Algorithmic Antitrust (Economic Analysis of Law in European Legal Scholarship, 12)

Contents
Prologue: Algorithmic Antitrust-A Primer
	1 Introduction
	2 What Are Algorithms?
	3 Are Algorithms Inherently Secret?
	4 ``Algorithmic Antitrust´´: Competition Policy for Algorithm-Driven Decisions
	5 Is The Digital Hand Malicious?
	6 Algorithmic Antitrust: A Primer
	7 Presentation of the Book
	References
Algorithmic Antitrust: A Critical Overview
	1 Context
	2 Some First Principles
		2.1 What Is an Algorithm?
		2.2 The Economics
		2.3 Multisided Markets
		2.4 Big Data
	3 Dominance
	4 Algorithmic Pricing and Collusion
		4.1 Algorithmic Pricing
		4.2 Machine-Based Collusion
		4.3 Why Machine-Based Algorithmic Collusion Is Not a Problem
	5 Mergers
		5.1 Killer Acquisitions
		5.2 Conglomerate Mergers
		5.3 Merger Reforms
	6 Concluding Observations
	References
Algorithmic Antitrust and Consumer Choice
	1 Introduction
	2 Competition Law in Digital Markets
		2.1 Algorithm Input
		2.2 Consumer Benefits
		2.3 Antitrust Issues
			2.3.1 Leverage and Nudging Strategies
				2.3.1.1 AI and Data
				2.3.1.2 Nudge and AI
			2.3.2 Consumer Choice
			2.3.3 Price Algorithms
			2.3.4 Tacit Collusion and Personalized Pricing
	3 The Google Shopping Case: Leverage, AI, and Nudge
	4 Conclusion
	References
Algorithms, Big Data, and Merger Control
	1 Introduction
	2 Horizonal Unilateral Effects
		2.1 Mergers Between Algorithm/Analytics Software Providers
		2.2 Platform Mergers/Acquisitions
			2.2.1 Analysing a Merger´s Impact on the ``Paying´´ Side of a Market
			2.2.2 Analysing a Merger´s Impact on the ``Free´´ Side of the Market
				2.2.2.1 Privacy as a Parameter of Competition?
				2.2.2.2 Degrading the Quality of the Algorithm
				2.2.2.3 Use of Data to Exploit Customers
	3 Non-Horizontal Foreclosure
		3.1 Interoperability
		3.2 Accumulation of Data
	4 Looking Forward: Dynamic Theories of Harm
	5 Conclusion
	References
Reasons to be Cheerful: The Benevolent Market Power of Decentralised Blockchains
	1 Introduction
	2 Clarifying Terminology
	3 The Nature of a Permission-Less Blockchain´s Role Within a Market
		3.1 A Platform
		3.2 Pricing
		3.3 Control
	4 Reasons to be Cheerful
		4.1 Reducing Transaction Costs and Expanding Output
		4.2 Clashing with the Tech Titans
			4.2.1 Tokenisation
			4.2.2 Creating a Decentralised Alternative to Digital Platforms
			4.2.3 The Benevolent Market Power of a Decentralised Permission-Less Blockchain
			4.2.4 User Control of Their Data
		4.3 Innovative Remedies
		4.4 Ways of Working
	5 Conclusion
	References
Can Antitrust Trust Blockchain?
	1 Introduction
	2 Distributed Ledger Technologies Toolkit
		2.1 Blockchain Origin
		2.2 Blockchains
			2.2.1 Bitcoin Blockchain
			2.2.2 Public, Private and Permissioned Blockchains
			2.2.3 Smart Contracts and Ethereum
			2.2.4 Blockchain Tokens
			2.2.5 Recent Developments in DLT
	3 DLT and for Competition
		3.1 From Centralized to Decentralized Platforms
			3.1.1 The Internet Centralization
			3.1.2 Is It the Time for a Blockchain Era?
			3.1.3 Blockchain Standards
		3.2 DLT as Antitrust Tool
		3.3 Conclusions
	4 Do Blockchain Raise Antitrust Concerns?
		4.1 Anti-trust in Trustless Technologies
		4.2 What Kind of Entity Is Blockchain?
		4.3 Forms of Collusion
			4.3.1 Private and Consortium Blockchains
			4.3.2 Public Blockchain
			4.3.3 United American Corp v. Bitmain
			4.3.4 Delegate Proof of Stake (DPS)
		4.4 Blockchain Concentration
			4.4.1 ASICs
			4.4.2 Vertical Concentration
		4.5 Exclusionary Conduct
	5 Conclusions
	References
The Technology Innovation Time Gap in Competition Law Enforcement: Assessing the European Commission´s Approach
	1 Introduction
	2 Why The Vertical Block Exemption and Vertical Guidelines are Inadequate to Respond to the Technology Time Gap
	3 The Commission´s New Tools for Bridging the Technological Time Gap
	4 Conclusion
	References
Epilogue: Algorithmic Antitrust-A Questioning
	References