Adaptation And Evolution in Collective Systems (Advances in Natural Computation)

Contents......Page 12
Preface......Page 8
1.1 Collective Outcomes of Interacting Agents......Page 16
1.2 The Study of Collective Systems......Page 20
1.3 The Price of Anarchy in Collective Systems......Page 25
1.4 Review of the Literature......Page 32
1.5 Evolutionary Design of Desired Collective Systems......Page 40
1.6 Outline of the Book......Page 43
2.1 Classification of Games and Nash Equilibrium......Page 46
2.2 Correlated Equilibrium......Page 55
2.3 Interaction Structures......Page 58
2.4 Learning in Games......Page 62
2.5 Evolutionary Games......Page 66
2.6 Relation between Learning and Evolution......Page 72
2.7 Design of Learning and Evolving Agents......Page 75
3.1 Social Interactions with Externalities......Page 80
3.2 Binary Decisions with Externalities......Page 82
3.3 Decomposition to Pair-wise Interactions......Page 91
3.4 Compound Social Games......Page 93
3.5 Nash Equilibrium and Collective Efficiency......Page 101
3.6 Conflict Resolution between Collective Efficiency and Equity......Page 110
4.1 A Threshold Model for Dealing with Heterogeneity in Agents......Page 116
4.2 A Micro-Macro Loop......Page 118
4.3 Two Facets of an Individual's Decision: Purposive and Contingent Decisions......Page 122
4.4 Micro-Macro Dynamics within a Collective......Page 127
4.5 Micro-Macro Loop between Two Collectives......Page 134
4.6 Micro-Macro Dynamics between Two Collectives......Page 137
5.1 Merit of Knowledge Sharing......Page 146
5.2 A Formulation of Knowledge Transaction Games......Page 149
5.3 Characteristics of Knowledge Transaction......Page 153
5.4 Repeated Knowledge Transaction......Page 157
5.5 Knowledge Transaction by Multiple Agents......Page 163
5.6 The Knowledge Accumulation Process as a Micro-Macro Loop......Page 167
6.1 Identity and Diversity......Page 176
6.2 Integration and Segregation......Page 180
6.3 Global and Local Adaptation Models......Page 182
6.4 Threshold Distributions and Locating Heterogeneous Agents......Page 186
6.5 Performance Measures......Page 191
6.6 Evaluation of Collective Adaptive Dynamics......Page 196
7.1 Selective Interaction in Games......Page 206
7.2 Evolution of Preference......Page 209
7.3 Social Games with Neighbor Selection......Page 212
7.4 Preference Reinforcement through Selective Interaction......Page 219
7.5 Coexistence of Conformists and Nonconformists......Page 224
7.6 Development of Preference through Interaction......Page 228
8.1 Social Interaction with the Logic of the Minority......Page 234
8.2 Formalisms of Dispersion Games......Page 239
8.3 The Price of Anarchy of Uncoordinated Collective Decisions......Page 243
8.4 Learning Models in Dispersion Games......Page 248
8.5 The Principle of Give-and-Take in Dispersion Games......Page 251
8.6 Localized Dispersion Games and Emergence of Dynamic Orders in Harmony......Page 255
8.7 Interpretation of the Principle of Give-and-Take......Page 261
9.1 Repeated Interactions on Social Networks......Page 264
9.2 Repeated Interactions with Bounded Memory......Page 270
9.3 A Strategy Choice with a Coupling Rule......Page 272
9.4 Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Games on Social Networks......Page 279
9.5 Iterated Coordination Games on Social Networks......Page 289
9.6 Iterated Hawk-Dove Games on Social Networks......Page 293
9.7 Sustainable Coupling Rules......Page 297
10.1 Dispersion Games on Social Networks......Page 302
10.2 Generalized Rock-Scissors-Paper Games......Page 318
10.3 A Coupling Rule with a Memory of Two......Page 321
10.4 A Coupling Rule with a Memory of Four......Page 334
10.5 Effects of Implementation Error in Collective Evolution......Page 339
10.6 From Co-evolution to Collective Evolution......Page 347
Bibliography......Page 356
Index......Page 368