About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication

Cover
......Page 1
About Oneself: De SeThought and Communication......Page 4
Copyright......Page 5
Contents......Page 6
List of Contributors......Page 8
1. Introduction......Page 10
2.1 De se skepticism......Page 12
2.2 The Fregean account......Page 14
2.3 The belief state account......Page 16
2.4 The property account......Page 18
3. Communication and De Se Thought......Page 20
4. Volume Overview......Page 25
References......Page 29
PART I: Foundational Issues in De Se Thought......Page 32
1. Immunity to ErrorThrough Misidentification and De Se Thought......Page 34
2. Quasi-Memory......Page 38
3. Two Morals......Page 40
4. Wh-Misidentification......Page 41
5. Presuppositions......Page 51
6. Two Grades of Immunity......Page 55
8. Immunity and Safety......Page 58
9. Conclusion......Page 62
References......Page 63
1. The Phenomenology of Constancy in Variation......Page 65
2. Intentionalism and Constancy in Variation......Page 72
3. Dual Representationalism and Dual Variability......Page 75
3.1 Subjective Dual Representationalism and Dual Variability......Page 76
3.2 Objective Dual Representationalism and Dual Variability......Page 78
4. The Phenomenology of Centered Contents......Page 83
5. Constancy in Variation and Phenomenal Intentionalism......Page 86
References......Page 93
1.1 Skepticism and exceptionalism......Page 95
1.2 Radical de se Skepticism......Page 97
1.3 The doctrine of propositions......Page 100
2.1 Famous cases......Page 102
2.2 Internalism and exceptionalism......Page 105
3.1 Expanding the doctrine of propositions......Page 108
3.2 The problem......Page 111
3.3 Objections and replies......Page 114
3.4 Is the problem specific to the de se?......Page 116
4. Theoriesof De Se Attitudes......Page 118
4.1 Frege and Lewis......Page 119
4.2 Perry......Page 122
4.3 A fourth and final theory......Page 124
References......Page 126
1. Introduction......Page 130
2. Centered PossibleWorlds......Page 132
3. Against Intra-world Ignorance......Page 133
4. Self-location and Singular Propositions......Page 140
References......Page 145
PART II: De Se Thought and Communication......Page 148
1.1 Mental indexicality......Page 150
1.2 Thought as vehicle......Page 153
1.3 Limited accessibility: rejecting the Naïve Conception of Communication......Page 158
1.4 Indexical communication in the mental file framework......Page 161
2.1 Naïve communication with centred contents: Egan......Page 164
2.2 Going uncentred: Moss and Stalnaker......Page 167
2.3 Centred surrogates: Kölbel and Torre......Page 171
2.4 Recentering and mental files: Gibbard......Page 175
2.5 Recentering and the metarepresentational stance:Weber......Page 178
3. Conclusion......Page 183
References......Page 184
7: Token-Reflexive Presuppositions and the De Se......Page 188
1. De Se Thoughts: Two Conflicting Accounts......Page 189
2. States and Contents: the Presuppositional View......Page 195
References......Page 205
1. Introduction: From De Se Attitudes to De Se Speech......Page 209
1.1 The mainstream view and the first person pronoun’scontribution to what is said......Page 210
1.2 The many senses of ‘what is said’......Page 212
1.3 First-person speech as a major challenge to the mainstream view......Page 214
2. The Proposal......Page 217
2.1 Motivating the proposal......Page 218
2.2 The proposal, in some detail......Page 220
3.1 The proposal at work (): the traditional cases......Page 223
3.2 The proposal at work (): the cases of de se speech......Page 224
Acknowledgments......Page 227
References......Page 228
1. Introduction......Page 229
2.1 Discourse representation theory......Page 230
2.2 Mental files, anchors, and attitudes......Page 231
2.3.2 Double vision......Page 233
2.3.3 Faulty perception......Page 235
2.4 A model-theoretic interpretation......Page 236
3. Participant-neutral Interpretation: Updating the Common Ground......Page 239
4. Asymmetric Semantics: Distinguishing Speaker and Hearer......Page 242
4.1 The speaker’s perspective......Page 243
4.2 The hearer’s perspective......Page 244
5. De Se Communication Revisited......Page 245
5.1 Communicating a first person thought......Page 246
5.2 Notes on the second person......Page 248
6. Conclusion......Page 251
References......Page 252
1. Introduction......Page 255
2.1 Belief content and theoretical roles......Page 257
2.2 The argument from self-locating beliefs......Page 259
2.3 Replies......Page 261
2.4 Other arguments......Page 263
3. Centred Belief......Page 264
4.1 Belief reports......Page 267
4.2 Monism......Page 268
4.3 Transmission......Page 270
5.1 Semantic value, assertoric content, conveyed content......Page 271
5.2 The argument from self-locating utterances......Page 272
6. Centred Communication......Page 276
References......Page 278
1. Introduction......Page 281
2. Content and Force......Page 285
3. Relativity to Sequences......Page 286
3.1 Ninan......Page 287
3.2 Torre......Page 292
4.1 Moss......Page 295
4.2 Kölbel......Page 299
5.1 Gibbard......Page 305
5.2 Weber......Page 306
6. A Mini-Sketch of Positive Views......Page 311
Acknowledgments......Page 313
References......Page 314
1. Introduction......Page 316
2.1 A Kaplanian Framework......Page 319
2.2 Three varieties of centering......Page 323
3.1 The hearer challenge......Page 325
3.2 The views on the hearer challenge......Page 326
4. Assertability......Page 331
5. Agreement and Disagreement......Page 334
6. Same-saying and Propositional Anaphora......Page 335
7. Multicentering......Page 337
7.1 Multicentering and the hearer challenge......Page 339
7.2 Multicentering and assertability......Page 341
7.3 Multicentering, disagreement, and same-saying......Page 342
7.4 Multicentering and the common ground......Page 343
8. Beyond Neutralism......Page 345
Acknowledgments......Page 346
References......Page 347
Index......Page 350