Advanced Security and Safeguarding in the Nuclear Power Industry: State of the art and future challenges

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Front-Matter_2020_Advanced-Security-and-Safeguarding-in-the-Nuclear-Power-In
	Advanced Security and Safeguarding in the Nuclear Power Industry: State of the art and future challenges
Copyright_2020_Advanced-Security-and-Safeguarding-in-the-Nuclear-Power-Indus
	Copyright
Contributors_2020_Advanced-Security-and-Safeguarding-in-the-Nuclear-Power-In
	Contributors
About-the-Edit_2020_Advanced-Security-and-Safeguarding-in-the-Nuclear-Power-
	About the Editor
		Victor Nian
Preface_2020_Advanced-Security-and-Safeguarding-in-the-Nuclear-Power-Industr
	Preface
Acknowledgmen_2020_Advanced-Security-and-Safeguarding-in-the-Nuclear-Power-I
	Acknowledgment
1
	1. Recent advances in nuclear power technologies
		1. Introduction
		2. Methods for converting the energy of division to useful work
			2.1 Efficiency
			2.2 Heat transformation in electricity through mechanical work
			2.3 Direct conversion of heat into electricity
				2.3.1 Thermal electric generators.
				2.3.2 Thermoelectric generator accepted quality measure Q factor
				2.3.3 Thermal electron energy converter
				2.3.4 Where is the required voltage?
			2.4 Other methods for converting fission energy into useful work
				2.4.1 Magneto-hydrodynamic method
				2.4.2 Nuclear rocket engine
		3. Materials for nuclear reactors: classification of nuclear reactors
			3.1 Types of fuel element structures
				3.1.1 Types of fuel rods
			3.2 Fuel
				3.2.1 Pure uranium metal
				3.2.2 Alloyed uranium metal
				3.2.3 Plutonium metal
				3.2.4 Uranium oxides and plutonium
				3.2.5 Carbide uranium and plutonium
				3.2.6 Dispersion fuel
			3.3 Construction materials
				3.3.1 Aluminum and its alloys
				3.3.2 Magnesium and its alloys
				3.3.3 Zirconium and its alloys
				3.3.4 Stainless steel
				3.3.5 Graphite
			3.4 Coolant
				3.4.1 Water
				3.4.2 Gases
				3.4.3 Liquid metal
				3.4.4 Disadvantages
			3.5 Moderator
			3.6 Absorber
				3.6.1 Boron
				3.6.2 Cadmium
				3.6.3 Europium
				3.6.4 Reaction
			3.7 Classification of nuclear reactors
		4. Conclusion
		Suggested reading
2
	2. Non-power applications—new missions for nuclear energy to be delivered safely and securely
		1. Introduction
		2. New opportunities for civil nuclear energy
			2.1 Historical background
			2.2 Looking ahead
		3. Security and safeguards and safety—the three S's
			3.1 Security
			3.2 Safeguards—nuclear nonproliferation risks
			3.3 Safety—severe nuclear accidents
		4. Summary remarks
		References
3
	3. Radiation hazards from the nuclear fuel cycle
		1. Basic concepts of radiation hazards
		2. Overview of the nuclear fuel cycle
			2.1 Mining
			2.2 Milling
			2.3 Conversion
			2.4 Enrichment
			2.5 Fuel fabrication
			2.6 Reactor operation
			2.7 Storage of spent fuel
			2.8 Transportation of spent fuel
			2.9 Reprocessing of spent fuel
			2.10 Permanent disposal of spent fuel
			2.11 Decommissioning of nuclear fuel cycle facilities
		3. Presence or release of radioactive materials in the nuclear fuel cycle
			3.1 Mining
			3.2 Milling
			3.3 Conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication
			3.4 Nuclear reactor operation
			3.5 Reprocessing
		4. Concern with spent nuclear fuel
		5. Radiation concern in nuclear power plant decommissioning
		6. Conclusions
		References
4
	4. Health effects of exposure to ionizing radiation
		1. Introduction
		2. Basic concepts of ionizing radiation
		3. Biological effects of ionizing radiation
		4. Acute effects of ionizing radiation
			4.1 Main overexposed cases to ionizing radiation
				4.1.1 Atomic bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki
				4.1.2 Chernobyl accident
		5. Effects of low doses of ionizing radiation
			5.1 Radiation workers and patients exposed to ionizing radiation
			5.2 Environmental radiation exposures
		6. Radiation-induced chromosome alterations
		7. Transgenerational effects of radiation
		8. Epigenetics changes induced by ionizing radiations
		9. Radiation protection
		10. Final remarks
		References
5
	5. Nuclear plant severe accidents: challenges and prevention
		1. Introduction
		2. Fukushima Daiichi accidents and insights from the accident analyses
			2.1 Event progression at unit 1
			2.2 Event progression at unit 3
			2.3 Event progression at unit 2
			2.4 Explosions
			2.5 Unit 1 explosion and spent fuel pool conditions
			2.6 Unit 3 explosion and spent fuel pool conditions
			2.7 Unit 4 explosion and spent fuel pool conditions
			2.8 Remarks on the accident causes
		3. Investigative studies of lessons learned
			3.1 Causes of the fukushima accident as found by the US National Academy of Sciences study
			3.2 Lessons learned from the National Academy of Sciences Study
				3.2.1 Lessons learned on new information about hazards
				3.2.2 Lessons learned on improvement of plant systems, resources, and training
					3.2.2.1 Plant systems
					3.2.2.1 Plant systems
					3.2.2.2 Resources and training
					3.2.2.2 Resources and training
				3.2.3 Lessons learned on risk assessment of beyond-design-basis events
				3.2.4 Lessons learned on risk concepts for nuclear safety regulations
				3.2.5 Lessons learned on off-site emergency response
				3.2.6 Lessons learned on nuclear safety culture
		4. The new post-Fukushima regulatory body structure in Japan
			4.1 Recommendations by the National Diet Independent Investigation Commission
			4.2 Recommendations by the Government Investigation Committee
		5. Post-Fukushima regulations and technology development
			5.1 Japan's new regulatory regime
			5.2 New regulatory requirements in Japan
				5.2.1 Safety upgrade at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa site
					5.2.1.1 Power supply
					5.2.1.1 Power supply
					5.2.1.2 Earthquake protection
					5.2.1.2 Earthquake protection
					5.2.1.3 Tsunami protection
					5.2.1.3 Tsunami protection
					5.2.1.4 Emergency preparedness
					5.2.1.4 Emergency preparedness
			5.3 Post-Fukushima regulatory requirements in the United States
				5.3.1 Implementation on Gen-III+reactor
			5.4 Development of Accident Tolerant Fuel Technology as Risk Mitigation
		6. Concluding remarks
		References
6
	6. Nuclear off-site emergency preparedness and response: key concepts and international normative principles∗∗This chapter is  ...
		1. Introduction
		2. The international normative setting for emergency preparedness and response
			2.1 The IAEA-centered regulatory framework
				2.1.1 Relevant international treaty instruments
				2.1.2 EPR-related IAEA safety standards, operational arrangements, and services
				2.1.3 The “normative pull” of emergency preparedness and response–related safety standards
			2.2 Other international, regional, and industry-inspired nuclear emergency preparedness and response efforts
		3. Specific emergency preparedness and response policy challenges and international regulatory responses
			3.1 Cross-border coordination of emergency preparedness and response: shared understandings and mutual trust
			3.2 Emergency planning zones
			3.3 Event reporting and information sharing
			3.4 Validation of national emergency preparedness and response through international peer review and emergency exercises
		4. Nuclear emergency assistance: global, regional, and bilateral arrangements
		5. Conclusions
		References
7
	7. International conventions and legal frameworks on nuclear safety, security, and safeguards
		1. Part 1: what is meant by nuclear safety, security, and safeguards?
		2. Part 2: what are the key international conventions on safety, security, and safeguards?
			2.1 Introduction
			2.2 Safety
				2.2.1 Convention on nuclear safety
				2.2.2 Joint convention on the safety of spent fuel management and on the safety of radioactive waste management
				2.2.3 Convention on early notification of a nuclear accident
				2.2.4 Convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency
			2.3 Security
				2.3.1 Convention on the physical protection of nuclear material
				2.3.2 Amendment to the convention on the physical protection of nuclear material
				2.3.3 International convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism
			2.4 Safeguards
				2.4.1 The treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons
				2.4.2 IAEA safeguards agreements
				2.4.3 Model protocol additional to the agreements(s) between states(s) and the international atomic energy agency for the applica ...
				2.4.4 Comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty and protocol to the comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty
		3. Part 3: what are the additional conventions of relevance?
			3.1 Convention of environmental impact assessment in a transboundary context (the “Espoo Convention”)
			3.2 Convention on access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters ...
		4. Part 4: what are the significance of these regimes? – reputational risk analysis
			4.1 Reputational risk
				4.1.1 International standards and practices
				4.1.2 International agreements
				4.1.3 Public acceptance and sustained government commitment
				4.1.4 Host country nuclear regulatory authority
				4.1.5 Sustainability
				4.1.6 Nuclear liability and insurance
		5. Part 5: concluding thoughts
		References
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	8. Civil liability in the event of a severe nuclear disaster
		1. Introduction
			1.1 Legal issues
		2. Nuclear new build programs
			2.1 Volume
			2.2 Geographic distribution
			2.3 New entrants
		3. The international nuclear liability regimes
			3.1 Origins
			3.2 Regimes
			3.3 Key legal principles
			3.4 Convention on supplementary compensation for nuclear damage
			3.5 Nonsovereign extralegal initiatives
			3.6 The advantages of a harmonized international legal regime
		4. Nuclear new build countries—national legal regimes
			4.1 The United States
			4.2 China
			4.3 Russia
			4.4 India
			4.5 The United Kingdom
			4.6 The United Arab Emirates
			4.7 The advantages of international convergence
		5. Conclusion
		References
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	9. Future challenges in safety, security, and safeguards
		1. Introduction
		2. Overview of global nuclear industry
		3. Loss of public trust in nuclear safety
		4. Challenges for nuclear security
		5. Challenges for nuclear safeguards
		6. “Safeguarding” public from nuclear risks
		7. Conclusion
		References
Index
	Index
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