......Page 1
Half-title......Page 3
Title......Page 5
Copyright......Page 6
Contents......Page 7
Preface......Page 9
1.1 What is metaphysics?......Page 13
1.2 Modality......Page 16
1.3 Ontology......Page 23
1.4 Skeptical attacks......Page 28
2.1 A familiar, central, and tricky relation......Page 32
2.2 The relation and the relata......Page 33
2.3 Three theories of causation......Page 35
2.4.2 Non-causal connections......Page 39
2.4.3 Simultaneous causation......Page 41
2.4.4 Causes vs. background conditions......Page 42
2.5.2 Overdetermination......Page 44
2.5.3 Preemption......Page 45
2.5.4 Transitivity......Page 48
2.6.1 Is chancy causation possible?......Page 49
2.6.2 Overlapping......Page 52
2.6.3 Underdetermination......Page 53
2.7 A concluding observation......Page 55
3.1 The Problem of Freedom and Determinism......Page 57
3.2 Freedom......Page 59
3.3 Determinism......Page 60
3.4 Hard Determinism......Page 63
3.5 Compatibilism......Page 65
3.6 Incompatibilism......Page 70
3.7 Simple Indeterminism......Page 76
3.8 Volitional Indeterminism......Page 79
3.9 Libertarian Agent Causation......Page 81
3.10 Compatibilist Agent Causation......Page 87
3.11 No easy answers......Page 89
4.1 Law or accident?......Page 91
4.2 Starting points......Page 92
4.3 Regularity accounts......Page 98
4.4.2 Goodman on laws......Page 104
4.4.3 Lewis on laws......Page 106
4.4.4 Armstrong on laws......Page 108
4.5 Laws and supervenience......Page 110
5.1 Introduction......Page 115
5.2 Characterizing The Problem of Personal Identity......Page 117
5.3 Physical approaches to personal identity......Page 123
5.4 Soulful approaches to personal identity......Page 127
5.5 Psychological approaches to personal identity......Page 129
5.6 Biological approaches to personal identity......Page 135
5.7 The no-criteria approach......Page 143
6.1 The Mind–Body Problem......Page 145
6.2 What is Dualistic Interactionism?......Page 147
6.3 DI’s conflict with Physical Determinism......Page 150
6.4 DI’s conflict with Physical Indeterminism......Page 153
6.5 Four versions of Materialism......Page 156
6.5.1 The Identity Theory......Page 157
6.5.2 Functionalism......Page 160
6.5.3 Non-Reductive and Eliminative Materialism......Page 165
6.6 Dualism, Materialism, and The Exclusion Problem......Page 167
7.1 Introduction......Page 171
7.2 McTaggart’s argument......Page 172
7.3 The A Theory and The B Theory......Page 174
7.4 The rate of passage argument......Page 177
7.5 The argument from relativity......Page 179
7.6 “Thank goodness that’s over”......Page 181
7.7 Three- and Four-Dimensionalism......Page 182
7.8 The argument from temporary intrinsics......Page 185
7.9 Lewis’s ‘patchwork’ argument for person-stages......Page 187
7.10 Thomson’s argument against Four-Dimensionalism......Page 189
7.11 Presentism, Eternalism, and The Growing Universe Theory......Page 191
7.12 Is time like space?......Page 195
8.1 A statue and a lump......Page 196
8.2 Physical and non-physical objects......Page 197
8.3 The Special Composition Question......Page 202
8.4 Contact and Fastening......Page 204
8.5 Nihilism......Page 205
8.6 Van Inwagen’s Proposed Answer......Page 207
8.7 The Serial Response......Page 208
8.8 Universalism and the argument from vagueness......Page 209
8.9 Brutal Composition......Page 212
8.10 A question about simples......Page 215
8.11 Things and stuff?......Page 222
8.12 The Problem of Identity over Time for Physical Objects......Page 226
8.13 The return of the statue and the lump......Page 232
8.14 All stuff all the time?......Page 234
8.15 Many hard questions......Page 237
9.1 The One-Over-Many Problem......Page 239
9.2.1 Multiply instantiable properties and relations......Page 240
9.2.2 Platonic universals......Page 242
Generality......Page 243
9.2.4 Aristotelian universals......Page 245
9.3.1 Sets, tropes, and austerity......Page 246
9.3.2 Set Nominalism......Page 247
9.3.3 Trope Nominalism......Page 248
9.3.4 Austere Nominalism......Page 250
9.4 Explanatory success?......Page 252
9.5 Some common-sense truths......Page 255
9.6 Ontological decisions......Page 262
Bibliography......Page 263
Index......Page 271