Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Science

Title page
Copyright page
Table of Content
Chapter 1: Introduction
	Experimental philosophy and philosophy of science
		What might experimental philosophy of science be?
		Why experimental philosophy of science?
		Forthcoming attractions
		Notes
		References
Part One: Explanation and Understanding
	Chapter 2: Scientific Discovery and the Human Drive to Explain
		The role of explanation in learning
		Explaining in a nonideal world: Two novel experiments
		General discussion
		Appendix A: Better and worse rules for all stimulus types
		Appendix B: Rated rules
		Notes
		References
	Chapter 3: The Challenges and Benefits of Mechanistic Explanation in Folk Scientific Understanding
		The rise of mechanism in the philosophy of science
		Apparent mechanistic ignorance
		An early love of mechanisms?
		The role of higher-level causal abstractions
		Some consequences of knowledge outsourcing
		Remaining questions
		Conclusions
		References
Part Two: Theories and Theory Change
	Chapter 4: Information That Boosts Normative Global Warming Acceptance without Polarization: Toward J. S. Mill’s Political Ethology of National Character
		Introduction
		Experiment 1: Boosting GW acceptance with graphs and averaging
		Results
		Discussion
		Experiment 2: Changing GW acceptance with representative (and misleading) statistics
		Experiment 3: Changing GW beliefs with supra-nationalistic (and super-nationalistic) statistics
		Experiment 4: Increasing GW acceptance with scientific statistics, texts, and videos
		General discussion
		Acknowledgments
		Notes
		References
	Chapter 5: Doubly Counterintuitive: Cognitive Obstacles to the Discovery and the Learning of Scientific Ideas and Why They Often Differ
		A common starting point: Intuitive theories
		Divergent paths: Discovering vs. learning scientific truths
		Divergent background assumptions
		Case study: Divergent paths to understanding evolution
		Implications for understanding and improving scientific knowledge
		Conclusion
		References
	Chapter 6: Intuitive Epistemology: Children’s Theory of Evidence
		Introduction
		A theory of evidence: Theories support abstraction
		Evidence of children’s theory of evidence
		Epistemologized psychology: Cognitive psychology as epistemology
		Conclusion
		Notes
		References
Part Three: Special Sciences
	Chapter 7: Applying Experimental Philosophy to Investigate Economic Concepts: Choice, Preference, and Nudge
		Introduction
		Conceptual variance and conceptual ecology
		Commonsensible realism
		Choice concepts: Folk vs. economic
		Preference concepts: Behavioral, psychological, or constructive?
		Tracking changing methodological practice: To nudge or not to nudge?
		Conclusion
		References
	Chapter 8: Scientists’ Concepts of Innateness: Evolution or Attraction?
		The vernacular concept of innateness
		Two hypotheses about scientists’ concept of innateness
		Experimental study
		Scientific and folk concepts
		Innateness in science
		Conclusion
		Notes
		References
Part Four: General Considerations
	Chapter 9: Causal Judgment: What Can Philosophy Learn from Experiment? What Can it Contribute to Experiment?
		Introduction
		Normative and descriptive theorizing
		Sources of normativity
		Relating the normative and descriptive
		Intuition and X-phi
		Intuitions, surveys, and causal inference
		Invariance: Normative theory and descriptive results
		Cheng’s causal power model
		Some philosophical morals
		Implications for X-phi
		Notes
		References
List of Contributors
Index